Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
Parker v. Durham School Services, L.P.
Plaintiffs Tiffaney Whitt, on behalf of her minor children, and Jeremiah Parker, Whitt’s adult son, filed a lawsuit against Kearney School District and Durham School Services, L.P., due to racial harassment experienced by Parker and his siblings on a school bus operated by Durham. Plaintiffs alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim against Durham, asserting they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Kearney and Durham, which required safe, harassment-free transportation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Durham’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, which challenged the validity of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim. Durham then filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in its contract with Kearney. The district court denied this motion, concluding that Durham waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause by not raising it earlier in the litigation. Durham appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Durham knew of its right to arbitrate, as it possessed the contract containing the arbitration clause, and acted inconsistently with that right by engaging in extensive litigation and discovery before filing the motion to compel arbitration. The court also noted that the district court’s consideration of prejudice to Plaintiffs, although erroneous, did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The appellate court rejected Durham’s argument that it could not have known to seek arbitration until the district court’s summary judgment ruling and found that Durham’s actions were inconsistent with preserving its right to arbitrate. The court also denied Plaintiffs’ request to adopt a process for certifying interlocutory appeals as frivolous and their request for costs under Fed. R. App. P. 38. View "Parker v. Durham School Services, L.P." on Justia Law
DocRx, Inc. v. Piedmont Comprehensive Pain Management Group, LLC
Piedmont Comprehensive Pain Management Group, LLC ("Piedmont") provides pain-management care and had a business arrangement with DocRx Dispensing, Inc. ("DRD") for billing and collection services. DRD collected payments from insurance companies for medications dispensed by Piedmont and kept a portion as compensation. In 2022, Piedmont sued DRD and other related entities and individuals, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and various tort-based claims, accusing them of improperly depriving Piedmont of funds owed for dispensing medications.The Mobile Circuit Court initially granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on an April 2017 agreement between Piedmont and DRD, which included an arbitration clause. The court stayed the action pending arbitration. During arbitration, the defendants produced a later August 2017 agreement, which also contained an arbitration clause and was signed by both parties. Piedmont then requested the trial court to lift the stay, arguing that the defendants could not insist on arbitration while denying the existence of the April 2017 agreement. The trial court lifted the stay, and the defendants appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court held that claims based on the August 2017 agreement, which was signed by both parties, must be arbitrated. The court also noted that the trial court's initial order compelling arbitration of claims based on the April 2017 agreement was a final judgment, and Piedmont's failure to appeal within the required time frame meant the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside that order. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's order lifting the stay and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DocRx, Inc. v. Piedmont Comprehensive Pain Management Group, LLC" on Justia Law
R.K. Metals, LLC v. E & E Co., Inc.
Mark Lovil, the manager of R.K. Metals, LLC, signed a commercial lease with E&E, Co. Inc. in 2015 in his representative capacity. The lease did not include a personal guaranty or arbitration clause. R.K. Metals became delinquent in rent payments, leading E&E to require a new lease in 2018, which included both a personal guaranty and an arbitration clause. Lovil signed the new lease as president of R.K. Metals, but R.K. Metals claimed they were unaware of the new clauses until the final version was delivered.R.K. Metals filed a complaint in the Lee County Circuit Court in May 2020, seeking declaratory relief and asserting breach-of-contract claims. The circuit court found the lease enforceable and ordered arbitration. E&E sought to include Lovil personally in the arbitration, leading to a determination of his status as guarantor. The circuit court granted E&E’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding Lovil personally liable as guarantor and a necessary party to arbitration.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Lovil’s signature on the lease, despite his corporate designation, bound him personally as guarantor due to the clear language of the guaranty clause. The court also found that Lovil, as personal guarantor, was bound by the arbitration clause. The court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel, noting Lovil’s close legal relationship with R.K. Metals, and concluded that he must participate in arbitration.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that Lovil is personally bound as guarantor and compelled to participate in arbitration. View "R.K. Metals, LLC v. E & E Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Vicor Corp. v. FII USA Inc.
