Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

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Sergio Ramirez, a former police officer, was terminated by the City of Indio Police Department following an internal affairs investigation. Ramirez was initially placed on administrative leave after being charged with rape and sexual assault, though he was later acquitted of all criminal charges. Despite the acquittal, the internal investigation concluded that Ramirez had violated several departmental policies, leading to his termination. Ramirez appealed the decision through the administrative appeal process outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City and the Indio Police Officers’ Association.The arbitrator, after a full evidentiary hearing, recommended Ramirez's reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. However, the City Manager upheld the termination, citing Ramirez's poor judgment, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. Ramirez then petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County for a writ of mandate, arguing that the City Manager should have deferred to the arbitrator's findings on the weight and credibility of the evidence. The Superior Court denied the petition, affirming the City Manager's decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the MOU clearly vested the City Manager with the final authority to make disciplinary decisions, including the power to reject the arbitrator's advisory findings. The court found that the City Manager had conducted a thorough review of the arbitrator's recommendations and the evidence before making the final decision. The court also concluded that the administrative appeal process provided Ramirez with due process, as it included notice, an opportunity to respond, and a meaningful hearing. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, upholding Ramirez's termination. View "Ramirez v. City of Indio" on Justia Law

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A former employee, Liu, sued her employer, Miniso, alleging various employment-related claims, including sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and wage and hour violations. Liu claimed that she faced severe and pervasive harassment and discrimination based on her sexual orientation and gender identity, and that she was misclassified as an exempt employee, leading to unpaid wages and denied breaks. Liu also alleged that she was retaliated against for refusing to participate in illegal practices and for whistleblowing, which led to her constructive termination.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Miniso's motion to compel arbitration of Liu's claims. Miniso argued that Liu's allegations of sexual harassment were insufficient to state a claim and that the arbitration agreement should be enforced for the non-sexual harassment claims. The trial court found that Liu had adequately stated a claim for sexual harassment and, based on the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), ruled that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for all of Liu's claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that under the EFAA, if a plaintiff's case includes at least one claim of sexual harassment, the entire case is exempt from arbitration at the plaintiff's election. The court emphasized that the EFAA's language invalidates arbitration agreements with respect to the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claims. This interpretation avoids the inefficiency of having separate proceedings for different claims and aligns with the legislative intent to protect plaintiffs from being compelled into arbitration for sexual harassment disputes. View "Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, who are users of Coinbase's cryptocurrency platform, filed a complaint against Coinbase, Inc. alleging violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the California False Advertising Law (FAL), and the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). They sought public injunctive relief, claiming Coinbase misrepresented its security features to the public. Coinbase's user agreement, which plaintiffs accepted, included an arbitration clause. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration, arguing the plaintiffs sought private injunctive relief, which is subject to arbitration.The San Francisco Superior Court denied Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiffs sought public injunctive relief, which is not subject to arbitration under California law. The court noted that the complaint exclusively sought public injunctive relief and did not request any relief that would solely benefit the plaintiffs or existing Coinbase customers. The court also referenced a related federal case, Aggarwal I, where plaintiffs sought individual relief, supporting the conclusion that the current complaint sought public injunctive relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint indeed sought public injunctive relief. The court explained that public injunctive relief under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL is intended to prohibit unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the public, rather than redress individual wrongs. The court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations and requests for relief were aimed at preventing Coinbase from continuing its allegedly deceptive practices, which primarily benefit the public. Consequently, the arbitration provision in Coinbase’s user agreement could not compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims for public injunctive relief. View "Kramer v. Coinbase, Inc." on Justia Law

