Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Seller entered into a purchase agreement with Buyer for the sale of certain equipment. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause. Buyer eventually assigned its assets for the benefit of creditors to Assignee. Assignee sold Buyer’s tangible assets but retained choses in action. Assignee later brought a complaint in arbitration seeking damages for breach of the purchase agreement. The arbitrator concluded that Assignee had standing to bring the action and that the purchase agreement conferred jurisdiction upon him to hear the matter. Seller then brought this action seeking to enjoin the arbitration. The Court of Chancery dismissed this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that a complete contractual remedy existed in arbitration. View "CVD Equip. Corp. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The case arose from a dispute over the adequacy of concrete work Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. performed on a condominium construction project as a subcontractor to LPIHGC, LLC. The subcontract contained a binding arbitration clause. The arbitrator entered a partial final award and final award (collectively, the arbitration award), ruling in favor of LPIHGC. LPIHGC filed a motion to confirm, and Nordic filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing to address disputed issues of material fact. The circuit court granted LPIHGC’s motion and denied Nordic’s motion and entered final judgment in favor of LPIHGC. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed, concluding that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose various relationship with the law firms of LPIHGC’s attorneys established a reasonable impression of partiality requiring vacatur of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the circuit court did not explain the basis of its rulings on the record or enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, the Court was unable to determine whether the circuit court erred in denying Nordic’s motion to vacate. Remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on Nordic’s motion to vacate. View "Nordic PCL Constr., Inc. v. LIPHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

BSDL petitioned the district court to confirm an arbitration award rendered against the government of Belize. The district court entered judgment in favor of BSDL. The arbitration award arises out of the alleged breach by Belize of a 2005 agreement between Belize and Belize Telemedia Limited, BSDL’s predecessor in interest. The court concluded that the language of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6), arbitration exception makes clear that the agreement to arbitrate is severable from the underlying contract. In order to succeed in its claim that there was no “agreement made by the foreign state . . . to submit to arbitration,” Belize must show that the Prime Minister lacked authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. Belize has failed to do this and therefore, Belize failed to carry its burden of establishing that BSDL’s allegations do not bring this case within the FSIA’s arbitration exception. The court rejected Belize's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Government of Belize" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident, Robert and Terri Zeller filed a complaint against Charlotte Nixon alleging claims for negligence and loss of consortium. The Zellers submitted their claims for arbitration under Utah Code 31A-22-321, which provides that the election of arbitration stands unless a notice of rescission is filed within ninety days. After the ninety-day rescission period had passed, the Zellers moved to amend their complaint to add a claim for negligent entrustment against Nixon & Nixon, Inc. Nixon opposed the motion to amend and filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the Zellers were justified in seeking the amendment, thus freeing the Zellers of the statutory limitations on their claims against Nixon and allowing their claims to proceed against Nixon & Nixon. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the claims against Nixon, as those claims were irretrievably subject to arbitration given the Zellers’ failure to rescind their election of arbitration within ninety days; and (2) affirmed as to the claims against Nixon & Nixon, holding that the Zellers’ earlier election of arbitration as to their claim against Nixon did not encompass their subsequent claim against the corporation. View "Zeller v. Nixon" on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law

