Plaintiffs, two groups of cotton farmers, filed suits against the cooperative of which they were members under contract, alleging that they were fraudulently induced to join the cooperative. Plaintiffs’ agreements with the cooperative provided for the arbitration of all disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The cooperative filed a motion to stay the litigation and a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motions, concluding that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the agreements were unconscionable because they forced the farmers to “forego substantive rights and remedies afforded by statute.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the limitation of statutory remedies was insufficient to defeat arbitration under the FAA. Remanded.View "Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-general contractor entered into an agreement with Defendant-subcontractor to perform work on a project. A dispute arose between the parties when Plaintiff issued Defendant a notice of termination. The issue was submitted to arbitration, and both parties submitted claims to the arbitrator for money damages. The arbitrator found that Plaintiff’s termination of Defendant was wrongful and granted damages. Plaintiff sought to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court concluded that a release signed by Defendant that waived all claims prior to a certain date barred Defendant’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the arbitrator’s decision should have been allowed to stand because it showed due regard for the parties’ release and did not reach an irrational result. View "Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition Co." on Justia Law

USPS appealed from the district court's grant of APWU's motion to vacate an arbitral award on the basis that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers under the relevant agreement by applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel against APWU. The court held that the arbitrator's decision to apply collateral estoppel - which was based on his interpretation of particular provisions of the arbitration agreement, and is within an arbitrator's authority to decide under a broad arbitration agreement - did not exceed his powers under the arbitration agreement as would be required to justify vacating the award. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and supplemental state law against the County and other County officials, alleging that they wrongfully investigated, prosecuted, and harassed plaintiffs in retaliation for plaintiffs' opposition to the actions of the County Sheriff, County Attorney, and their deputies. At issue was whether federal or state privilege law governs the admissibility of evidence of an alleged settlement reached during mediation of federal and state law claims. The court concluded that the privilege law governs, but that the County waived any available privilege. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's enforcement of the settlement agreement reached in mediation.View "Wilcox v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondent entered into an agreement. The parties later disputed whether their agreement required Petitioners to indemnify Respondent for breaching certain representations and warranties in the agreement. The parties proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrators selected Respondent’s $125 million settlement award. Petitioners moved to vacate the award, asserting that one of the arbitrators was neither impartial nor free from bias. After a hearing, the trial court granted Petitioners’ motion, concluding that the arbitrator did not disclose information that might yield a reasonable impression that the arbitrator was not impartial. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Petitioners waived their evident partiality claim by failing to object or inquire further when the disclosures occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s order vacating the award and requiring a new arbitration, holding (1) the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the information that might yield a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality to an objective observer constituted evident partiality; and (2) Petitioners did not waive their partiality challenge.View "Tenaska Energy, LLC v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Broadcasting Board of Governors, sought review of the Board's decision to uphold an arbitrator's finding that the petitioner violated both a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor laws when it laid off sixteen employees. The court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Congress has barred the courts from hearing challenges to FLRA orders that involve an award by an arbitrator, unless the order involves an unfair labor practice, and there was no unfair labor practice in this case.View "Broadcasting Board of Governors of Cuba v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The Gobellans retained Law Firm to defend them and bring suit. Associate was assigned to the case. Associate later left Law Firm and took several clients, including Gobellans, with him. Law Firm sued Associate over client contingency fees, and later settled. Law Firm also sued Gobellans, and moved to compel the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contingency fee agreement between Law Firm and Gobellans. The trial court and court of appeals denied Law Firm’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that because Law Firm had litigated the fee issue with Associate, it waived its right to arbitrate claims stemming from its fee agreement with Gobellans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Law Firm’s litigation conduct involved suing Associate, with whom it had no arbitration agreement, and filing limited pleadings against Gobellans, the conduct did not substantially invoke the litigation process against Gobellans or prejudice them; and (2) thus, Law Firm did not waive its right to arbitrate its dispute with Gobellans. View "Hodges, LLP v. Gobellan" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a fee dispute between associated attorneys arising out of mass-tort cases in Copiah County between 2005 and 2010. The first appeal arose out of a joint-venture agreement between Don Mitchell and the law firm of Sweet & Freeese, PLLC. The second appeal stemmed from an alleged oral referral agreement between McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, and the members of the joint venture. The appellants in this consolidated appeal challenged the County Chancery Court’s denial of their motions to compel arbitration of claims brought against them by Mitchell and the McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freese v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a class-action complaint against a Bank, asserting several claims arising from the Bank’s alleged practice of manipulating customers’ checking-account debit transactions to maximize the amount of overdraft fees charged to each customer. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision contained in the Deposit Agreement attached to Appellees’ complaint. In response, Appellees denied the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied Bank’s motion, ruling that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the circuit court did not find that there was a valid arbitration agreement, the case must be remanded to the circuit court to determine whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties.View "Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

AECI filed suit against the Union seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. Relying on the court's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the district court ruled that the last chance agreement (LCA) superseded the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, when the arbitrator ignored the clear and unambiguous terms of the LCA, he imposed his personal standards of industrial justice. The court concluded that the district court read the Coca-Cola bottling decision too broadly. Where a CBA requires "just cause" to discipline or discharge an employee but fails to define the term, the arbitrator's broad authority to interpret the contract, to which the court must defer, includes defining and applying that term of the contract. Viewed from this perspective, the arbitrator's decision to sustain the Union's grievance must be enforced. Because the arbitrator specifically invoked and applied the just cause provision of the CBA, the contract between AECI and the Union that defined his authority, his decision "draws its essence" from the CBA. Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision sustaining the Union's grievance must be enforced. The court declined to enforce the portion of the award granting the employee back pay from the day he was suspended until the day he was discharged. The court reversed and remanded.View "Associated Electric Coop. v. IBEW" on Justia Law