Polar Tank discharged a maintenance technician for failing to safely complete repair of an overhead crane. The Union grieved the discharge and the grievance was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator partially upheld the grievance, reducing the technician's discipline to a thirty-day unpaid suspension. Polar Tank sued to vacate the arbitration award and the Union counterclaimed to enforce it. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment enforcing the award where the award at issue drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator considered the technician's poor performance and concluded that it constituted negligence but not the type of insubordination for which Article 29 mandated discharge; the court rejected Polar Tank's claim that the arbitrator was wrong to disregard the Standards of Conduct; and the arbitrator did not err in disregarding the Management Rights clause.View "PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

CEATS filed a patent infringement suit against airlines and ticket agencies. After the parties failed to reach a settlement during court ordered mediation, a jury found that CEATS’s patents were infringed, but invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of invalidity. While its first appeal was pending, CEATS filed sought relief from the judgment under FRCP 60(b) based on an alleged relationship between the court-appointed mediator and the law firm representing most of the accused infringers. The alleged relationship was brought to light in the unrelated Karlseng litigation. The district court denied CEATS’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that it disagreed with the district court’s finding that the mediator had no duty to disclose his dealings with one of the firms involved in the litigation, but that the three “Liljeberg factors” did not establish that this case presents an “extraordinary circumstance” where relief from judgment is warrantedView "CEATS, Inc. v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit to recover unpaid overtime wages from her former employer, Bloomingdale's. The district court granted Bloomingdale's motion to compel arbitration, determining that shortly after being hired by Bloomingdale's, plaintiff entered into a valid, written arbitration agreement and that all of her claims fell within the scope of that agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff had the right to opt out of the arbitration agreement, and had she done so she would be free to pursue this class action in court. Having freely elected to arbitrate employment-related disputes on an individual basis, without interference from Bloomingdale's, she could not claim that enforcement of the agreement violated either the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the arbitration agreement was valid and, under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., it must be enforced according to its terms. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit alleging that Nordstrom violated various state and federal employment laws by precluding employees from bringing most class action lawsuits in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. Nordstrom, relying on the revised arbitration policy in its employee handbook, sought to compel plaintiff to submit to individual arbitration of her claims. The district court denied Nordstrom's motion to compel. The court concluded that Nordstrom satisfied the minimal requirements under California law for providing employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee handbook, and Nordstrom was not bound to inform plaintiff that her continued employment after receiving the letter constituted acceptance of new terms of employment. Accordingly, the court concluded that Nordstrom and plaintiff entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes on an individual basis. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to address the issue of unconscionably.View "Davis v. Nordstorm, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents sold a collection of insurance companies to Petitioners in an agreement that contained an arbitration clause. Petitioners later invoked arbitration, alleging breach of contract. After Respondents complained about Petitioners’ first and second choice arbitrators the American Arbitration Association (AAA) struck the arbitrators. Petitioners’ third appointee was not challenged, and the arbitration proceeding resulted in an award in Respondents’ favor. When Respondents filed a motion to confirm the award in the trial court, Petitioners renewed their previous objection to the disqualification of their first-choice arbitrator. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that the arbitration panel was properly appointed under the terms of the arbitration agreement and the AAA rules. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the AAA disqualified Petitioners’ first-choice arbitrator for partiality, the arbitration panel was formed contrary to the express terms of the arbitration agreement; (2) therefore, the arbitration panel exceeded its authority when it resolved the parties’ dispute; and (3) accordingly, the arbitration award must be vacated. View "Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice action for injuries allegedly sustained by his wife while she was a resident at Defendant’s nursing home. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and for dismissal, asserting that the case was controlled by a valid arbitration agreement. The circuit court entered a general denial order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, and it was deemed denied. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.View "Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y v. Kolesar" on Justia Law

Asset Acceptance, LLC filed a complaint against Amy Newby, alleging that Newby had received a credit card from Asset and that her account was past due and remained unpaid. Newby asserted counterclaims against Asset. Asset subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, claiming that the credit card was issued to Newby by Chase Bank and was subject to a cardholder agreement that contained an arbitration provision. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Asset had waived its right to arbitration by filing its complaint in the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying Asset’s motion to compel arbitration, and (2) denying sanctions against Asset pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11. View "Asset Acceptance LLC v. Newby" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against KeyBank for overcharging in overdraft fees. At issue was whether KeyBank waived enforcement of the delegation clause. The court concluded that circuit precedent compelled the conclusion that KeyBank waived enforcement of the delegation clause. KeyBank waived its delegation clause argument when it waited to raise the issue until it had asked the district court to decide arbitrability - and lost. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order compelling arbitration on the threshold question of arbitrability and remanded for further proceedings.View "Johnson v. Key Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Delaware Supreme Court centered on the circumstances under which an arbitration award could be vacated where it was argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The parties to a corporate acquisition agreed to arbitrate disputes about the acquired company’s balance sheet on the effective date of the transaction. They retained an arbitrator to decide whether a workers' compensation reserve had been calculated correctly. The arbitrator decided, without any analysis, that there would be no adjustment to the balance sheet. The Court of Chancery vacated the arbitrator's decision, finding that the arbitrator did not follow the relevant provision of the parties’ share purchase agreement. But the test for “manifest disregard for the law” was not whether the arbitrator misconstrued the contract (even if the contract language is clear and unambiguous). "To vacate an arbitration award based on 'manifest disregard of the law,' a court must find that the arbitrator consciously chose to ignore a legal principle, or contract term, that is so clear that it is not subject to reasonable debate." Because the record did not support such a finding, the arbitrator’s award was reinstated. View "SPX Corporation v. Garda USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law