Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether the parties’ disputes pertaining to certain workers’ compensation insurance payment agreements should be submitted to arbitration. To resolve this issue, the Court of Appeals was required to make a threshold determination of the whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in relation to Cal. Ins. Code 11658. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding (1) because application of the FAA does not invalidate, impair, or supersede section 11658, the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not implicated, and the FAA applies to the parties’ payment agreements in this case; and (2) because the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability and enforceability of the arbitration clauses to the arbitrators, the FAA mandates that the arbitration provisions be enforced as written. View "Monarch Consulting, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn." on Justia Law

Jessie and Annie Bullock were residents of Courtyard Gardens, a nursing-home facility. Linda Gulley, the Bullocks’ daughter, entered admission agreements and optional arbitration agreements on behalf of each parent. After Jessie died, Malinda Arnold, as personal representative of Jessie’s estate and as attorney-in-fact of Annie, filed a complaint against Courtyard Gardens, alleging, inter alia, negligence and medical malpractice. Courtyard Gardens moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the arbitration agreement was impossible to perform because it selected the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) to serve as arbitrator, and the NAF was no longer in business. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the NAF term was merely an ancillary logistical concern and was severable; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Courtyard Gardens’ motion to compel arbitration based on impossibility of performance. View "Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab. LLC v. Arnold" on Justia Law

The court previously found that NOV Norway had a contractual right to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The remaining defendants, nonsignatories to that agreement, contend that they are also entitled to arbitration. The district court found that NOV LP was contractually entitled to arbitration and ordered arbitration within the Southern District of Texas. The district court's order was interlocutory. Consistent with the purpose of Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(3), and every circuit that has considered the issue, the court held that Section 16 forbids appellate review. The court also concluded that the court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Additionally, despite having nothing to appeal, NOV Norway was listed as an appellant within the defendants’ notice of appeal. The appeals brought by NOV LP and NOV Norway are dismissed. View "Al Rushaid v. National Oilwell Varco, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Remax and Jose Garcia-Yanez, alleging 13 causes of action related to her employment. The trial court granted Remax's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation in the judicial forum under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. The arbitration provider subsequently dismissed the arbitral proceeding after no arbitration costs were paid. Plaintiff then moved that the trial court lift its prior order staying the litigation and defendants filed no contemporary motion or petition seeking an order compelling resumption of the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and lifted the litigation stay. Defendants then appealed the order lifting the litigation stay. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that defendants are appealing from a nonappealable order. View "Gastelum v. Remax Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Archangel Diamond Corporation Liquidating Trust, as successor-in-interest to Archangel Diamond Corporation (collectively, “Archangel”), appealed dismissal of its civil case against defendant OAO Lukoil (“Lukoil”), in which it alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract, and commercial tort law. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Lukoil and under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Archangel Diamond Corporation was a Canadian company and bankrupt. The liquidating trust was located in Colorado. In 1993, Archangel entered into an agreement with State Enterprise Arkhangelgeology (“AGE”), a Russian state corporation, regarding a potential license to explore and develop diamond mining operations in the Archangelsk region of Russia. Archangel and AGE agreed that Archangel would provide additional funds and that the license would be transferred to their joint venture company. However, the license was never transferred and remained with AGE. In 1995, AGE was privatized and became Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (“AGD”), and the license was transferred to AGD. Diamonds worth an estimated $5 billion were discovered within the license region. In 1998, Lukoil acquired a controlling stake in AGD, eventually making AGD a wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil. Pursuant to an agreement, arbitration took place in Stockholm, Sweden, to resolve the license transfer issue. When AGD failed to honor the agreement, Archangel reactivated the Stockholm arbitration, but the arbitrators this time concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute even as to AGD. Archangel then sued AGD and Lukoil in Colorado state court. AGD and Lukoil removed the case to Colorado federal district court. The district court remanded the case, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because all of the claims were state law claims. The state trial court then dismissed the case against both AGD and Lukoil based on lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to AGD, reversed as to Lukoil, and remanded (leaving Lukoil as the sole defendant). On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s previous dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, which it had not addressed before, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court granted Lukoil and AGD's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery. In 2008 and early 2009, the case was informally stayed while the parties discussed settlement and conducted discovery. By June 2009, Archangel had fallen into bankruptcy due to the expense of the litigation. On Lukoil’s motion and over the objection of Archangel, the district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, concluding that the matter was related to Archangel’s bankruptcy proceedings. Lukoil then moved the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing the matter, and the bankruptcy court concluded that it should abstain. The bankruptcy court remanded the case to the Colorado state trial court. The state trial court again dismissed the action. While these state-court appeals were still pending, Archangel filed this case before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, maintaining that Lukoil had a wide variety of jurisdictional contacts with Colorado and the United States as a whole. Finding no reversible error in the district court's ruling dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Archangel Diamond v. OAO Lukoil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Delbert alleging that Delbert violated debt collection practices. The district court granted Delbert's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 4. The court concluded, however, that the arbitration agreement in this case is unenforceable where it purportedly fashions a system of alternative dispute resolution while simultaneously rendering that system all but impotent through a categorical rejection of the requirements of state and federal law. The court went on to conclude that the FAA does not protect the sort of arbitration agreement that unambiguously forbids an arbitrator from even applying the applicable law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp." on Justia Law

