The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from district court decisions regarding an uninsured motorist claim between Plaintiffs-Appellants Sam and Deva Ferrell and Defendant-Respondent United Financial Casualty Company (United Financial, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance Company). The parties underwent arbitration, and the Ferrells subsequently filed a petition that sought confirmation of the arbitration award and an award of costs and attorney fees. The district court ordered confirmation of the arbitration award and interest based upon an agreement of the parties. On the issue of attorney fees, the district court found that arbitration began five months prior to the amendment of I.C. 41-1839 which explicitly allowed attorney fees in arbitration, and therefore the statute as it existed did not provide for attorney fees in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the district court.View "Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The O'Neals appealed a circuit court order that granted Bama Exterminating Company, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration. The dispute arose shortly after the O'Neals closed on the purchase of a house. As part of the loan disclosures, Bama Exterminating prepared an inspection report that the house was termite-free. The report did disclose a prior infestation at the house's carport from several years earlier. Mr. O'Neal signed the report right below the arbitration provision. Two weeks after closing, the O'Neals discovered "bugs" in the walls. They called Bama Exterminating who confirmed that the bugs were termites. The O'Neals then sued Bama Exterminating alleging negligence, wantonness and breach of contract. Bama Exterminating answered their complaint with the affirmative defense of the arbitration clause in the inspection report. The parties moved toward trial in the circuit court. When mediation failed, Bama Exterminating moved the court to compel arbitration. The O'Neals argued that the exterminator waived its right to compel arbitration by its participation in the litigation process. The Supreme Court found the exterminator did not waive its right to compel arbitration, and therefore affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the company's motion.View "O'Neal v. Bama Exterminating Company, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Waikoloa Beach Villas condominium project was developed by Respondent, Sunstone Waikoloa, LLC. Petitioner, the Association of Apartment Owners of the Waikoloa Beach Villas, contacted Respondent to resolve issues resolving purported construction defects. Petitioner then filed a motion to compel mediation and arbitration. Respondent argued that it could not request arbitration because it had failed to comply with the requirements of the Declaration of Condominium Property Regime for the Villas. The Declaration imposed numerous requirements that Petitioner must meet before initiating arbitration or litigation proceedings against Respondent. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the ICA, holding that section R.4(c) of the Declaration violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-105(a) because it imposed limitations on Petitioner in arbitration or litigation more restrictive than those imposed on other persons. Remanded.View "Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Waikoloa Beach Villas v. Sunstone Waikoloa, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nina Strausberg signed an arbitration agreement as a mandatory condition of her admission to Defendants' nursing home. Despite having signed the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff sued the home its operators alleging negligent care. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on which party has the burden to prove that a contract is unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable. The district court found that Plaintiff had failed to prove unconscionability and, therefore, granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the district court erred by placing the burden on Plaintiff to prove unconscionability. The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that Plaintiff had the burden to prove that the agreement was unconscionable because unconscionability is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement, and under settled principles of New Mexico law, the party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proof. Furthermore, the Court held that federal law preempted the Court of Appeals' holding because it treats nursing home arbitration agreements differently than other contracts. View "Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure to complete a mediation conference in a timely manner does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction, and dismissal is not mandated. South Carolina Code 15-79-125 requires a pre-suit mediation process for medical malpractice claims, and that the conference be completed within a 120-day period, which may be extended. The issue before the Court centered on whether the failure to complete the mediation conference in a timely manner divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and required dismissal. The contrary decision of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for the pre-suit mediation process to be completed. View "Ross v. Waccamaw Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Nitro-Lift contracts with operators of oil and gas wells to provide services. Howard and Schneider entered a confidentiality-noncompetition agreement with Nitro-Lift that contained an arbitration clause” After working for Nitro-Lift on wells in Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas, they quit and began working for one of Nitro-Lift’s competitors. Nitro-Lift served them with a demand for arbitration. The former employees filed suit Oklahoma, asking the court to declare the agreements void and enjoin enforcement. The court dismissed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not be resolved by application of Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, 219A, which limits the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. Nitro-Lift argued that any dispute as to the contracts’ enforceability was a question for the arbitrator. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that the state court misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which favors arbitration.View "Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard" on Justia Law

Although respondents' credit card agreement required their claims to be resolved by binding arbitration, they filed a lawsuit against petitioner and a division of petitioner bank, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq. At issue was whether the CROA precluded enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging violations of the Act. The Court held that because the CROA was silent on whether claims under the Act could proceed in an arbitrable forum, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., required the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.View "CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a complaint against AT&T Mobility LLC ("AT&T"), which was later consolidated with a putative class action, alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free. AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with respondents and respondents opposed the motion contending that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The district court denied AT&T's motion in light of Discover Bank v. Superior Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. At issue was whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 2, prohibited states from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures. The Court held that, because it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, California's Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA. Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.View "AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

An investment treaty between the U.K. and Argentina authorizes a party to submit a dispute to “the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made,” and permits arbitration if, 18 months after such submission, the tribunal has not made a final decision. BG, a British firm, had an interest in MetroGAS, an Argentine entity licensed to distribute natural gas in Buenos Aires. At the time of BG’s investment, Argentine law provided that gas tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars and would be set at levels sufficient to assure gas distribution firms a reasonable return. Argentina later changed the calculation basis to pesos. Profits became losses. BG sought arbitration, which was conducted in Washington, D. C. BG claimed that Argentina had violated the Treaty, which forbids expropriation of investments and requires each nation to give investors fair and equitable treatment. Argentina denied the claims and argued that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction because BG had not complied with the local litigation requirement. The arbitration panel concluded that Argentina’s enactment of laws that hindered recourse to its judiciary excused compliance and that Argentina had not expropriated BG’s investment but had denied fair and equitable treatment. The district court confirmed the award. The District of Columbia Circuit vacated, holding that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed. The local litigation requirement was a matter for arbitrators to interpret and apply; courts should review that interpretation with deference. Courts presume that the parties intended arbitrators to decide disputes about application of procedural preconditions to arbitration, including claims of waiver, delay, defense to arbitrability, time limits, notice, laches, or estoppel. The provision is procedural; it determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a duty to arbitrate. It is a claims-processing rule. The fact that contract is a treaty does not make a difference. The Treaty contains no evidence that the parties had intentions contrary to the ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold arbitration issues. View "BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

An agreement between American Express and merchants who accept American Express cards, requires that all of their disputes be resolved by arbitration and provides that there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” The merchants filed a class action, claiming that American Express violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable and that arbitration could not proceed because of prohibitive costs. The Circuit upheld its reversal on remand in light of a Supreme Court holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. The Supreme Court reversed. The FAA reflects an overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements even for claims alleging violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command. No contrary congressional command requires rejection of this waiver. Federal antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or indicate an intention to preclude waiver of class-action procedures. The fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. View "Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest." on Justia Law