The parties disputed ownership of life insurance policies and, according to their contract, submitted the dispute to a rabbinical arbitration panel. The arbitration panel appointed by the parties entered an award mandating the immediate transfer of the insurance policies at issue to Kolel and appellants subsequently appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly denied vacatur based on claims of bias and corruption; properly denied vacatur based on claims of premature decision and failure to consider evidence; and properly denied appellants' motion for reconsideration. Therefore, appellants have not presented any evidence that meets the high burden of proof necessary to vacate an arbitration award, and therefore the district court properly denied their motion for vacatur and granted Kolel's motion for confirmation of that same arbitration award. View "Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil v. YLL et al." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Ernst & Young filed a motion to compel arbitration of state wage and hour claims asserted by its former employee. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Ernst & Young had waived its right to arbitration by failing to assert that right as a defense in an action brought by two other former employees. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff had not established any prejudice as a result of Ernst & Young's alleged delay in asserting its arbitral rights. View "Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an order of the district court denying Argentina's motion to dismiss a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed by Blue Ridge on foreign immunity grounds. The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the district court's rejection of Argentina's assertion of foreign immunity under the collateral order doctrine; the court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in concluding that Blue Ridge, as an assignee, could state a claim to confirm the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes award because that issue was not "inextricably intertwined" with the district court's foreign sovereign immunity decision; the district court correctly concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity pursuant to two separate and independent exceptions to the immunity from suit provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: the implied waiver exception and the arbitral award exception, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), (2), and (a)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed insofar as the district court concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Qwest Corporation and Qwest Broadband Services, Inc. appealed a district court order granting partial summary judgment. After Richard Grosvenor filed a putative class action, Qwest moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court denied Qwest’s motion and scheduled a trial to determine whether the parties had reached an agreement to arbitrate. Both parties then moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted both motions in a single order, concluding that the parties entered into an agreement, but that the agreement was illusory and unenforceable. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Qwest argued that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the district court's order. Finding that in order to invoke appellate jurisdiction under the FAA, Qwest did not satisfy the Act's criteria by either explicitly moving to stay litigation and/or compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA, or making it unmistakably clear from the four corners of the motion that the movant sought relief provided for in the FAA. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Qwest's appeal. View "Grosvenor v. Qwest Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

E&Y appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss or stay proceedings, and to compel arbitration, in a putative class action brought by its former employees. At issue on appeal was whether an employee could invalidate a class-action waive provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. The court held that the FLSA did not include a "contrary congressional command" that prevented a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement from being enforced by its terms. The court also held that, in light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the employee's argument that proceeding individually in arbitration would be "prohibitively expensive" was not a sufficient basis to invalidate the action waiver provision at issue here under the "effective vindication doctrine." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the parties' dispute over an arbitration award to plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling on interest and attorney's fees, and Lloyd's cross-appealed requesting return of an alleged overpayment to plaintiff from a fund which held that the award in escrow pending the outcome of litigation. The court concluded that the decision of the arbitrators did not foreclose the district court from awarding interests on the remaining portions of the arbitration award; plaintiff was entitled to post-award, pre-judgment interest pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.130; to the extent the mandate must include instructions on pre-judgment interest to comply with Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court reformed the mandate as such; plaintiff was entitled to collect post-judgment interest on his post-award, pre-judgment interest from the date of this opinion until the date Lloyd's pays the interest; plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 689A.410(5); and the district court did not impermissibly overpay plaintiff when it released the funds from the escrow account and included interest on the contract damages through the date of payment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. View "Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between the Union and Carlisle over the arbitrability of a grievance concerning disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Carlisle and denied the Union's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Carlisle's claim for declaratory judgment was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where there was no basis for the district court to conclude that the Union acquiesced in the splitting of Carlisle's claims. Therefore, the Union did not waive its right to rely on the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded with directions to dismiss Carlisle's action View "Carlisle Power Trans. Products v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff terminated Defendant from employment. Thereafter, Defendant began arbitration proceedings seeking severance compensation he felt was contractually due. After arbitration hearings had commenced, the hearings were postponed for two months due to a medical situation afflicting Plaintiff's counsel. During the recess, Plaintiff formally requested pre-hearing and hearing third-party subpoenas directed at Defendant's current employer. The tribunal denied the issuance of the subpoenas. After the arbitration hearings resumed, the tribunal found Defendant was entitled to compensation pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement dealing with his termination without cause. The tribunal also found Defendant was entitled to pre-award interest. Plaintiff subsequently sought vacatur of the award, which the trial court denied. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration tribunal did not engage in misconduct by denying the issuance of the pre-hearing and hearing subpoenas; and (2) the tribunal did not exceed its authority in awarding pre-award interest to Defendant. View "Doral Fin. Corp. v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of LJL's exercise of its contractual option to purchase Pitcairn's ownership stake in a jointly owned high-rise luxury residential building in New York City, after which the parties pursued an arbitration to determine the value of the property. Both parties subsequently appealed from the district court's judgment. In LJL's appeal, the court agreed with its contention that the arbitrator's exclusion of Pitcairn's hearsay exhibits was within the arbitrator's authorized discretion and, therefore, vacated the district court's order overturning the arbitrator's determination of the Stated Value. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the arbitrator acted in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement in refusing to determine the Purchase Price and, therefore, remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award in its entirety. In Pitcairn's appeal, the court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Pitcairn's claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LJL 33rd Street Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative consumer class action suit against DirecTV and Best Buy, alleging violations of California's consumer protection laws. The arbitration agreement at issue in this instance was a customer service agreement between DirecTV and individuals who believed they purchased DirecTV equipment from Best Buy stores. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion held that Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2, preempted the State of California's rule rendering unenforceable arbitration provisions in consumer contracts that waive collective or class action proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement in this case was enforceable under Concepcion and, therefore, the district court did not err in compelling plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against DirecTV. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs were not required to arbitrate their claims with Best Buy. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc." on Justia Law