Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case stems from a dispute over a petition to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between IATSE and InSync. The district court granted IATSE’s petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ initial agreement and “stayed” the case. The court concluded that the district court's arbitration order was final under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the stay lacked any legal or practical effect. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the order. On the merits, the court concluded that, given the scope of the arbitration provision and the nature of the parties’ dispute, the arbitrator and not the district court must consider IATSE and InSync’s competing interpretations of the evergreen clause and decide whether the 2003–2007 CBA expired or was terminated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "IATSE Local 720 V. InSync Show Prod." on Justia Law

The litigation resulting in these consolidated appeals stemmed from disputes within the Cohen family. Maurice placed his assets the “Maurice Trust,” and after he died, the trust assets were passed to trust (“the QTIP Trust”), and to a charitable organization (“Fund”). After Maurice’s wife died, the remaining assets of the QTIP Trust rolled over to the Fund. Later, half of the Fund’s assets were given to a new charity, the C-S Foundation (“C-S”). The Fund’s successor, the FPE Foundation (“FPE”) filed this federal case against the Cohens’ two children, one of their spouses, and the advisor to the co-trustees of the QTIP Trust. FPE filed this federal case against members of the Cohen family, alleging that certain Defendants exceeded their powers as co-trustees of the QTIP trust and that the co-trustees’ advisor breached his fiduciary duty to that trust. C-S intervened and counterclaimed against FPE. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause contained in the Maurice Trust. The district court allowed the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendants did not waive their right to arbitration, and thus, dismissal was appropriate; and (2) C-S’s counterclaim was subject to the arbitration clause in the Maurice Trust. View "FPE Found. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

The Zarecors invested $800,000 in the RMK Funds. Morgan Keegan was the lead underwriter for the Funds and was heavily involved in their operations. The Zarecors allege that Morgan Keegan omitted facts regarding policies and structure of the Funds; misrepresented the quality of the Funds to Zarecor; and “was intimately involved with” misrepresentations and omissions made in SEC filings, prospectuses, and other marketing materials. When the Funds collapsed in 2007, the Zarecors lost $718,577. Unrelated plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a class that purchased mutual funds, including the RMK Funds, claiming that Morgan Keegan was liable as a “controlling person” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78t(a), and violations of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. 77k. The Zarecors were part of the putative class, but opted out. The class action was resolved by settlement. In 2009, the Zarecors filed a statement of claim in arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleging that Morgan Keegan had violated federal, New Jersey and Arkansas securities laws. The FINRA arbitration panel awarded them $541,000 in 2010, but a court vacated the award, holding that the dispute was not subject to arbitration under FINRA. The court dismissed their subsequent suit as untimely. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims under Arkansas law and federal law, but concluded that the claim under New Jersey law was timely. View "Zarecor v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against DAI, alleging claims of fraud, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Plaintiffs also requested to vacate the arbitration award issued by the ADRC. After removal to the district court, the district court granted DAI’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ counterclaims. The district court further granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the arbitration award based on its finding that the arbitrator was biased. The court vacated the district court's grant of the motion to vacate the award because plaintiffs have failed to show that any of the circumstances enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a), are present in these circumstances. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Directory Assistants Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Parnow, Shawn Lisenby, Bob Andrade, Gabriel Bautista, and Saiyaz Abdul filed a class action against Universal Protection Service, LP and Universal Services of America, Inc. (collectively, UPS). Plaintiffs worked as armed security guards at the Yolo County Superior Court, under the employ of UPS. As part of their job, they have to provide equipment, such as guns, handcuffs, and radios, and have to pay the costs to maintain their certification to work as armed guards, but they are not reimbursed for equipment or training costs. When they filed an administrative complaint, they were all fired except plaintiff Lisenby, and none were paid their wages. The trial court granted a stipulated stay, pending the outcome of a then-pending case in the California Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a “representative action” under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) and also petitioned to compel class-wide arbitration. The agreement listed a number of disputes that were covered, including “any state or local statutes and ordinances relating to wage and hour or wage payment matters.” It excluded employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, and disputes involving workers compensation and unemployment insurance. UPS answered with a general denial, coupled with various affirmative defenses, including that the class action claims were barred by the arbitration agreement. UPS also filed a cross-complaint seeking a declaration that: (1) the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether class action relief was barred by the arbitration agreement; and (2) that the arbitration agreement barred class actions. After plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint, UPS moved to compel individual arbitration and stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, in part arguing that under American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules, whether class arbitrations were permitted was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Plaintiffs obtained judicial notice of the AAA Rules. The trial court denied the motion to compel individual arbitration, and stayed the suit pending the arbitration. UPS petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the order compelling it to submit to arbitration. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the agreements’ incorporation by reference of the AAA Rules vested the arbitrator with the power to decide the disputed issue. The alternative writ was discharged, the stay (issued previously) was vacated, and the petition for mandate was denied. View "Universal Protection Service v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Carlson sued Home Team, alleging that she was employed as Home’s office manager from February 4, 2013, until her wrongful termination on July 1, 2013. Carlson sought damages for wrongful termination, harassment, breach of her employment agreement, unpaid overtime, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Home moved to compel arbitration, because on Carlson’s first day of work, she was directed to Home’s electronic “onboarding system,” which contained company policies, including Home’s Agreement to Arbitrate. Carlson objected to the Agreement in an email, stating: “I would like to negotiate the terms.” In a conference call with Home’s human resources manager, Carlson asked who would pay for any arbitration and what firm would perform it. The HR Manager began to explain, but Carlson “cut [her] off,” saying that was all the information she needed and she would sign the Agreement. Home’s in-house counsel produced a copy of the Agreement that Carlson “signed electronically,” which was kept in her personnel file.The trial court denied Home’s motion. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and rejecting contentions that state law unconscionability principles are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, and that the courts could sever unconscionable provisions. View "Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc." on Justia Law