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Heide Montoya, a former Superintendent of On-Board Services at Amtrak, was discharged in 2020 and later rehired to a different position. Montoya filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination and other state-law claims. The litigation became complicated due to a dispute over arbitration. Amtrak argued that Montoya had agreed to arbitration by continuing to work after receiving an email notice. Montoya denied receiving the arbitration agreement, and the district judge could not resolve the issue due to a lack of definitive evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, held a status hearing where the judge indicated that the evidence was insufficient to determine if an arbitration agreement existed. The judge suggested that the parties confer and possibly provide a joint statement on how to proceed. Instead of following these steps, Amtrak filed a notice of appeal, relying on §16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows interlocutory appeals from orders bypassing arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that §16 of the FAA only applies when the Act as a whole is applicable. Section 1 of the FAA excludes contracts of employment for railroad employees, among others, from its scope. Since Montoya was an Amtrak employee, the case falls outside the FAA. The court referenced similar cases and legal precedents, including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, to support its conclusion. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Amtrak's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the district court still needs to resolve whether Montoya agreed to arbitrate disputes under state law. View "Montoya v. National Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

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A motor vehicle collision occurred in Sussex County, Delaware, involving Joanne Dudsak, a New Jersey resident insured by New Jersey Manufacturers (NJM), and Christopher Koester, a Maryland resident insured by Allstate Insurance Company. NJM paid Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to Dudsak and sought inter-company arbitration in Delaware to recover these costs. Allstate opposed, arguing that NJM's policy, being from New Jersey, did not qualify for arbitration under Delaware law, which requires the vehicle to be registered in Delaware for PIP subrogation rights.The arbitrator ruled in favor of NJM, awarding the full amount and rejecting Allstate's jurisdictional challenge. Allstate then filed a Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award in the Delaware Chancery Court, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. NJM moved to dismiss the petition, claiming the issue was moot because Allstate had agreed to tender its policy limits, which would extinguish NJM's subrogation rights under Delaware law.The Delaware Chancery Court denied NJM's Motion to Dismiss, finding that a real dispute remained. The court then addressed the merits of Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court applied the standard of review under 10 Del. C. §5714(a)(5), which allows vacating an arbitration award if the arbitrated claim was barred by limitation and the objection was raised from the outset. The court found that §2118 of the Delaware PIP statute applies only to vehicles required to be registered in Delaware and does not cover out-of-state policies like NJM's. Consequently, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by accepting jurisdiction over the case. The court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment, vacating the arbitration award. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Eileen Cure, a licensed investment advisor, entered into agreements with LPL Financial LLC (LPL) to act as a registered representative under LPL’s broker-dealer umbrella. These agreements included arbitration provisions. Cure, along with her companies, Cure & Associates, P.C. and Premier Wealth & Retirement Management, LLC, filed claims against LPL after LPL terminated its relationship with Cure, alleging she violated LPL’s policies. Cure’s companies, which were not signatories to the arbitration agreements, also alleged business disparagement and other claims against LPL.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted LPL’s motion to compel arbitration for Cure but denied it for her companies, stating that the companies were not signatories to the arbitration agreements. The court also denied LPL’s request to stay the litigation pending arbitration. LPL appealed, arguing that under California and Texas law, equitable estoppel principles should compel Cure’s companies to arbitrate their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cure’s companies, although nonsignatories, were bound by the arbitration provisions due to equitable estoppel. The court found that the companies received direct benefits from Cure’s agreements with LPL, making them subject to the arbitration clauses. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of LPL’s motion to compel arbitration for the companies and vacated the order denying a stay of the litigation. The case was remanded for the district court to compel arbitration of the companies’ claims and to stay the action pending arbitration. View "Cure & Associates, P.C. v. LPL Financial" on Justia Law

