Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

More than 13 years ago, lawyers around the country began class actions challenging the installation of fiberoptic cable on property without landowners’ consent. The cases began to settle on a state-by-state basis, leaving the lawyers to allocate awarded and expected attorney’s fees. The lawyers informally grouped themselves based on their negotiation and litigation positions. The Susman Group participated in mediation and agreed to a fee division, but balked at signing a written agreement, ostensibly because Susman disliked its enforcement terms. The district court held that Susman is bound by the agreement despite his failure to sign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, given the parties’ lengthy course of dealing, Susman’s failure to promptly object to the written agreement can objectively be construed as assent. A finding that Susman’s refusal to sign was a case of “buyer’s remorse” rather than a genuine objection to the enforcement terms in the agreement was supported by the record. View "McDaniel v. Qwest Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and other checking account customers filed suit against the Bank for allegedly charging excessive overdraft fees in breach of their account agreement. The district court denied the Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that state law applied when courts determined whether a valid arbitration agreement is in effect, and the Federal Arbitration Act's, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., presumption did not; under North Carolina law, the Bank Agreement was entirely superseded, and the arbitration agreement in that agreement therefore became ineffective; the district court properly looked to the PNC Agreement to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes; under North Carolina law, the PNC Agreement's silence was insufficient to form such an agreement; based on the terms of the agreement, the PNC Agreement applied retroactively; and because the agreement governing the dispute at hand did not permit the Bank to compel arbitration, the district court properly denied the motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

USW appealed the district court's vacatur of an arbitral award against Conoco involving dismissal of a refinery employee who failed a workplace drug test. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that Conoco did not clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate arbitrability and affirmed the district court's determination that the employee's discharge was not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement and its decision to vacate the arbitration award. View "ConocoPhillips, Inc. v. Local 13-0555 United Steelworkers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Union alleging that it breached its duty of fair representation. The Union filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff's claim was time-barred. The court held that the statute of limitations on plaintiff's claim accrued when the arbitrator issued his final award even though the collective bargaining agreement provided that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding subject to appeal by either party. Further, a state court action to vacate the arbitration award did not toll that limitations period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the Union's motion. View "Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass'n. of Univ. Professors at The N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC and THI of New Mexico, LLC (collectively THI) operate a nursing home in Hobbs, New Mexico. When Lillie Mae Patton's husband was admitted into the home, he entered into an arbitration agreement that required the parties to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his care at the home except claims relating to guardianship proceedings, collection or eviction actions by THI, or disputes of less than $2,500. After Mr. Patton died, Mrs. Patton sued THI for negligence and misrepresentation. THI then filed a complaint to compel arbitration of the claims. The district court initially ruled that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable and ordered arbitration. Under New Mexico law a compulsory-arbitration provision in a contract may be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if it applies only, or primarily, to claims that just one party to the contract is likely to bring. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the state law for contracts governed by the FAA. The Court held that New Mexico law was preempted in this case and the arbitration clause should have been enforced. View "THI of New Mexico at Hobbs v. Patton" on Justia Law

After MediVas defaulted on a loan, Marubeni foreclosed on promissory notes held by MediVas and threatened to foreclose on additional MediVas assets. MediVas and others filed suit against Marubeni in state court, raising numerous state law claims. Marubeni, invoking a contractual arbitration clause, removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and initiated arbitration against plaintiffs. At issue was whether an order compelling arbitration was appealable when the district court neither explicitly dismissed or explicitly stayed the action. The court held that such an order implicitly stayed the action and thus was not "a final decision with respect to an arbitration" under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(3); the court adopted a rebuttable presumption that an order compelling arbitration but not explicitly dismissing the underlying claims stayed the action as to those claims pending the completion of the arbitration; and the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "MediVas, LLC v. Marubeni Corp." on Justia Law

After BIVI discharged an employee for falsifying work records, the Union grieved the discharge. BIVI and the Union submitted the dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator ordered that the employee be reinstated without back pay, and BIVI commenced this action to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union and BIVI appealed. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) where BIVI's Article VIII, Section 3(d) argument was waived and where the arbitrator conducted a straightforward balancing of the management rights and just cause provisions. The court also concluded that BIVI has not made the factual and legal showing that would be required for the court to invoke the narrow public policy exemption and vacate an arbitration award that fully acknowledged the employee's misconduct, denied her back pay as a result of that misconduct, but reinstated her to her former position. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica v. UFCW" on Justia Law

In 2004 GEA, a German company, agreed to sell a subsidiary, DNK, to Flex‐N‐Gate, a U.S. manufacturer for €430 million. The contract required arbitration of all disputes in Germany. The sale did not close. GEA initiated arbitration before the Arbitral Tribunal of the German Institution of Arbitration. The arbitration was pending in 2009 when GEA filed suit in an Illinois federal district court, against Flex‐N‐Gate and its CEO, Khan, alleging that the defendants had fraudulently induced it to enter into the contract; that Khan stripped the company of assets so that it would be unable to pay any arbitration award; and that Khan was Flex‐N‐Gate’s alter ego. GEA then asked the district judge to stay proceedings, including discovery. The judge declined to stay discovery. GEA filed a notice of appeal after the German arbitration panel awarded GEA damages and costs totaling $293.3 million. The Seventh Circuit dismissed GEA’s appeal as moot, but the German Higher Regional Court in vacated the arbitration award. GEA renewed its motion. The district judge again denied the stay, stating that he was unsure how the arbitration would affect the case before him and didn’t want to wait to find out. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district judge then imposed a stay, which it later lifted for the limited purpose of allowing Khan to conduct discovery aimed at preserving evidence that might be germane to GEA’s claims against him in the district court suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had appellate jurisdiction.View "GEA Group AG v. Baker" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a protracted dispute over attorneys' fees awarded in the Wal-Mart wage and hour multidistrict litigation. Appellants, the Burton Group, appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award allocating attorneys' fees, contending that the district court erred in declining to vacate the award under section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a). The court concluded that a non-appealability clause in an arbitration agreement that eliminates all federal court review of arbitration awards, including review under section 10(a) of the FAA, was not enforceable. Accordingly, the court proceeded to the merits of the Burton Group's claims, and affirmed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award in a memorandum disposition filed contemporaneously with this opinion. View "In re: Wal-Mart" on Justia Law