This appeal stemmed from the parties' dispute over Lone Star's proposed adjustments to a Revenue Calculation that provided payment to Sunbelt. The arbitrator agreed with Lone Star's upward judgment to the revenue attributable to its former customers, but reformed the contract after concluding that the parties had made a mutual mistake when their agreement listed the revenue target for the former Lone Star clients.The court affirmed and remanded for reconsideration of the mutual mistake claim. The court held that, because the parties did not agree in either the asset purchase agreement or the engagement letter to have the arbitrator decide reformation, the court must decide the issue. View "Hebbronville Lone Star Rentals, LLC v. Sunbelt Rentals Industrial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration award and granting a petition to confirm it. In this case, the arbitrator did not comply with several applicable disclosure requirements, which gave rise to multiple grounds for disqualification. The court held that the arbitrator was actually aware of at least one of the grounds for disqualification, and thus the resulting arbitration award was subject to vacatur. The court held that, by not disclosing the four pending arbitration with counsel for Chase, the arbitrator violated the continuing disclosure duties under Ethics standard 7(d). View "Honeycutt v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Andromeda and Internaves entered into a shipping contract that unambiguously required the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. At issue on appeal was where the parties agreed to arbitrate. The district court was unable to determine the site of arbitration and resorted to the statutory default forum, compelling arbitration in its own district. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration in London under English law. The court held that the parties' intention to arbitrate in London was discernible from the very terms they wrote into the contract and thus the parties provided for the forum, which the district court was obliged to recognize and uphold. View "Internaves de Mexico S.A. de C.V. v. Andromeda Steamship Corp." on Justia Law

At issue was whether a court may vacate an arbitrator’s decision for manifest disregard of applicable law even though such a ground is not listed in Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-224(b).Petitioners sought to vacate the arbitration award in this case, arguing that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded well-established Maryland law. The circuit court dismissed the petition but denied Respondents’ request for attorney’s fees. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s award did not demonstrate manifest disregard of applicable law and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees.Specifically, the Court held (1) the General Assembly did not preempt the common-law ground of manifest disregard of the law when it enacted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act; (2) because the arbitrator did not make a palpable mistake of law or fact appearing on the face of the award, the lower courts correctly concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not demonstrate a manifest disregard; and (3) the circuit court did not err in declining to award attorney’s fees to Respondent. View "WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Associates" on Justia Law

Current and former employees of the University of Southern California may not be compelled to arbitrate their collective claims for breach of fiduciary responsibility against USC in an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of USC's motion to compel arbitration of claims for breach of fiduciary duty in the administration of two ERISA plans. The panel held that the district court properly denied USC's motion to compel arbitration where the claims asserted on behalf of the Plans in this case fell outside the scope of the arbitration clauses in individual employees' general employment contracts. View "Munro v. University of Southern California" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted TKM's, the intervenor plaintiff, motion for panel rehearing and denied the motion for rehearing en banc. The court withdrew the prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.Daewoo filed suit against AMT, seeking an order compelling AMT to arbitrate and an attachment of pig iron owned by AMT. TKM attached the same pig iron in Louisiana state court and then intervened in the federal suit. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, because Daewoo's suit related to a covered arbitration agreement. In this case, the parties dispute whether Louisiana's non-resident attachment statute allowed for attachment in aid of arbitration. The court declined to adopt a categorical approach to this issue and held that, because Louisiana law allowed for attachment in aid of yet-to-be-brought actions, non-resident attachment may be available in aid of arbitration when an eventual confirmation suit was contemplated. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, nonetheless, because Daewoo did not strictly comply with the attachment statute's procedural requirements. View "Stemcor USA Inc. v. Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration panel's award against Argentina. The panel held that Argentina was liable to AWG for breach of a contract for the country's water services. Argentina argued that a member of the arbitration panel had, with a connection to two of the parties to the proceeding, shown "evident partiality" under 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), and that the way the panel reached its determination exceeded its authority under section 10(a)(4). The court held that the interests at issue were trivial and could not have created evident partiality. Therefore, the court found no basis to vacate the panel's award under section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court also held that Argentina failed to show that the panel's decision had no basis in the governing arbitration agreement. Likewise, the court could not vacate the award under the New York Convention. View "Republic of Argentina v. AWG Group Ltd." on Justia Law

When Charlotte Fischer moved into a nursing home, she received an admissions packet full of forms. Among them was an agreement that compelled arbitration of certain legal disputes. The Health Care Availability Act (“HCAA” or “Act”) required such agreements contain a four-paragraph notice in a certain font size and in bold-faced type. Charlotte’s agreement included the required language in a statutorily permissible font size, but it was not printed in bold. Charlotte’s daughter signed the agreement on Charlotte’s behalf. After Charlotte died, her family initiated a wrongful death action against the health care facility in court. Citing the agreement, the health care facility moved to compel arbitration out of court. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, determining the arbitration agreement was void because it did not strictly comply with the HCAA. At issue was whether the Act required strict or substantial compliance. The Colorado Supreme Court held "substantial:" the agreement at issue her substantially complied with the formatting requirements of the law, notwithstanding the lack of bold type. View "Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer" on Justia Law

The trustee for the Laudine L. Ploetz, 1985 Trust filed suit against Morgan Stanley, alleging that it had transferred funds from the account without authorization. The trustee later moved the district court to vacate the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) after she learned that the chairperson of the arbitration panel had undisclosed service in a case years earlier involving Morgan Stanley.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the trustee's motion to vacate the arbitration, holding that the trustee did not warrant relief from the award under any of the court's evident-partiality standards since she did not explain how the chairperson's undisclosed mediation of the previous case created even an impression of possible bias. The court held that the mere fact that non-disclosure of the past service violated FINRA rules governing arbitration did not provide the district court with any basis to conclude he was evidently partial. Furthermore, arbitrator misbehavior that results only in the violation of a party's rights under FINRA rules was not significant enough to merit relief under 9 U.S.C. Sec. 10(a)(3) unless the party was deprived of a fair hearing. View "Ploetz v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC" on Justia Law

Phillip Moore, Gloria Moore, and Katelyn Moore sued Olshan Foundation Repair of Jackson, LLC (Olshan), and Wayne Brown. Olshan and Brown sought to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision within a contract between Phillip Moore and Olshan for the repair of the foundation of the Moores’ home. The circuit court ordered Phillip and Gloria Moore to arbitrate their claims. But because the circuit court declined to order Katelyn Moore to the arbitral forum, Olshan and Brown appealed. Finding that Katelyn Moore was neither a third-party beneficiary to the foundation-repair contract nor was she bound by direct-benefit estoppel, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Katelyn Moore’s claims, including negligence and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, were wholly independent of the terms of the contract to which she was not a party. As such, Olshan was not allowed to enforce an arbitration clause respecting Katelyn Moore’s claims, which were unrelated to the contract. View "Olshan Foundation Repair Company of Jackson, LLC v. Moore" on Justia Law