Leo Brown was admitted to the Hattiesburg Health and Rehab Center (HHRC) in February 2012. His wife, Emma, signed an admission agreement both in her individual capacity and on Leo's behalf. Specifically, Emma's signature appears on a line just above the line: "signature of responsible party in his/her individual capacity and on behalf of the resident in the following capacity," where Emma circled the "authorized agent and/or health care surrogate" option. Leo did not sign the agreement. Her husband died soon after his discharge, and she brought a wrongful-death suit against HHRC. HHRC moved to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial judge held a hearing on HHRC's motion and denied it, stating: "I do not agree that [Emma] was authorized to sign on Mr. Brown's behalf, and I don't – I do not agree that it is binding on Mr. Brown." The trial judge later entered an order, finding again that the Admission Agreement was not binding on Leo. HHRC appealed, challenging the trial court judgment as to: (1) whether the arbitration provision contained within the Admission Agreement entered between Emma Brown, individually and on behalf of Leo Brown, and [HHRC] created a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate; and (2) whether the arbitration provision contained within the Admission Agreement entered between Emma Brown, individually and on behalf of Leo Brown, and [HHRC] was unconscionable. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Leo is not bound by the arbitration provision. And because that issue was dispositive, the Court did not address HHRC's unconscionability argument. View "Hattiesburg Health & Rehab Center, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

Nilene Junker was admitted to the Nichols Center nursing facility after surgery. Junker's daughter, acting with power of attorney, signed an admission agreement on Junker's behalf. The admission agreement contained an arbitration clause. While she was being put in a room, Junker fell and sustained injuries. Junker sued the Nichols Center, and the nursing home filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court ruled from the bench without hearing arguments from the parties, holding that the arbitration agreement was not valid and that the "arbitration agreement must fail because it does not make provision for an arbitrator in the event the parties could not agree." The Nichols Center appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the circuit court erred by denying the motion to compel arbitration on the basis of forum unavailability. "The motion to compel asked the court to determine whether the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable. The court was not asked to rewrite the terms of the agreement to provide for an arbitrator, but rather to compel Junker to comply with the procedures outlined in the agreement. There must be some attempt by the parties to select an arbitrator; then, if the parties cannot agree, the court may be called on to appoint an arbitrator." The case was remanded for a hearing on the motion to compel and a determination of the validity of the arbitration agreement. "If the arbitration agreement is valid, Junker cannot simply refuse to arbitrate." View "NC Leasing, LLC v. Junker" on Justia Law