William Carroll, M.D., Loring Rue, M.D., and Gustavo Heudebert, M.D. (collectively, defendants), appealed a circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of claims asserted against them by Paul F. Castellanos, M.D. Dr. Castellanos alleged that he was an "internationally recognized" physician with a specialty practice as a "laryngologist and bronchoesophagologist (airway surgeon)" who was "recruited to come to the University of Alabama at Birmingham in 2005 to establish a center of excellence for the treatment of voice and aero digestive disorders at University of Alabama, Birmingham Academic and Medical Center" ("UAB Medical Center"). University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C. ("UAHSF") and Dr. Castellanos executed a "Physician Employment Contract" describing the details of his employment, which contained an arbitration provision. The questions whether the individual defendants, as nonsignatories to the employment contract, could enforce the arbitration provision in that contract and whether the arbitration provision encompassed Dr. Castellanos's claims against the individual defendants were questions for the arbitrator, not the court, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the employment contract. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in denying the individual defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carroll v. Castellanos" on Justia Law

In this construction dispute, the Court of Chancery granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award for failure to state a claim and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his authority or act in manifest disregard of the law when he awarded Defendant damages.In their first claim, Plaintiffs argued that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the provisions in the contract between the parties regarding the total cost of the construction project evidences a manifest disregard for the law. In their second claim, Plaintiffs argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and acted in manifest disregard of the law when he issued an award for fees and expenses to Defendant. The Court of Chancery disagreed, holding that the arbitrator did not act in manifest disregard of the law in either respect. View "Stempien v. Marnie Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint to vacate or modify an arbitration award for failure to state a claim, holding that there was no reasonably conceivable evident material miscalculation or evident material mistake in the arbitrator’s report.In 2017, Plaintiff and Company entered into a Securities Purchase Agreement. In 2018, under the dispute resolution provision of the agreement, Plaintiff and the Company engaged in mandatory, binding arbitration regarding the Company’s total accounts receivable reserve (the Total AR Reserve). The arbitrator issued a report determining the Total AR Reserve was $661,165. Plaintiff then filed a complaint to vacate or modify the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator made an evident material miscalculation or evident material mistake in his determination of the Total AR Reserve. The Court of Chancery disagreed and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "CLP Toxicology, Inc. v. Casla Bio Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court’s review was who had the power to determine the location of an arbitration proceeding: an arbitrator or Circuit Court. The Court concluded that, under the facts of this case, the arbitrator had that power; thus, reversed and remanded. View "Alliance Investment Company, LLC v. Omni Construction Company, Inc., a/k/a OCC, Inc" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss this putative class action in favor of arbitration of Plaintiff’s claim in his individual capacity after concluding that the parties had a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate, holding that the arbitration clause was enforceable because it was conscionable under Massachusetts law.Plaintiff drove for Lyft, Inc., the defendant. Plaintiff tapped “I accept” on his iPhone when presented with Lyft’s terms of service agreement, which contained a provision requiring that disputes between the parties be resolved by arbitration. In this putative class action Plaintiff alleged that Lyft misclassified its Massachusetts drivers as independent contractors under the Massachusetts Wage Act. Left removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss in favor of individual arbitration. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived his contract-formation argument; and (2) the arbitration clause was not substantively unconscionable and was thus enforceable. View "Bekele v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case arising from a dispute arising from the parties’ lease agreement, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court denying Defendant’s motion to stay litigation in favor of arbitration, holding that the parties failed to resolve their dispute through amicable mutual discussions pursuant to an arbitration clause in their agreement, and therefore, their dispute was ripe for arbitration.Plaintiffs leased from Defendant a parcel of land for the purposing of building and maintaining a building. Construction was never commenced, and Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant restore the property to its former condition. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendant was in breach of the lease. Defendant moved for a stay of litigation, arguing that the arbitration clause in the lease required that all disputes be resolved by arbitration. The hearing justice denied the motion, concluding that the lease’s arbitration clause applied only to disputes that did not involve an alleged breach of the lease. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the language of the agreement provided that alleged breaches of the lease were to be arbitrated provided that the parties attempted and failed to resolve those disputes through mutual discussions; and (2) because the parties attempted conciliation, their dispute was ripe for arbitration. View "Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education v. Hellenic Society Paideia - Rhode Island Chapter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff engaged Pinel to sell his Danville home in 2008. In 2015 he filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of California residents who, in 2004-2011, used Pinel to buy or sell a home in California and had utilized TransactionPoint, Fidelity's real estate software program, alleging Pinel had entered into unlawful sublicensing agreements with Fidelity subsidiaries, allowing those entities to contract their settlement services to Pinel clients using TransactionPoint, and the Fidelity defendants paid unlawful sublicensing fees to Pinel for the TransactionPoint-generated business. The defendants cited the arbitration clause in plaintiff’s listing agreement, which contained a notice provision required by Code of Civil Procedure 1298(c) with spaces for the client’s and broker’s initials. Pinel produced a copy of plaintiff's listing agreement. The 1298(c) notice on the copy showed plaintiff’s initials; the space for Pinel’s initials was blank. Pinel submitted a declaration that the original listing agreement was destroyed in accordance with Pinel’s normal document retention policy; that the copy was obtained from the listing agent; that it was Pinel’s policy to allow a client to elect whether to assent to the arbitration provision by initialing paragraph 19B; that Pinel “would as a matter of policy and custom and practice adopt the election of the client and initial Paragraph 19B.” The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Pinel’s motion. Pinel failed to establish that it had initialed the arbitration provision. The language of that provision contemplated mutual agreement and that each would indicate assent by initialing the provision. View "Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc." on Justia Law

