The parties were litigating a dispute involving an estate and family trusts when a family corporation filed for bankruptcy. The parties signed an agreement with a provision stating that they would attempt to settle any disputes by mediation and, if unsuccessful, by binding arbitration. The bankruptcy court’s order approving the settlement contained a permanent injunction prohibiting the parties from suing each other “on subjects pertaining to the subject matter of this litigation” without first obtaining its permission to do so. Later, that court denied Leonard permission to file suit and ordered the parties to comply with the agreement. The parties signed an arbitration agreement and “agreed to a resolution through arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Texas General Arbitration Act.” Leonard subsequently filed a Complaint in Arbitration, alleging fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duties. After a hearing, the arbitrator dismissed most of the claims, stating that his ruling was based both on the statute of limitations and lack of standing Other parties sought to confirm the arbitration award; Leonard moved to vacate, alleging the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Manifest disregard is not a ground for vacatur under the Act. The court of appeals held, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, that the TAA’s enumerated vacatur grounds (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 171.087) are exclusive. View "Hoskins v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

North Memorial and MNA, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), referred a grievance to arbitration. The district court subsequently granted in part MNA's motion to vacate the arbitral award. The arbitrator addressed whether North Memorial violated the CBA when it refused to regularly schedule the Grievant with no weekend work. The district court imposed a prospective remedy on the parties. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded the arbitrator was without authority to issue a prospective remedy because his decision exceeded the scope of the submission presented to him by the parties. Reading the plain language of the issue as set out in the decision, the court did not believe that the arbitrator was even arguably acting within the scope of his authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minnesota Nurses Association.v. North Memorial Health Care" on Justia Law

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 21 U.S.T. 2517, requires signatory states to recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” In this appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression for the Circuit: whether a cruise ship employee who is injured on the job, and whose employment contract contains an arbitration agreement governed by the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 201, can bar arbitration by showing that high costs may prevent him from effectively vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. The court concluded that it need not definitely answer this question because, even if the court were to assume that plaintiff could raise a cost-based (public policy) defense in response to NCL's motion to compel arbitration, on this record he has plainly failed to establish that the costs of arbitration would preclude him from arbitrating his federal statutory claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate. However, the court denied defendant's motion for sanctions. View "Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Yosemite, in state court for breach of contract and wrongful termination. After removal to federal court, and eight months after plaintiff filed his complaint, Yosemite moved to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Yosemite's motion to arbitrate because Yosemite had waived its right to arbitration. In this case, although Yosemite knew of its existing right to arbitration, it acted inconsistently with this right by proceeding in court for more than eight months before asserting that right. Yosemite invoked the litigation machinery by removing the case to federal court, filing an answer, participating in a pretrial hearing, filing a scheduling report which recommended a trial date and discovery deadlines, and filing a motion to transfer venue. Yosemite also failed to do all it could reasonably have been expected to do to raise its right at the earliest feasible time. Finally, Yosemite's actions caused plaintiff prejudice. View "Messina v. North Central Distrib." on Justia Law

Central States is multiemployer pension fund. Bulk Transport is a Fund member and made contributions to the pension account of its employee, Loniewski. Bulk had certified that Loniewski was entitled by a collective bargaining agreement to participate in the Fund although the agreement was limited to Bulk’s drivers. Loniewski was a Bulk mechanic for 40 years. Bulk now denies that he was covered and has demanded that Central States refund $49,000 that Bulk had contributed to Loniewski’s pension account between 2002 and 2012. The Fund denied the request and sought a declaratory judgment. The district judge rejected Bulk’s claim. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 amends ERISA by imposing liabilty on employers who withdraw, partially or completely, from participation in an underfunded multiemployer pension fund, 29 U.S.C. 1381. Central States also assessed Bulk with withdrawal liability of $740,000 for the years 2010 through 2012, which Bulk challenged as excessive. At Bulk’s request, the court barred the Fund from enforcing its rules, which require arbitration of such a dispute by and conforming to the procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the refund, but reversed with respect to the arbitration rules. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Pension Funds v. Bulk Transp. Corp." on Justia Law

The NFL suspended New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady for four games because of his involvement in a scheme to deflate footballs during the 2015 AFC Championship Game. After Brady requested arbitration, League Commissioner Roger Goodell, who served as arbitrator, entered an award confirming the discipline. The district court vacated the award based on the reasoning that Brady lacked notice that his conduct was prohibited and punishable by suspension, and that the manner in which the proceedings were conducted deprived him of fundamental fairness. The court concluded that the Commissioner properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy between the League and a player. In their collective bargaining agreement, the players and the League mutually decided many years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule violations, should impose appropriate sanctions, and may preside at arbitration challenging his discipline. In this case, the court concluded that Brady received adequate notice that deflation of footballs could lead to suspension, the Commissioner's decision to exclude testimony from NFL General Counsel fits within his broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and raises no questions of fundamental fairness, and there is no fundamental unfairness in the Commissioner's denial of notes and memoranda generated by the investigative team where the collective bargaining agreement does not require the exchange of such notes. The court concluded that the Association's remaining claims are without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass'n" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against defendants for wrongful termination and whistleblower retaliation, defendants petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to plaintiff's employment agreement and associated documents. The trial court denied the petition. The court concluded that the trial court erroneously excluded a supplemental declaration as untimely. Because defendants were not required to establish the authenticity of plaintiff's signature on the Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) until challenged by plaintiff in his opposition, they were not required to file the supplemental declaration pursuant to the deadline set by Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b) for a party’s moving papers. The court also concluded that the declaration established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Espejo v. So. CA Permanente Med. Group" on Justia Law

Prince George’s County terminated the employment of Marlon Ford, a member of the County Police Civilian Employees Association, after a criminal investigation during which Ford was questioned regarding alleged crimes. The Association filed a grievance on Ford’s behalf. An arbitrator vacated the termination of Ford’s employment, determining that the County had violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the County and the Association because officers of the county police department failed to advise Ford of his right to have a representative from the Association present during the criminal investigative interview. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) under the County’s code, the County lacked the authority to enter into a CBA that requires a Weingarten advisement before a criminal investigative interview of one of the County’s police civilian employees; and (2) therefore, the arbitrator the arbitrator exceeded his authority by basing the arbitration award on the determination that the County violated the CBA because its police officers failed to make a Weingarten advisement. View "Police Civ. Empl. Ass'n. v. Prince George's Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a collective action against J&G under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., alleging that J&G failed to pay its truck drivers for overtime work. J&G waived its contractual right to compel arbitration by participating in the litigation, but when plaintiff amended his complaint to add state law claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit, J&G moved to compel arbitration as to those new claims. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that J&G’s waiver through litigation of the right to arbitrate plaintiff’s FLSA claim does not extend to the state law claims that were pleaded for the first time after J&G had litigated to the point of waiver the FLSA claim. Finding a Seventh Circuit case instructive, Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., the court concluded that J&G did not waive the right to arbitrate the state law claims raised in the second amended complaint because those claims were not in the case when it waived by litigation the right to arbitrate the FLSA claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Collado v. J. & G. Transport, Inc." on Justia Law