In an action arising out of a fee dispute between a law firm and two clients, the action was removed to federal court and then the unpaid-fees claims proceeded to arbitration. The district court granted the firm relief from the stay and issued an order dividing the counterclaims into two categories: those the clients could raise in arbitration and those they could not.Determining that it had jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that the clients' counterclaims were within the scope of what the parties agreed to arbitrate and the counterclaims seeking something else -- like money from the firm -- were not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, with one exception. The court held that the district court should not have decided that the clients terminated the relationship, because the arbitrator should decide the issue. View "Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's vacatur of the arbitration award plaintiff received against his insurer, Great American, for wrongfully denying his claim for damage to his corn crop. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings, holding that vacatur of the arbitration award was improper because the arbitrators rendered a sufficiently mutual, final, and definite award. The court held that the arbitration panel's failure to break down the award by county did not mean that it was so imperfectly executed such that it rendered no mutual, final, and definite award. The court also found that the panel's written explanation for the award amount was adequate. View "Great American Insurance Co. v. Russell" on Justia Law

After EDI assigned plaintiffs to pack produce for San Miguel Produce, plaintiffs filed suit against San Miguel for labor law violations. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of EDI and San Miguel's joint motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration was mandated. The court held that EDI and San Miguel were co-employers with an identity of interests and mutual responsibility for complying with state law governing employers in the produce packing industry, and it was inconsequential that plaintiffs chose not to name EDI as a defendant. In this case, plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising from their employment and, at all relevant times, EDI was plaintiffs' employer. The court remanded with directions to stay the court proceedings and to order the parties to arbitrate their dispute. View "Vasquez v. San Miguel Produce, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that (1) an attorney does not have standing to petition to compel arbitration of his clients' claims; (2) a signatory to an arbitration agreement can compel a nonsignatory parent company of a signatory subsidiary on an agency theory where (a) the parent controlled the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary was a mere agent or instrumentality of the parent and (b) the claims against the parent arose out of the agency relationship; (3) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by substituting the attorney's clients as the real parties in interest in the arbitration; and (4) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by denying attorneys' fees to a party that prevailed in the arbitration. Therefore, the court agreed with the reasoning in Safari Associates v. Superior Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1400, and declined to follow DiMarco v. Chaney (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1809 .Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with directions for the trial court to enter new orders on the petition to compel arbitration and the cross-petitions to vacate and to correct the award. The court also reversed the trial court's order denying attorneys' fees in the postarbitration proceedings. View "Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision vacating an arbitration award to Aspic, in an action seeking to resolve how much money ECC owed Aspic after ECC terminated for convenience two subcontracts it had awarded to Aspic. The panel held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and failed to draw the essence of the award from the subcontracts. In this case, the arbitrator did not base his conclusion upon Aspic and ECC's actual past procedures, but upon his rationalization that to enforce the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clauses on Aspic would be unjust. The panel held that the award disregarded specific provisions of the plain text in an effort to prevent what the arbitrator deemed an unfair result, and therefore such an award was irrational. View "Aspic Engineering and Construction Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying SPAR Group, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in this case brought by Paradise Hogan against SPAR Business Services, Inc. (SBS) and SPAR, holding that SPAR could not compel Hogan to arbitrate because SPAR was not a party to the agreement containing the arbitration clause.SPAR, a retail services provider, obtained the majority of its personnel from SBS, a staffing company. After SBS engaged Hogan as an independent contractor and assigned him to perform services for SPAR, Hogan and SBS entered into an independent contractor master agreement that contained an arbitration clause. Hogan later sued SBS and SPAR, and both defendants sought to compel arbitration. The district court compelled arbitration as to Hogan’s claims against SBS but denied the motion to compel arbitration as to SPAR. SPAR appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no legal basis to compel Hogan to arbitration where the clear terms of the agreement showed that Hogan did not consent to arbitrate his claims against SPAR. View "Hogan v. SPAR Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held that an asset purchase agreement between the parties in this case required the parties to arbitrate their dispute over the net working capital of the assets that Defendant brought from Plaintiff, thus granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.Before the Court, Defendant argued that the parties agreed to an expert determination of certain narrow disputes but not to binding arbitration. The Court of Chancery disagreed, holding (1) the contract language was unambiguous and manifested an intent to require the parties to arbitrate their disputes; and (2) there was no basis to rule that a failure to include arbitration rules in an arbitration clause invalidates the arbitration clause or changes the distinction between procedural and substantive arbitrability. View "Agiliance, Inc. v. Resolver SOAR, LLC" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court previously unanimously held that KPMG, LLP could not enforce arbitration agreements attached to five annual engagement letters with Singing River Health System (Singing River), a community hospital, because the terms and condition of the letters were not sufficiently spread upon the hospital board’s minutes to create an enforceable contract. In this appeal, KPMG sought to enforce the very same arbitration agreements attached to the very same engagement letters with Singing River - this time against Jackson County, Mississippi, which acted as Singing River’s bond guarantor. For the same reason the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration in KPMG, LLP v. Singing River Health System, the Court reversed and remanded the trial court’s grant of KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration in this case. View "Jackson County, Mississippi v. KPMG, LLP" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court finding that an arbitration agreement between the parties in this case was enforceable, granting AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc.’s (AT&T) motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Nereida Rivera-Colon’s (Rivera) suit, holding that Rivera manifested her intent to accept the agreement to arbitrate legal grievances as per Puerto Rico law.Rivera filed suit against AT&T, her former employer, alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination. AT&T entered a special appearance and moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. In response, Rivera argued that there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under Puerto Rico law, Rivera was bound by the arbitration agreement because she failed to opt out of the agreement. View "Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Amanda Kernahan purchased a “home service agreement” from defendants Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., and Choice Home Warranty. When she became dissatisfied, she filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking statutory and common law relief. Plaintiff claimed that the agreement misrepresented its length of coverage and that the deceptively labelled “MEDIATION” section of the agreement failed to inform her that she was waiving her right to a jury trial and would be deterred from seeking the additional remedies of treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice in favor of arbitration, citing the "mediation" provision. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable. The court found the provision both ambiguous and noncompliant with Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), “in either its form or its function.” The court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration, rejecting defendants’ argument that language stating that all claims will be resolved “exclusively” by arbitration would or should have adequately informed plaintiff that she is waiving her right to proceed in court, as opposed to use of other available dispute resolution processes. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint, and the New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc." on Justia Law