Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4334. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired from his job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan in the United States Navy Reserve. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the plain text of USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. View "Ziober v. BLB Resources" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was injured when the car she was driving was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist, claimed uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and medical payments coverage under two State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company policies. An arbitration panel found that the accident caused Plaintiff $378,000 in damages, $125,000 of which were identified as medical costs. The parties' dispute regarding the extent of coverage available to Plaintiff proceeded to trial. The superior court determined that only one of the State Farm policies covered Plaintiff, deferred to the arbitration award as to Plaintiffs' actual damages, established the amount owed by State Farm, and reduced the arbitration award accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court correctly determined that only one of the policies covered Plaintiff, but (2) the court’s decision regarding the amount due under that policy was in error. Remanded. View "Graf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Susan Berube was terminated from her employment with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for having alcohol on her breath while meeting with a client. The Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local 1989 (MSEA) initiated the grievance process, which included an arbitration proceeding, on Berube’s behalf. The arbitrator entered an award reinstating Berube to her employment position. The State and the DHHS filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. The superior court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the arbitration award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by determining that the grievance was arbitrable because the arbitration request was filed after the deadline established in the collective bargaining agreement. View "State v. Maine State Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, filed suit against his former employer, IBC, contending that IBC violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by failing to pay proper overtime rates. The district court denied IBC's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that, upon a motion to compel arbitration, a court should address the arbitrability of the plaintiff’s claim at the outset of the litigation. Therefore, the district court was required to consider the arbitrability of plaintiff's claim before conditionally certifying the collective. The court further concluded that, because the arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, any disputes about the arbitrability of plaintiff's claim or the scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator, not the courts. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration and the court reversed and remanded. The court vacated the stay pending appeal. View "Reyna v. Int'l Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

A representative of Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center (Extendicare), executed an arbitration agreement with Anna Marie Taylor (“Decedent”) requiring the arbitration of claims arising from Decedent’s stay at the Extendicare facility. Following Decedent’s death, Daniel and William Taylor (“the Taylors”) brought wrongful death claims on behalf of themselves as wrongful death beneficiaries and survival claims on behalf of Decedent’s estate against Extendicare and two other defendants. Extendicare moved to bifurcate the wrongful death and survival actions, and to compel arbitration of Decedent’s survival claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The trial court relied upon Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(e) to deny Extendicare’s motion to bifurcate, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the FAA preempted the lower courts’ application of Rule 213(e) under the facts presented. Upon review, the Court concluded that the FAA preempted the application of Rule 213(e), and required arbitration of the survival claim against Extendicare. The Court therefore reversed the Superior Court, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc." on Justia Law

Eileen Dalton purchased two used cars under separate finance contracts which contained provisions that retained self-help remedies for both parties, and that allowed either party to compel arbitration of any claim or dispute arising out of the contracts that exceeded the jurisdiction of a small claims court (which in New Mexico was $10,000). One of the cars was repossessed without judicial action. Dalton sued, alleging fraud, violations of the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code, unfair trade practices, conversion, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of warranty of title. Santander Consumer USA moved to compel arbitration based on the clause contained in the finance contracts. Dalton argued that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable on its face, and therefore unenforceable because the self-help and small claims carve-outs were unreasonably one-sided. After review of the provisions at issue here, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration provision in this case was not substantively unconscionable because: (1) lawful self-help remedies were extrajudicial remedies; and (2) the small claims carve-out was facially neutral because either party had to sue in small claims court if its claim was less than $10,000, or arbitrate if its claim exceeds $10,000, thereby neither grossly unfair nor unreasonably one-sided on its face. View "Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

When Hampton Court Nursing Father admitted Father to its nursing home facility, Son and Hampton Court signed a a nursing home contract that included an arbitration clause. Father did not sign the contract. Son later filed suit on Father’s behalf, alleging negligence and statutory violations. The circuit court granted Hampton Court’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the judicial proceedings. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Father was the intended third-party beneficiary of the nursing home contract, and therefore, Hampton Court could bind him to its contract, which Father never signed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that the third-party beneficiary doctrine did not bind Father to the arbitration agreement in the nursing home admission agreement. View "Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The Michigan office of Alix, an international company, administers payroll and benefits for U.S. employees and is directly involved in U.S. hiring. In 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, for its Dallas Corporate Services team. The employment agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan” and states, “any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any termination of employment . . ., shall be exclusively subject to binding arbitration under the . . . American Arbitration Association . . . decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to both parties.” In 2014, Brewington was terminated. He filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, on behalf of himself and a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. The Michigan district court ruled that Brewington was precluded from pursuing arbitration claims on behalf of any purported class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that court’s refusal to dismiss, finding that Brewington had sufficient contacts with Michigan to establish personal jurisdiction, and upheld summary judgment in favor of Alix. An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration to indicate that the parties agreed to it. This clause is silent on the issue and is limited to claims concerning “this Agreement,” as opposed to other agreements. It refers to “both parties.” View "AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were hired by U-Haul as customer service representatives and, as a condition of their employment, they signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs filed a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Lab. Code, 2698 et seq., alleging that U-Haul violated several provisions of the Labor Code, including overtime and meal break requirements. The trial court denied U-Haul's motion to compel plaintiffs to individually arbitrate whether they qualified as "aggrieved employees" and thus had standing to pursue a PAGA claim. The court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs are not required to individually arbitrate whether they qualify as aggrieved employees where whether plaintiffs have standing to pursue a PAGA claim is not an issue that falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; even if the agreement does require plaintiffs to arbitrate whether they have standing to bring a PAGA claim, the provision is unenforceable under California law; and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., does not preempt state law rules applicable to PAGA claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez v. U-Haul Co. of CA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, primarily low-income mobile home owners who rent the land owned by Westmont, filed suit against Westmont and others (collectively, appellants) alleging contract, tort and statutory causes of action. Appellants filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate the claims but the trial court denied the motion to compel. The court concluded that the arbitration provision contained in the rental agreements was procedurally unconscionable because it failed to disclose prohibitively expensive arbitration fees and was neither provided in a Spanish-language copy nor explained to respondents who did not understand written English; the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable as it imposed arbitral fees that were unaffordable or would have substantially deterred plaintiffs from asserting their claims; and the provision’s unreasonably shortened limitations periods for many of the asserted causes of action and its limitation on the remedies available in arbitration for statutory claims further support a finding of substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Penilla v. Westmont Corp." on Justia Law