Monschke, acting as personal representative for the estate of her mother, the decedent, filed suit for wrongful death and elder abuse against Timber Ridge Assisted Living, which petitioned to compel arbitration on the ground plaintiff, on behalf of decedent, had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause before enrolling decedent in the facility. The trial court denied the petition, finding the wrongful death claim had been brought on behalf of decedent’s surviving children, and the children were not parties to the arbitration agreement. The trial court also declined to submit the elder abuse claim to arbitration because of the possibility of conflicting rulings. The court of appeal affirmed. While a personal representative’s interests may not directly align with the interests of any particular heir, the personal representative’s duty is to stand in the position of the heirs, not the decedent. View "Monschke v. Timber Ridge Assisted Living, LLC" on Justia Law

Five former employees of Credit Suisse began arbitration proceedings before FINRA concerning employment-related disputes. The employees had entered into employment agreements with Credit Suisse that included provisions to resolve all employment‐related disputes by arbitration before a private arbitration provider.Credit Suisse sought to compel the employees to dismiss the FINRA arbitration and pursue their claims in a non‐FINRA arbitral forum. The district court granted Credit Suisse's petition and entered judgment ordering the employees to pursue their claims in a non‐FINRA arbitral forum. The court concluded that FINRA Rule 13200 does not prohibit the enforcement of pre‐dispute waivers of a FINRA arbitral forum. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Credit Suisse Secs. LLC v. Tracy" on Justia Law

The shipper petitioner appealed the district court's order confirming an arbitration award and award of attorney's fees and costs to the respondent carrier. The court concluded that the shipper has not established any ground for vacating the arbitral award. The court rejected the shipper's argument that the arbitral panel manifestly disregarded the substantive law of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and the shipper's argument that the panel chairman was guilty of corruption or misbehavior because he failed to disclose his illness to the parties. The court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award. The court concluded, however, that there was no finding that the petitioner shipper breached the charter agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs. View "Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers A.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Concord appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that a grievance filed by respondent, the Concord Police Supervisor[s’] Association (Union), and a retired bargaining unit member was arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City and the Union were parties to a CBA that expired on December 31, 2012. Lieutenant Paul Leger retired on January 31, 2013, while negotiations for a successor CBA were ongoing. Negotiations for the successor CBA culminated in an agreement signed on December 19, 2013, nearly eleven months after Leger retired. In March 2014, more than a year after Leger retired, he and the Union filed a grievance with the City because he did not receive the cost of living wage adjustment effective January 1, 2013. The City denied the grievance, and the Union subsequently demanded arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the PELRB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of City of Concord " on Justia Law