Vicor Corporation supplied power converter modules to Foxconn for years. Vicor alleged that Foxconn switched to manufacturing and importing knock-off modules that infringed Vicor's patents. In July 2023, Vicor filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Foxconn. Simultaneously, Vicor sued Foxconn for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which stayed the case pending the ITC's resolution. Foxconn then initiated arbitration in China, claiming Vicor had agreed to arbitrate disputes based on terms in purchase orders. Vicor filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking to enjoin the arbitration and declare it was not bound by the arbitration or license terms.The district court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction against the arbitration, despite Foxconn's request for a stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659. The court acknowledged that Section 1659 applied but concluded it could still grant preliminary relief based on the All Writs Act and its inherent authority to preserve its jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Section 1659 required the district court to stay proceedings because Vicor's claims involved issues also present in the ITC proceeding. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction despite Foxconn's request for a stay. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Vicor Corp. v. FII USA Inc." on Justia Law
Lampo v. Amedisys Holding, LLC
Nicole Lampo was hired by Amedisys Holding, LLC as a physical therapist. A month after her hiring, Amedisys sent an email to all employees introducing an arbitration program. The email required employees to acknowledge the arbitration materials and provided an opt-out option within 30 days. Lampo acknowledged the email but did not opt out. She continued working for Amedisys until her termination in March 2018, after which she filed a lawsuit against Amedisys and her former supervisor for wrongful discharge, tortious interference, and defamation. Amedisys moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement.The Circuit Court of Georgetown County denied Amedisys's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that Lampo's failure to opt out did not constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that Lampo had accepted the arbitration agreement as a matter of law by not opting out and continuing to work.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Lampo did not accept Amedisys's offer to form an arbitration agreement by merely failing to opt out and continuing to work. The court emphasized that silence and inaction do not constitute acceptance of an offer unless specific circumstances indicate a manifestation of assent, which were not present in this case. The court concluded that there was no evidence of Lampo's intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement, and thus, no valid arbitration agreement was formed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lampo v. Amedisys Holding, LLC" on Justia Law
Karlin vs. UATP Springfield, LLC
Presley Karlin, a 17-year-old, was injured at Urban Air Springfield, a trampoline and adventure park, due to allegedly inadequate protective cushions. After turning 18, Karlin sued Urban Air for negligence. Urban Air responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Karlin’s mother on his behalf. Karlin argued that his mother lacked the authority to sign the agreement and that the agreement only applied to claims arising on the day it was signed, not to his injury four months later.The Circuit Court of Greene County overruled Urban Air’s motion to compel arbitration. Urban Air appealed, limiting its arguments to the arbitration agreement signed by Karlin’s mother. The court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the arbitration agreement contained a delegation clause that required threshold issues of arbitrability to be decided by an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the arbitration agreement did contain a delegation clause, which required any disputes about the scope, arbitrability, or validity of the agreement to be settled by arbitration. Since Karlin did not specifically challenge the delegation clause itself, the court held that the clause was valid and enforceable. Consequently, Karlin’s claims regarding the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement must be presented to the arbitrator.The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Urban Air’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Karlin vs. UATP Springfield, LLC" on Justia Law
Design Gaps, Inc. v. Shelter, LLC
Jason and Kacie Highsmith hired Shelter, LLC to manage a home renovation project and later contracted with Design Gaps, Inc. to design and install cabinets and closets. The contracts required arbitration for disputes but did not specify completion dates. Design Gaps failed to meet multiple promised deadlines, leading the Highsmiths to terminate the contracts and hire another company. The Highsmiths shared Design Gaps' copyrighted drawings with the new contractor. They then filed for arbitration, alleging breach of contract and other claims, while Design Gaps counterclaimed for various issues, including copyright infringement.The arbitrator held a three-day hearing, during which the Highsmiths presented multiple witnesses, while Design Gaps only presented David Glover. The arbitrator found in favor of the Highsmiths, awarding them damages and attorney’s fees, and denied Design Gaps' counterclaims, including the copyright claim, citing fair use and lack of evidence for copyright registration.Design Gaps petitioned the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator disregarded the law and failed to issue a reasoned award. The district court denied the petition and confirmed the arbitration award, also granting the Highsmiths' motion for attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal, citing lack of federal jurisdiction based on the precedent set in Friedler v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Co., which held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over motions to vacate arbitration awards unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond the Federal Arbitration Act. The court concluded that the petition did not meet this requirement. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Shelter, LLC" on Justia Law