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In 2022, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) by passing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA), which renders arbitration agreements unenforceable at the plaintiff’s election in sexual assault and sexual harassment cases arising on or after March 3, 2022. Jane Doe filed a lawsuit in 2023 against her employer, Second Street Corporation, and two supervisors, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and wage-and-hour violations. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the employee handbook. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the EFAA rendered the arbitration provision unenforceable for all of Doe’s claims and allowed her to file a first amended complaint adding additional claims, including constructive wrongful termination.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that Doe’s sexual harassment claims, which included conduct both before and after the EFAA’s effective date, were exempt from mandatory arbitration. The court also ruled that all of Doe’s other claims were exempt from arbitration under the EFAA because they were part of the same case. Additionally, the court permitted Doe to file a first amended complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that under the EFAA’s plain language, Doe’s sexual harassment claims, which alleged continuing violations both before and after the EFAA’s effective date, were not subject to mandatory arbitration. The court also held that the EFAA invalidates an arbitration clause as to the entire case, not just the claims alleging sexual harassment. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration and did not abuse its discretion by allowing Doe to file a first amended complaint. View "Doe v. Second Street Corp." on Justia Law

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A woman named Lisa was under a conservatorship due to being gravely disabled from a mental disorder. Her father, Scott, was appointed as her conservator and placed her in a skilled nursing facility. Scott signed two optional arbitration agreements with the facility on Lisa's behalf. After Lisa died, her parents sued the facility's owners and operators, alleging various claims including wrongful death. The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on the agreements Scott signed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition to compel arbitration. The court found no evidence that Scott had the authority to bind Lisa to the arbitration agreements for the successor claims. Additionally, the court found that neither Scott nor Lisa's mother, Marilyn, signed the agreements in their individual capacities, thus the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the conservatorship order did not give Scott the authority to sign the arbitration agreements on Lisa's behalf. The court reasoned that the conservatorship order did not explicitly or implicitly authorize Scott to waive Lisa's right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration because Scott did not sign the agreements in his individual capacity, and Marilyn did not sign them at all. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, denying the petition to compel arbitration. View "Enmark v. KC Community Care" on Justia Law

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Joyce Toth purchased a Food Sensitivity Test from Target's website and followed the instructions to create an account on Everlywell's website, where she clicked a checkbox indicating that she had read and accepted the terms and conditions. These terms included an arbitration agreement. Toth later received test results that she found confusing and inaccurate, leading her to file a putative class action against Everlywell, alleging deceptive marketing and misuse of personal medical information.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Everlywell's motion to compel arbitration, holding that Toth had formed a valid "clickwrap" contract by clicking the checkbox. The court found that Everlywell provided reasonable notice of the terms and secured Toth's assent. It also rejected Toth's arguments that the contract lacked consideration, that Everlywell did not provide reasonable notice, and that the contract was illusory or unconscionable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Toth had received reasonable notice of the terms and had meaningfully assented to them by clicking the checkbox. The court also found that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable, noting that the User Agreement incorporated the AAA rules, which delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Toth's arguments regarding the unilateral-modification clauses and the alleged unconscionability of the arbitration agreement were deemed insufficient to invalidate the delegation provision. Thus, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and Toth's claims must be resolved through arbitration. View "Toth v. Everly Well, Inc." on Justia Law

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A former employee, Campbell, filed a putative class action lawsuit against her employer, Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC, alleging wage and hour violations. Campbell claimed that employees were not paid proper overtime, were required to work through meal and rest breaks without compensation, were not paid minimum wage, and were not paid in a timely manner. Sunshine initially proceeded with litigation and agreed to participate in mediation. However, Sunshine later claimed to have discovered an arbitration agreement signed by Campbell, which included a class action waiver.The Superior Court of Orange County found that Sunshine had waived its right to compel arbitration. Despite allegedly discovering the arbitration agreement in November 2022, Sunshine continued to engage in mediation discussions and did not inform Campbell or the court of its intent to compel arbitration until March 2023. Sunshine's delay and conduct were deemed inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, leading the court to conclude that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found clear and convincing evidence that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration. The court noted that Sunshine's actions, including agreeing to mediation on a class-wide basis and delaying the motion to compel arbitration, were inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The court emphasized that Sunshine's conduct demonstrated an intentional abandonment of the right to arbitrate, thus affirming the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health" on Justia Law