Joe Robertson appealed a circuit court order that held his claims against Mount Royal Towers were subject to an arbitration agreement and compelled him to arbitrate those claims. Finding that Robertson had not met his burden of showing that the arbitration agreements he signed were not applicable in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers" on Justia Law

The parties in this case agreed to a compromise to settle an ongoing dispute regarding the ownership of a company while they were actively litigating the issue. The general terms of the compromise were jotted down on a piece of lined writing paper, then submitted to the court with the understanding that a formal typewritten agreement would follow. When a dispute arose as to a provision in the subsequent formal version, the issue was submitted to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found the initial, handwritten agreement, which did not contain a disputed third-party consent clause, to be binding and enforceable. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitrator’s decision should have been vacated due to his refusal to consider parol evidence of the condition precedent. Finding no statutory grounds to disturb the arbitrator’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and the arbitrator. View "Robinson v. Henne" on Justia Law

Richard and Lisa Keane and the companies they managed, and Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC (BFU) had a disagreement arising from a development deal involving the Houston Professional Plaza. They went to mediation, but the parties had a disagreement regarding the terms of the mediated agreement. They then turned to arbitration. The arbitrator granted two awards in favor of BFU. The award did not specify any date by which the Keanes were to pay the money, nor did the award include interest. The district court confirmed the arbitration awards, and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff returned the writ not satisfied. BFU then obtained an order for a debtor's examination. A partial satisfaction of judgment was made, but the Keanes did not direct how the payment made was to be applied to the two arbitration awards. BFU applied the partial satisfaction to one of the awards, and filed a motion to have the Keanes held in contempt for failing to pay the second. The Keanes challenged the contempt action. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that because the order confirming the arbitration award did not require the Keanes to do anything and because contempt cannot be used to enforce payment of the debt in this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding them in contempt and the order later entered awarding the respondent attorney fees and court costs. View "Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane" on Justia Law

After undergoing surgery, Decedent died due to complications resulting from a vein being lacerated during surgery. Decedent's wife, Plaintiff, filed a complaint against the doctor who performed the surgery and the doctor's surgical practice for medical malpractice resulting in wrongful death. Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a financial agreement signed by Decedent prior to his surgery. The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration, and the court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiff appealed,. The Supreme Court quashed the decision compelling arbitration, holding (1) the damages clause of the arbitration provision of the financial agreement violated the public policy pronounced by the legislature in the Medical Malpractice Act; and (2) the offensive clause was not severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision. View "Franks v. Bowers" on Justia Law

After declaring a fiscal emergency, the City of Los Angeles adopted a mandatory furlough program for its civilian employees. Many of those employees that were represented by a union (Union) filed grievances against the City, contending that the furloughs violated memorandums of understanding (MOUs) governing the terms and conditions of their employment. The grievances were denied, and the City denied the employees' request to arbitrate. The superior court subsequently granted the Union's petition for an order compelling the City to arbitrate the dispute. The court of appeal granted the City's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the City could not be compelled to arbitrate under the terms of the MOUs because arbitration would constitute an unlawful delegation to the arbitrator of discretionary policymaking powers that the City's charter vested in its city council. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) arbitration of the employee furlough dispute did not constitute an unlawful delegation of discretionary authority to the arbitrator; and (2) the City was contractually obligated to arbitrate the dispute. View "City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

An agreement between American Express and merchants who accept American Express cards, requires that all of their disputes be resolved by arbitration and provides that there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” The merchants filed a class action, claiming that American Express violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable and that arbitration could not proceed because of prohibitive costs. The Circuit upheld its reversal on remand in light of a Supreme Court holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. The Supreme Court reversed. The FAA reflects an overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements even for claims alleging violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command. No contrary congressional command requires rejection of this waiver. Federal antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or indicate an intention to preclude waiver of class-action procedures. The fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. View "Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest." on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

The Providence School Board (Board) provided health insurance to active employees and retirees. In 2006, the Providence Teachers Union (Union) filed a grievance protesting a difference in the increase of premium costs for retirees compared with a more modest increase in premium costs for active employees. The Union argued that the Board's action violated three provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the board and the union. An arbitrator ruled in the Union's favor, concluding that the Board violated the CBA by failing to include retirees and active employees in a single group when it calculated the healthcare premium rates. The trial justice vacated the arbitration award, concluding (1) the Union did not have standing to pursue a grievance on behalf of retirees, and (2) the issue of the calculation of the group premium rate was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to Arena v. City of Providence and City of Newport v. Local 1080, the Union could not pursue this grievance on behalf of the retirees; and (2) because the Union had no standing to pursue this particular grievance, the grievance was not arbitrable. View "Providence Sch. Bd. v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958" on Justia Law

This appeal was the last chapter in a case with a "long and tortuous procedural history." The sheriff of Suffolk County brought this appeal after Plaintiff, a jail officer employed by the sheriff, filed an action to enforce an arbitrator's award of back pay to Plaintiff after a finding that Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged. The sheriff appealed from the superior court ruling that Plaintiff had no duty to mitigate his damages by seeking comparable employment. The union for the jail officers and employees of the county, on behalf of Plaintiff, cross appealed from the judge's decision not to assess statutory postjudgment interest on the arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate his damages, but the sheriff waived this issue by failing to raise it earlier in the proceedings; and (2) the superior court judge did not err in deciding not to assess postjudgment interest on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated interlocutory appeal were defaulted mortgagors of Rhode Island real estate. Defendants were the corresponding mortgagees, Plaintiffs' agents or assignees, who allegedly held Rhode Island mortgagees' legal titles and asserted the right to foreclosure for default on mortgage terms. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the ostensible assignments of their mortgagees' legal titles were invalid, leaving the assignees without the right to foreclose. The district court imposed a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction against foreclosure and possessory proceedings and appointed a special master to mediate the claims. Defendants appealed and filed a mandamus petition, claiming that the district court erred in failing to provide notice and hearing before issuing the stay and in failing to set limits of time and cost when referring the mortgagors' cases to the special master. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to hold a prompt hearing with reasonable notice on the question of whether the injunction should be continued and to establish specific limits of time and expense if the reference for mediation was to remain in effect. View "In re Mortgage Foreclosure Cases" on Justia Law