UHC hired Haworth as a part-time physician in 2005. After UHC terminated her employment in 2010, she sued for retaliation and wrongful termination. UHC successfully moved to compel arbitration under a provision in Haworth’s employment contract. UHC’s counsel recommended to Haworth’s counsel, Smith, that they select either Retired Judge Broadman or Retired Justice Dibiaso as the arbitrator, stating that he had used both several times, and asked Smith to let him know if he agreed to either one or if he proposed an alternative. Smith agreed to Broadman. After a hearing and briefing, Broadman issued judgment in UHC’s favor, finding that UHC terminated Haworth’s position due to its financial distress, the impracticality of employing part-time physicians, and personnel issues, and that she was an at-will employee. The court vacated the award (Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.20, on the ground that Broadman failed to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements of sections 1281.9 and 1281.85 and that those obligations cannot be waived. The court of appeal remanded, noting that Haworth’s attorneys had actual knowledge of a ground for disqualification before the arbitration commenced and that the failure to disclose could be waived. View "United Health Ctrs. of San Joaquin v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC filed a complaint seeking a judgment of foreclosure against John and Cheryl Bartlett, alleging that the Bartletts had defaulted on a note secured by a mortgage on their home. After Bayview failed to appear at three mediation sessions, the district court dismissed Bayview’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction in light of Bayview’s pattern of disruptive behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Bayview’s action with prejudice, as the district court understood the gravity of the sanction it was imposing, did not improperly rely on the Bartletts’ motions to dismiss, and correctly weighed the applicable facts in making its decision.View "Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs sued Payday Financial, Webb, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and other entities associated with Webb, alleging violations of civil and criminal statutes related to loans that they had received from the defendants. The businesses maintain several websites that offer small, high-interest loans to customers. The entire transaction is completed online; a potential customer applies for, and agrees to, the loan terms from his computer. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that the loan agreements required that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe on their Reservation in South Dakota. Following a limited remand, the district court concluded that, although the tribal law could be ascertained, the arbitral mechanism detailed in the agreement did not exist. The Seventh Circuit held that the action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. Rejecting an alternative argument that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation, the court stated that tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. View "Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Paul Kennamer and Dorothy Kennamer appeal an order entered by the Marshall Circuit Court compelling them to arbitrate their claims against Ford Motor Credit Company LLC and Ray Pearman Lincoln, Inc. (the dealership). The Kennamers had problems with the used car they purchased and stopped making payments on the loan they obtained through Ford Credit and the dealership. After review of the retail-installment contract at the center of this controversy, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision insofar as it granted the dealership's motion to compel arbitration and reversed insofar as it granted Ford Credit's motion to compel arbitration. View "Kennamer v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC" on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment, Employee signed an agreement to arbitrate claims with Employer. Employee later filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), alleging that Employer had discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. The ICRC subsequently filed a statement of charges with the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA). Employer filed a motion to dismiss the ICRC’s charges or, in the alternative, compel arbitration. The DIA denied Employer’s motion on the ground that ICRC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and, consequently, not bound by it. On judicial review, the district court remanded instructions for the ICRC to dismiss the matter pending arbitration by the parties, concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the FAA did not require arbitration of this proceeding because it was brought by an entity that was not bound to arbitrate under generally applicable principles of contract law, where the ICRC was not a party to the agreement and its interest was not derivative of Employee’s. View "Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of a union, filed a complaint against Defendant, her former employer, alleging that during her employment she was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of her race and color and that she was wrongfully terminated. Defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings, arguing that the proper forum for resolution of Plaintiff’s claims was binding arbitration as required by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Defendant. A hearing justice granted Defendant’s motion to stay and ordered that the matter be resolved through arbitration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the hearing justice’s decision was in error because the CBA’s arbitration provision did not preclude her from asserting her statutorily created rights under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) in a judicial forum. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding that the CBA’s general arbitration provision, which contained no specific reference to the state anti-discrimination statutes at issue, did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of Plaintiff’s right to a judicial forum in which to litigate her claims arising under the RICRA and the FEPA. Remanded.View "Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate. View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In each of these appeals, the district court granted a financial services firm's motion to enjoin a FINRA arbitration brought against the firm by a public financing authority. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction in both appeals and the district court had authority to enjoin arbitration in both appeals. On the merits, the court concluded that the FINRA arbitration rules have been superseded by forum selection clauses requiring "all actions and proceedings" related to the transactions between the parties to be brought in court. Accordingly, the court affirmed both appeals. View "Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

The Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA) filed a grievance against the University Laboratory School (ULS), alleging that the ULS refused to implement the proper salary placement for teachers as agreed to in a supplemental agreement negotiated by the HSTA and the Hawaii Board of Education. The ULS argued that the step placement chart the HSTA sought to enforce had never been agreed upon or incorporated into the agreement. The HSTA subsequently filed a grievance and a motion to compel arbitration of its grievance. The circuit court denied the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying HSTA’s motion, determining that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the HSTA’s grievance and that the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration was premature. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the parties agreed to leave questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration after concluding that an arbitration agreement existed. Remanded.View "Haw. State Teachers Ass’n v. Univ. Lab. Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased property from Defendants pursuant to a lease agreement that included an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs later sued Defendants over disputes regarding the lease. After engaging in litigation with Plaintiff for more than two years, Defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration under the parties’ lease agreement. Plaintiff objected to the motion, arguing that Defendants had waived their right to enforce the arbitration clause by engaging in lengthy litigation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, concluding, as a matter of law, that a party cannot waive enforcement of an arbitration clause in a contract. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the record was inadequate for review because the trial court failed to make any factual findings on the issue of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the legal basis of the trial court’s decision was at issue, a factual record on the question of waiver was not necessary to review the trial court’s decision; and (2) the trial court based its judgment on an incorrect statement of the law, and therefore, the court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for a stay pending arbitration. View "MSO, LLC v. DeSimone" on Justia Law