Defendant Halliburton Energy Services hired Plaintiff Edward Flemma to work as a cement equipment operator in Houma, Louisiana, in January of 1982. During his twenty-six years of employment with Halliburton, Flemma was promoted several times and worked for the company in Louisiana, Texas, Angola, and New Mexico. The last position he held was as district manager in Farmington, New Mexico, where he worked from 2006 until the time of his termination in 2008.The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a conflict of laws issue that requires the Court to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule. Upon review, the Court concluded that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violated New Mexico public policy. Thus, the Court applied New Mexico law and concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties because Halliburton's promise to arbitrate was illusory. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Guidotti began attempting to settle approximately $19,550 in unsecured consumer debt without declaring bankruptcy. She entered into contracts with several “credit counseling agencies.” Dissatisfied with the results, Guidotti brought a putative class action against the companies, alleging that they conspired to provide unlicensed debt adjustment services in violation of the New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act, the New Jersey RICO statute, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and various common law principles. With two of the companies, RMBT and Global, Guidotti opened a special bank account into which she automatically deposited a monthly amount. Those funds were then supposedly to be used to pay the various defendants for their debt negotiation services, with the remaining funds to be used to pay a negotiated settlement. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration as to most of the defendants, but denied the motion as to RMBT and Global, finding that there had been no meeting of the minds on an agreement to arbitrate. The Third Circuit vacated, finding the record insufficient to prove that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the two companies and Guidotti agreed to arbitrate. View "Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent awarded Petitioner a contract to develop an affordable housing development project. The parties entered into a development services agreement (DSA) that contained a provision stating that the parties would proceed to arbitration under state law in the event of a dispute. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from the project. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner asserting several causes of action, including intentional misrepresentation and negligence. Petitioners counterclaimed. Petitioners later filed an arbitration motion, which the circuit granted. The intermediate court of appeals denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the order compelling arbitration in this case was sufficiently final under the collateral order doctrine to be appealable under the general civil matters appeal statute; (2) the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the DSA encompassed all claims of Respondent and counterclaims of Petitioners; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted the motion to compel alternative dispute resolution and to stay proceedings. Remanded. View "County of Hawaii v. UniDev, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against NoteWorld alleging, among other things, violations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and Washington state law. At issue on appeal was whether an entity could compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause in a contract to which it was not a party. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that NoteWorld was not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary or through equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court need not decide any other question on appeal and affirmed the judgment. View "Rajagopalan v. NoteWorld, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond James Financial Services required its clients (the investors) to sign an agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the handling of their investments. At issue in this case was whether Florida's statute of limitations that is applicable to a "civil action or proceeding" applies to arbitration proceedings. In 2005, the investors filed a joint claim for arbitration against Raymond James, alleging federal and state securities violations and negligent supervision. The investors filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that the statute of limitations applied only to judicial actions and thus did not limit the time in which to bring their arbitration claims. The trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the investors. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the investors' arbitration claims in this case were barred by the statute of limitations, holding that Florida's statute of limitations applies to arbitration because an arbitration proceeding is within the statutory term "civil action or proceeding" found in Fla. Stat. 95.011. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In 1985, Behringwerke filed a U.S. patent application directed to the use of DNA sequences (enhancers) identified in human cytomegalovirus. An enhancer, when introduced into a cell that produces a drug, can enable the cell to produce the drug at a much higher rate. In 1992, Behringwerke and Genentech entered into a licensing agreement related to enhancers that matured into the patents-in-suit; for fixed annual payments, Genentech could practice the patents for research purposes. Genentech was to pay a royalty on sales of commercially marketable goods incorporating a “Licensed Product.” The Agreement, governed by German law, required that disputes be settled by arbitration. Behringwerke sold its pharmaceutical business to Sanofi, but the Agreement and patent rights stayed with Hoechst; both are German entities. In 2008, Sanofi sued Genentech for infringement based on sales of the allegedly infringing drugs Rituxan and Avastin, which Genentech had not identified as licensed products. Hoechst demanded arbitration before a European arbitrator. The district court found no infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Arbitration continued. On remand, Genentech sought to enjoin Sanofi from continuing the foreign arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding that Hoechst is a party to the arbitration, but not a party to the litigation and that an injunction would frustrate policies favoring enforcement of forum selection clauses, and would not be in the interest of international comity. The arbitrator determined that German substantive law, not U.S. patent law, would be used, that a drug could be a licensed article even though it did not contain the patented enhancers, if those enhancers were used in its manufacture, and that Genentech was liable for damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Genentech was not entitled to an injunction. View "Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, GMBH v. Genentech, Inc." on Justia Law

This federal case sought confirmation of an arbitration award made at the first, non-liability stage of arbitration as to a contract, and which was filed approximately one month after the arbitral opponents had filed a petition in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance to vacate the same award. The underlying arbitration resulted from the non-renewal of a sub-distribution agreement between V. Suarez & Co. (VSC) and Bacardi Caribbean Corporation (BCC). The federal district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that an absent party, Bacardi Corporation (BC), was an indispensable party whose joinder would destroy complete diversity. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the federal district court engaged in an incomplete Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) analysis, its conclusions under Rule 19 were wrong, and therefore, the proceeding should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the federal court should stay its hand where the Court of First Instance confirmed the award and that decision had been pending on appeal in the court of appeals since August 22, 2012. Remanded. View "Bacardi Int'l Ltd. v. V. Suarez & Co." on Justia Law

Vinmar appealed a judgment confirming an arbitration panel award to Tricon for damages and post-award interest on those damages at 8.5% because Vinmar breached a contract. Vinmar claimed that the parties never agreed to arbitrate and Tricon cross-appealed, contending that the district court improperly granted postjudgment interest at the statutory rate instead of the rate assigned by the arbitrators. The court concluded that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that Tricon and Vinmar reached a binding agreement to arbitrate even though they did not sign the contract. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court also affirmed the award and concluded that the arbitrators in this case did not award postjudgment interest, but post-award interest. View "Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Int'l, Ltd." on Justia Law

The beneficiary of an inter vivos trust sued the trustee for misappropriation of trust assets and failing to provide an accounting to the trust's beneficiaries. The trustee moved to compel arbitration, relying an arbitration provision contained in the trust. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the provision could not be enforced under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) because there was no agreement to arbitrate trust disputes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration provision contained in the trust was enforceable against the beneficiary, as (1) the settlor's intent here was to arbitrate any disputes over the trust; and (2) the beneficiary's acceptance of the benefits of the trust and suit to enforce its terms constituted the assent required to form an enforceable agreement to arbitrate under the TAA. Remanded. View "Rachal v. Reitz" on Justia Law

In 2008, Regents Bank issued two loans to Appellant. After Appellant failed to repay either loan, Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The district court stayed the proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan documents. The arbitrator ultimately ruled in Regents' favor. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) Regents employed undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award, holding (1) Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct; and (2) the arbitrator's refusal to void one of the loans was not a manifest disregard of the law. View "Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A." on Justia Law