Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Hyatt and Local 1 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that prohibits the hotel’s managerial employees from performing work normally performed by bargaining-unit employees absent an emergency. The CBA provides for the arbitration of any disputes not resolved by the grievance procedure. In 2013-2014, there were several incidents in which managers performed bargaining-unit work in circumstances that Local 1 did not regard as emergencies. The union took grievances to arbitration; both resulted in awards in Local 1's favor. Ninety days passed without Hyatt filing a petition to vacate; the union filed a petition to confirm the awards (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a)). The union alleged that Hyatt “has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to comply with” the awards. Local 1 cited 41 examples of managers allegedly performing bargaining unit work in 2015. The Seventh Circuit affirmed confirmation of the awards, rejecting Hyatt’s argument that the matter was either moot or did not present an appropriate case for confirmation. The district court’s “modest action” places the court’s contempt power behind the prospective relief ordered by the arbitrators, while reserving the merits of pending or future grievances for arbitration. Local 1 has conceded that any contempt petition would be based solely on the outcome of arbitrations post-dating the confirmation order. Confirming the awards does not undermine the agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration. View "Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp." on Justia Law

Genovese v. Gallo Wine Merchants, Inc., 628 A.2d 946 (Conn. 1993), which held that, under Con. Gen. Stat. 31-51bb, a factual determination made in a final and binding arbitration conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not have a preclusive effect in a subsequent action claiming a constitutional or statutory violation, is still good law.Plaintiff brought the present action alleging that her termination was in retaliation for bringing a previous action against Defendant alleging sex discrimination and for engaging in protected speech. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the factual underpinnings of the claims had been decided against her by the board of mediation in arbitration proceedings. The trial court denied the motion, citing Genovese. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining Defendant’s invitation to overrule Genovese. View "Spiotti v. Wolcott" on Justia Law

After Zetor filed suit against Ridgeway for trademark infringement, Ridgeway sought to enforce an arbitration clause in a prior settlement agreement between the parties. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's motion denying Ridgeway's motion to compel arbitration, holding that Zetor's claims have no relation to the terms of the settlement agreement; Zetor's claims rest on independent trademark and copyright grounds, which have no relation to the terms of the agreement and in no way depend on its existence; and the plain language of the contract did not apply to wholly independent claims arising several years later. View "Zetor North America, Inc. v. Ridgeway Enterprises" on Justia Law

Any limitation on an arbitrator’s authority to modify a disciplinary action pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provision requiring that discipline be imposed only for just cause must be specifically bargained for by the parties and incorporated into the CBA.The common pleas court in this case vacated an arbitration award that changed the disciplinary sanction recommended by the chief of police against Sergeant David Hill of the Findlay Police Department from termination to a length suspension. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the arbitration award did not draw its essence from the CBA between the city of Findlay and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association and was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the CBA placed no limitation on the arbitrator’s authority to review the disciplinary action imposed and fashion a remedy, the arbitrator acted within his authority; and (2) the arbitrator’s award drew its essence from the CBA and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. View "Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Findlay" on Justia Law

In case no. 1130590, Kathryn L. Honea appealed the denial of her motion to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. ("Raymond James"), and Bernard Michaud, an employee of Raymond James (collectively, "RJFS"). In case no. 1130655, RJFS appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; that appeal was dismissed. Honea opened several investment accounts with Raymond James. Honea and Raymond James executed a "client agreement" that included an arbitration provision. Honea filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court asserting that she had opened four accounts with Raymond James and that Michaud had acted as her financial advisor as to those accounts. She alleged that RJFS engaged in "abusive brokerage practices" in that her investments were not diversified, "were far too risky," and "were of poor quality." The arbitration panel dismissed Honea's breach-of-fiduciary-duty, negligence, wantonness, fraud, and Alabama Securities Act claims and proceeded to hear the breach-of-contract claims. An arbitration panel entered an award in favor of RJFS. The arbitration panel found that "Michaud did not sufficiently know his client nor make sufficient inquiry to attempt to know his client, her holdings, and/or her investment experience. These failures contributed to losses in [Honea's] account." However, the arbitration panel "denied" Honea's breach-of-contract claims, stating that they were "barred by the applicable statutes of limitations." Although the Alabama Supreme Court found one contract appeared to govern this case and that RJFS breached its duties by failing to properly understand Honea's investment knowledge before March 2000, Honea contended that allegedly improper transactions--the excessive use of margin and overly aggressive, high-risk trading occurring after March 2000--represented independent breaches of the FINRA rules. Those claims accrued within the six-year limitations period before her complaint was filed. Further, any knowledge by Honea of her losses did not mean that the trading activity was proper. Thus, to the extent that any transactions after March 2000 would be considered separate breaches of contract unrelated to the failure to properly know Honea, her holdings, or her investment experience, or setting up an "unsuitable" account, the Court found Honea demonstrated probable merit--for purposes of a Rule 59(g) hearing--that those claims would not be barred by the statute of limitations. Honea demonstrated that, in relation to the certain breach-of-contract claims, she was entitled to a Rule 59(g) hearing on her motion to vacate the arbitration award. View "Honea v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court erred in granting a motion to vacate an arbitration award affirming a school district’s termination of a principal. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting Respondents’ motion to vacate the award, holding (1) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority as an arbitrator because his decision did not contradict the express language of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement; (2) the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law because he acknowledged Nev. Rev. Stat. 391.3116 and applied the statute in reaching his decision; and (3) the arbitration award was not arbitrary or capricious because substantial evidence supported the arbitrator’s findings. View "Washoe County School District v. White" on Justia Law