JONES V. STARZ ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
Kiana Jones, along with thousands of other claimants, initiated dispute-resolution proceedings against Starz Entertainment, LLC, alleging violations of federal and state privacy laws. The arbitration provider, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), ordered the consolidation of these filings to be presided over by a single arbitrator. Jones petitioned the district court to compel individual arbitration, arguing that the consolidation violated the Starz Terms of Use, which she claimed required individual arbitration.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Jones's petition, holding that she was not "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because Starz had not failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate. The court also held that the consolidation did not present a gateway question of arbitrability for the courts to address.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The panel held that Jones was not a "party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate," as required by 9 U.S.C. § 4, because Starz never failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate. The court distinguished this case from Heckman v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., noting that the consolidation by JAMS did not present a gateway question of arbitrability. The panel also held that the FAA did not allow Jones, as the party seeking arbitration, to raise the argument that the Terms of Use were unconscionable to the extent that they allowed pre-arbitration consolidation by JAMS. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "JONES V. STARZ ENTERTAINMENT, LLC" on Justia Law
Dalton Drug Co., Inc. v. OptumRx, Inc.
OptumRx, Inc. ("OptumRx"), a national pharmacy-benefits manager, entered into contracts with Dalton Drug Co., Inc., and Hartford Pharmacy, LLC ("the Pharmacies") in 2015. These contracts included an arbitration provision for resolving disputes. In December 2021, the Pharmacies notified OptumRx of disputes regarding alleged fraudulent pricing and reimbursement schemes. After a failed resolution attempt via a telephone call in March 2022, OptumRx filed complaints in the Geneva Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the arbitration provision.The Geneva Circuit Court consolidated the actions and denied the Pharmacies' motion to dismiss, which argued that no justiciable controversy existed. OptumRx then moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Pharmacies' refusal to arbitrate created a justiciable controversy. The Pharmacies opposed, denying refusal to arbitrate and reiterating the lack of a justiciable controversy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of OptumRx, ordering arbitration.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that no justiciable controversy existed when OptumRx filed its actions. The court noted that the Pharmacies had up to a year to decide whether to pursue arbitration, and OptumRx's rights had not been "frustrated or affected" at the time of filing. Consequently, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering its summary judgment void. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the actions without prejudice. View "Dalton Drug Co., Inc. v. OptumRx, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Arbitration & Mediation, Supreme Court of Alabama
CHABOLLA V. CLASSPASS, INC.
The plaintiff, Katherine Chabolla, purchased a one-month subscription from ClassPass, a company offering access to gyms and fitness classes, in January 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ClassPass paused charges but resumed them when gyms reopened. Chabolla filed a lawsuit alleging that ClassPass violated California’s Automatic Renewal Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act by resuming charges without proper notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration, which argued that Chabolla had agreed to arbitrate any claims by using their website. The district court found that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use, which included the arbitration clause, and that Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest assent to those terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that ClassPass’s website, which resembled a sign-in wrap agreement, did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use on the landing page or the first screen. Even if the second and third screens provided such notice, Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest her assent to the Terms of Use on those screens. The court concluded that Chabolla’s use of the website did not amount to an unambiguous manifestation of assent to the Terms of Use, and therefore, she was not bound by the arbitration clause within those terms. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration. View "CHABOLLA V. CLASSPASS, INC." on Justia Law