Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Delaware Supreme Court centered on the circumstances under which an arbitration award could be vacated where it was argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The parties to a corporate acquisition agreed to arbitrate disputes about the acquired company’s balance sheet on the effective date of the transaction. They retained an arbitrator to decide whether a workers' compensation reserve had been calculated correctly. The arbitrator decided, without any analysis, that there would be no adjustment to the balance sheet. The Court of Chancery vacated the arbitrator's decision, finding that the arbitrator did not follow the relevant provision of the parties’ share purchase agreement. But the test for “manifest disregard for the law” was not whether the arbitrator misconstrued the contract (even if the contract language is clear and unambiguous). "To vacate an arbitration award based on 'manifest disregard of the law,' a court must find that the arbitrator consciously chose to ignore a legal principle, or contract term, that is so clear that it is not subject to reasonable debate." Because the record did not support such a finding, the arbitrator’s award was reinstated. View "SPX Corporation v. Garda USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two groups of cotton farmers, filed suits against the cooperative of which they were members under contract, alleging that they were fraudulently induced to join the cooperative. Plaintiffs’ agreements with the cooperative provided for the arbitration of all disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The cooperative filed a motion to stay the litigation and a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motions, concluding that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the agreements were unconscionable because they forced the farmers to “forego substantive rights and remedies afforded by statute.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the limitation of statutory remedies was insufficient to defeat arbitration under the FAA. Remanded.View "Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-general contractor entered into an agreement with Defendant-subcontractor to perform work on a project. A dispute arose between the parties when Plaintiff issued Defendant a notice of termination. The issue was submitted to arbitration, and both parties submitted claims to the arbitrator for money damages. The arbitrator found that Plaintiff’s termination of Defendant was wrongful and granted damages. Plaintiff sought to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court concluded that a release signed by Defendant that waived all claims prior to a certain date barred Defendant’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the arbitrator’s decision should have been allowed to stand because it showed due regard for the parties’ release and did not reach an irrational result. View "Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition Co." on Justia Law

USPS appealed from the district court's grant of APWU's motion to vacate an arbitral award on the basis that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers under the relevant agreement by applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel against APWU. The court held that the arbitrator's decision to apply collateral estoppel - which was based on his interpretation of particular provisions of the arbitration agreement, and is within an arbitrator's authority to decide under a broad arbitration agreement - did not exceed his powers under the arbitration agreement as would be required to justify vacating the award. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and supplemental state law against the County and other County officials, alleging that they wrongfully investigated, prosecuted, and harassed plaintiffs in retaliation for plaintiffs' opposition to the actions of the County Sheriff, County Attorney, and their deputies. At issue was whether federal or state privilege law governs the admissibility of evidence of an alleged settlement reached during mediation of federal and state law claims. The court concluded that the privilege law governs, but that the County waived any available privilege. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's enforcement of the settlement agreement reached in mediation.View "Wilcox v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondent entered into an agreement. The parties later disputed whether their agreement required Petitioners to indemnify Respondent for breaching certain representations and warranties in the agreement. The parties proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrators selected Respondent’s $125 million settlement award. Petitioners moved to vacate the award, asserting that one of the arbitrators was neither impartial nor free from bias. After a hearing, the trial court granted Petitioners’ motion, concluding that the arbitrator did not disclose information that might yield a reasonable impression that the arbitrator was not impartial. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Petitioners waived their evident partiality claim by failing to object or inquire further when the disclosures occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s order vacating the award and requiring a new arbitration, holding (1) the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the information that might yield a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality to an objective observer constituted evident partiality; and (2) Petitioners did not waive their partiality challenge.View "Tenaska Energy, LLC v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Broadcasting Board of Governors, sought review of the Board's decision to uphold an arbitrator's finding that the petitioner violated both a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor laws when it laid off sixteen employees. The court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Congress has barred the courts from hearing challenges to FLRA orders that involve an award by an arbitrator, unless the order involves an unfair labor practice, and there was no unfair labor practice in this case.View "Broadcasting Board of Governors of Cuba v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The Gobellans retained Law Firm to defend them and bring suit. Associate was assigned to the case. Associate later left Law Firm and took several clients, including Gobellans, with him. Law Firm sued Associate over client contingency fees, and later settled. Law Firm also sued Gobellans, and moved to compel the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contingency fee agreement between Law Firm and Gobellans. The trial court and court of appeals denied Law Firm’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that because Law Firm had litigated the fee issue with Associate, it waived its right to arbitrate claims stemming from its fee agreement with Gobellans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Law Firm’s litigation conduct involved suing Associate, with whom it had no arbitration agreement, and filing limited pleadings against Gobellans, the conduct did not substantially invoke the litigation process against Gobellans or prejudice them; and (2) thus, Law Firm did not waive its right to arbitrate its dispute with Gobellans. View "Hodges, LLP v. Gobellan" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a fee dispute between associated attorneys arising out of mass-tort cases in Copiah County between 2005 and 2010. The first appeal arose out of a joint-venture agreement between Don Mitchell and the law firm of Sweet & Freeese, PLLC. The second appeal stemmed from an alleged oral referral agreement between McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, and the members of the joint venture. The appellants in this consolidated appeal challenged the County Chancery Court’s denial of their motions to compel arbitration of claims brought against them by Mitchell and the McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freese v. Mitchell" on Justia Law