Hunt worked as a truck driver. In 2010, he signed an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement with Moore Brothers, a small Norfolk, Nebraska company. Three years later, Hunt and Moore renewed the Agreement. Before the second term expired, however, relations between the parties soured. Hunt hired Attorney Rine. Rine filed suit in federal court, although the Agreements contained arbitration clauses. Rine resisted arbitration, arguing that the clause was unenforceable as a matter of Nebraska law. Tired of what it regarded as a flood of frivolous arguments and motions, the district court granted Moore’s motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927 and ordered Rine to pay Moore about $7,500. The court later dismissed the action without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was within the district court’s broad discretion, in light of all the circumstances, to impose a calibrated sanction on Rine for her conduct of the litigation, culminating in the objectively baseless motion she filed in opposition to arbitration. View "James Hunt v. Moore Brothers, Inc." on Justia Law

A final determination of liability but not damages in arbitration can satisfy the final requirement of Article V(1)(e) of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards when the parties have agreed to submit the issue of liability to the arbitrator for a distinct determination prior to a separate proceeding to assess damages.At issue in this appeal was the district court’s judicial recognition of an English arbitrator’s determination of joint contract liability against the seller and the renovator of a building. The parties agreed to bifurcate litigation of the liability and damages issues. Accordingly, the district court treated the liability judgment, which was decided before the damages issues, as final and thus entitled to judicial recognition. Specifically, the district court held the contractor for the renovation work bound as a party to the agreement providing for arbitration of disputes. The renovator and contractor appealed, claiming that the arbitrator’s judgment of liability in the bifurcated arbitration proceeding lacked the finality required for judicial confirmation of a foreign arbitral award under 9 U.S.C. 207. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s liability judgment was final in this instance and that the contractor could indeed be subjected to arbitration. View "University of Notre Dame (USA) in England v. TJAC Waterloo, LLC" on Justia Law

The circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration was not a final, appealable judgment under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-301.Appellees were individuals who each purchased vehicles from the automobile dealership operated by Appellant. Appellees filed a class action lawsuit against Appellant, challenging Appellant’s practice of providing customers with an alleged free lifetime limited warranty for their vehicles conditioned on the consumer’s continued use of and payment for other services provided by Appellant. Appellant filed an independent action seeking to compel arbitration in the class action case. The circuit court concluded that Appellees’ claims were not subject to binding arbitration. Appellant appealed. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the order denying arbitration was not an appealable final judgment. The court of special appeals denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the appeal, holding that the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration was not a final, appealable judgment, depriving the court of special appeals of jurisdiction to hear an appeal of that order. View "Deer Automotive Group, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing plaintiff's case without prejudice where he alleged violations of minimum wage laws, as well as fraud. In this case, plaintiff signed a Volunteer Release, Waiver and Indemnification Agreement when he volunteered as a concession worker for a fundraiser. The court held that the agreement was not unconscionable under Missouri law because the agreement was easy to understand, with no evidence that it was non-negotiable. Furthermore, the agreement did not lack consideration where the consideration was that plaintiff was giving up his right to sue in return for his opportunity to volunteer and DNCS's contribution to Washington University, something neither was legally bound to do. Finally, the underlying factual allegations were covered by the arbitration provision. View "Leonard v. Delaware North Companies Sport Service, Inc." on Justia Law