Plaintiffs Andrew Alwert and Stanley Feldman brought putative class actions against Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox) claiming that Cox violated antitrust law by tying its premium cable service to rental of a set-top box. The district court granted Cox’s motions to compel arbitration, then certified the orders compelling arbitration for interlocutory appeal. The Tenth Circuit granted Plaintiffs permission to appeal. They argued that the arbitration order was improper because: (1) the dispute was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement; (2) Cox waived its right to invoke arbitration; and (3) Cox’s promise to arbitrate was illusory, so the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause in Plaintiffs’ subscriber agreements with Cox covered the underlying litigation and that Cox did not waive its right to arbitration. The Court did not resolve Plaintiffs’ argument that Cox’s promises were illusory because the argument amounted to a challenge to the contract as a whole, which was a question to be decided in arbitration. View "Alwert v. Cox Enterprises" on Justia Law

Dayton Public Schools notified Cox of its intent to terminate her employment for allegedly striking a student. An arbitration award, finding just cause for her termination, was handed down on December 10, 2013. The arbitrator e-mailed the decision to the School District attorneys on December 10, but Cox was not included as a recipient of the e-mail. On December 18, 2013, the Board of Education passed a formal resolution adopting the arbitrator’s decision and directed that Cox be served with the order by certified mail. On March 10, 2014, Cox moved to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award. The School District argued that notice of a petition seeking the vacation or modification of an arbitration award pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711 must be received by the adverse party or its attorney within the statutory three-month period contained in R.C. 2711.13. The trial court dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed; the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The three-month period for service of Cox’s motion began on December 11, 2013. On the same numerical day three months later, Cox sent notice of her motion by certified mail. Service was complete at the time of mailing and was timely. View "Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Multiple plaintiffs filed different class actions against 23andMe relating to the company’s health claims. 23andMe, a direct-to-consumer provider of genetic testing service, claimed that its service could be used to help customers manage health risks, as well as prevent or mitigate diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, and breast cancer. The district court granted 23andMe's motion to compel all plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. After reviewing the mandatory arbitration provision in the Terms of Service, the district court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue was enforceable. The court concluded that under principles established by recent California Supreme Court decisions, California’s common law rule of unconscionability does not provide a basis to revoke the arbitration agreement in the Terms of Service. In this case, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating the substantive unconscionability of the bilateral prevailing party clause; that the forum selection clause is unconscionable; that the intellectual property exemption is unconscionable under current California law; and that the unilateral modification provision renders the arbitration clause, set forth in a separate provision, unconscionable. Therefore, the arbitration agreement is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, worked as the lead trumpeter on a passenger Royal Caribbean cruise ship. The ship is a Bahamian flagged vessel with a home port in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Royal Caribbean, the operator of the vessel, is a Liberian corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. After plaintiff became ill while working for Royal Caribbean, he filed suit alleging unseaworthiness, negligence, negligence under the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and seaman’s wages and penalties. Royal Caribbean moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion. This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether a seaman’s work in international waters on a cruise ship that calls on foreign ports constitutes “performance . . . abroad” under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 202. The Convention makes enforceable an arbitration agreement between United States citizens if their contractual relationship “envisages performance . . . abroad.” The court affirmed the order compelling arbitration of the dispute because a seaman works abroad when traveling in international waters to or from a foreign state. View "Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

Grievant, a state employee and a member of a Union, was terminated after he was caught smoking marijuana. The Union contested Grievant’s termination. Concluding that complete termination of Grievant’s conduct was not the only appropriate penalty for his misconduct, an arbitrator reinstated Grievant to his employment and imposed a number of sanctions and conditions short of termination. The trial court vacated the award, concluding that there was a well-defined public policy against the use of marijuana and that the arbitrator’s award violated that policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that reinstatement of the Grievant violated public policy. View "State v. Conn. Employees Union Indep." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging causes of action for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At issue is whether an arbitration in her employee handbook is legally enforceable. In this case, the employee handbook containing the arbitration provision included a welcome letter as the first page, which stated, “[T]his handbook is not intended to be a contract (express or implied), nor is it intended to otherwise create any legally enforceable obligations on the part of the Company or its employees.” Plaintiff signed a form acknowledging she had received the handbook, which mentioned the arbitration provision as one of the “policies, practices, and procedures” of the company. The acknowledgement form did not state that plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision, and expressly recognized that she had not read the handbook at the time she signed the form. The court found, under these circumstances, that the arbitration provision in the employee handbook did not create an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the employer's petition to compel arbitration. View "Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc." on Justia Law

The Goldmans, proceeding before an arbitration panel operating under the auspices of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleged that their financial advisor and Citigroup had violated federal securities law in their management of the Goldmans’ brokerage accounts. The district court dismissed their motion to vacate an adverse award for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating the Goldmans’ motion failed to raise a substantial federal question. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nothing about the Goldmans’ case is likely to affect the securities markets broadly. That the allegedly-misbehaving arbitration panel happened to be affiliated with a self-regulatory organization does not meaningfully distinguish this case from any other suit alleging arbitrator partiality in a securities dispute. The court noted “the flood of cases that would enter federal courts if the involvement of a self-regulatory organization were itself sufficient to support jurisdiction.” View "Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Verizon, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Iowa Debt Collection Practices Act, Iowa Code 537.7103 (2014), arising out of a billing dispute. Verizon moved to compel arbitration and plaintiffs filed a response consenting to arbitration. Before the court ruled on Verizon's motion to compel arbitration, plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement. When the parties were unable to agree on a written settlement agreement, each filed a motion to enforce its version of the settlement. The court concluded that the district court did not err in deciding there was no binding pre-arbitration settlement; the district court did not clearly err in finding no enforceable settlement; and plaintiff Shultz had agreed to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to amend or correct the judgment. View "Schultz v. Verizon Wireless" on Justia Law

Kurtrina Smith and Rickey Levins separately initiated actions against defendants the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. ("the AME Church"); James L. Davis, bishop and presiding officer of the AME Church's Ninth Episcopal District (collectively, "the Ninth District"); and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln National") after Lincoln National denied their respective claims for benefits filed pursuant to a group life-insurance policy Davis had purchased from Lincoln National on behalf of the Ninth District. Smith and Levins alleged the group policy provided coverage for Smith's mother and Levins's father. The defendants moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions that were allegedly part of the group policy and certificates. The trial court denied those motions, and defendants appealed. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for arbitration proceedings. View "African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Levins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law