AVR, an Israeli corporation, and Interton, a Minnesota corporation, produce hearing aid technology, and entered into an Agreement, giving Interton a 20 percent interest in AVR. During negotiations, they discussed integrating AVR's DFC technology into Interton's products, and Interton's purchase of AVR's W.C. components. The Agreement incorporated terms indicating that the Agreement would be governed by the laws of the State of Israel and that “Any dispute between the parties relating to (or arising out of) the provisions of this Agreement … will be referred exclusively to the decision of a single arbitrator … bound by Israeli substantive law.” AVR commenced arbitration in Israel. Interton participated, but believed that disputes concerning DFC and W.C. were separate and not subject to arbitration. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected Interton's objection to the scope of arbitration, citing the "relating to (or arising out of)" language. An Israeli arbitrator awarded AVR $2,675,000 on its DFC and W.C. claims, plus fees and expenses. After the award became final in Israel, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201, AVR successfully petitioned the district court for recognition and enforcement in the US. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Convention does not allow Interton to relitigate the scope of arbitration in an American court. View "AVR Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Am. Hearing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Alpine repairs automotive glass and, under Minnesota law, receives from insured vehicle owners the right to seek payment from insurance companies for repairs performed. Alpine and several insurers had disputes regarding the amounts paid for 482 separate claims. Minnesota law mandates arbitration of these disputes. The district court determined many claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations included in some of the insurance policies; 248 claims either were not governed by the two-year statute of limitations or were timely. The court consolidated these claims for one arbitration and ordered arbitration. Alpine appealed the consolidation order. The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the consolidation order was not an appealable final judgment. The parties pursued arbitration of one claim in which Alpine sought reimbursement for an alleged underpayment of $398.77. Arbitration resulted in a ruling in favor of the insurance company. ​The district court confirmed the award. The Eighth Circuit again dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction View "Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appleberry worked for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, under a collective bargaining agreement. Deeming her performance unsatisfactory, the agency placed her on a “performance improvement plan” and then found that she failed to improve. Eventually, relying on that failure, the agency fired her. When Appleberry brought her removal to arbitration, as authorized (but not required) by the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator concluded that she could not challenge the key bases for the removal, i.e., the agency determinations that she should be placed on the performance-improvement plan and that she failed under the plan; that the collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7121, prescribed the exclusive process, including time limits, for challenging those determinations; but that Appleberry had abandoned that process after initiating it through filing grievances, allowing the time for completing challenges to run. The arbitrator barred reconsideration of “issues that were raised in [her] earlier grievances, or that could have been raised but were not.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the arbitrator should not have barred consideration of the performance-improvement-plan issues raised in her earlier, uncompleted grievances; the arbitrator properly enforced the grievance process designated as “exclusive” in the collective bargaining agreement. View "Appleberry v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

The parties’ dispute involved various “credit repair” services provided to plaintiff consumers, for which some of the disclosure requirements of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA, or the Act), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq., were not met. At issue was the district court's denial of a motion to vacate certain aspects of an arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by determining that plaintiffs failed to prove actual damages under the Act; the court rejected plaintiffs’ various arguments regarding their request for additional attorneys’ fees and costs; and the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his contractually delegated authority under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Dancel" on Justia Law

Donald Olson and Aimee Moore met in 1995. Between 1995 and 2004 they had business and personal relationships. The business relationship began with Donald training Aimee to fly helicopters in exchange for Aimee’s work for Donald and his businesses. Eventually Aimee managed Donald’s businesses, and they agreed that she would receive a share of business profits. Aimee and Donald disputed the nature of their personal relationship: Aimee characterizes the relationship as a cohabative domestic partnership; Donald asserts the relationship was not a domestic partnership. Aimee terminated the personal relationship in July 2004. In December 2004 Aimee and Donald signed an agreement “related to the deferred compensation owed Aimee . . . for work performed during the period January 1996 through 2004.” In November 2005, after negotiating for more than a year, Aimee and Donald signed a final settlement agreement to end their business relationship. Aimee initiated arbitration against Donald, but not his businesses, in January 2012. Aimee alleged that Donald breached the agreement they had regarding her deferred compensation and certain aspects of managing the business. The matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ultimately agreed with Donald and his businesses, concluding that the parties’ personal relationship was not a domestic partnership and finding that Donald and the businesses had not materially breached the settlement agreement. The arbitrator ruled in Donald’s and the businesses’ favor and awarded them reasonable prevailing party costs and attorney’s fees. Aimee appealed the arbitrator's decision to the superior court, which affirmed the arbitrator's decision. She appealed to the Supreme Court, who in applying the deferential standards of review, affirmed the superior court's decision confirming the arbitration award. View "Moore v. Olson" on Justia Law