Economy Linen and Towel Service faced a shortfall of qualified truck drivers and subcontracted with another firm to provide the necessary drivers. The union filed a grievance on the ground that the new drivers earned a higher hourly rate than the union-represented employees. An arbitrator ruled for the union. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that in reviewing arbitration awards, courts do not ask whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract correctly; “the parties bargained for an arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract, not a federal judge’s interpretation of it.” The court noted that this situation did not involve any allegations of fraud and that the arbitrator did not decide any issue outside of his authority but only determined which contractual provision controlled. View "Economy Linen & Towel Service, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Tri Marine in Washington state court, seeking to recover additional expenses for a knee injury he experienced as a deck hand on one of Tri Marine's vessels. Tri Marine then removed the case to federal court and moved to confirm an order issued by an arbitrator in the Philippines as a foreign arbitral award. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand, confirmed the order, and dismissed the action.The Ninth Circuit held that the parties' free-floating settlement agreement and order did not transform into an arbitral award simply because the parties convened with an arbitrator. The panel evaluated the award by looking to its essence and found several unique aspects of these proceedings that lead it to concluded that the order was not an arbitral award. In this case, there was no outstanding dispute to arbitrate by the time plaintiff and Tri Marine sat down with the arbitrator as the parties had already reached a settlement; the purported arbitration in no way followed the parties' prior agreements to arbitrate; and the procedure here deviated completely from typical Philippine procedures. The panel reversed in part and vacated in part, remanding for the district court to assess jurisdiction under the Convention Act and venue, as well as any defenses. View "Castro v. Tri Marine Fish Co." on Justia Law

Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc., doing business as Pacific Sotheby's International Realty (Sotheby's), David Schroedl, and David Schroedl & Associates (DSA) (collectively, Defendants) successfully moved for summary judgment against Daniel Ryan and Patricia Ryan, individually and as trustees of the Ryan Family Trust Dated August 25, 2006 (the Ryans). This matter arose over the sale of the Ryans' house in La Jolla. During an open house hosted by Schroedl, the Ryans' next door neighbor, Hany Girgis, informed Schroedl that he intended to remodel his home, which would permanently obstruct the Property's westerly ocean view. Ney and Luciana Marinho (the Marinhos) purchased the Property for $3.86 million. Defendants received $96,5000 at the close of escrow as their commission for the sale. At no time prior or during escrow, in the real estate disclosures, or in conversation, did Defendants disclose Girgis's extensive remodeling plans or their impact on the westerly ocean view and privacy of the Property. After learning this information, the Marinhos immediately attempted to rescind the real estate sales contract for several reasons, including the magnitude and scope of the Girgis remodel, the proximity of the new structure to the property line, the loss of privacy, the elimination of any possibility of a westerly ocean view, and a potential two-year construction project. The Ryans, based in part on Defendants' advice, refused to rescind the purchase real estate sales contract. The Marinhos then demanded arbitration per the terms of the real estate sales contract and sought rescission of the contract or, in the alternative, damages. The Marinhos alleged Defendants knew about Girgis's construction plans and failed to disclose this information. The Ryans sued Defendants for negligence. The crux of Defendants' argument was that the Ryans could not establish the existence of any cause of action without an expert witness. Because the Ryans did not designate an expert witness, Defendants argued summary judgment was warranted. The superior court agreed, granting Defendants' motion. The Ryans appealed the judgment following Defendants' successful motion, contending they did not need an expert witness to establish the elements of their causes of action against Defendants. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "Ryan v. Real Estate of the Pacific" on Justia Law