Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Montana Association of Counties Joint Powers Insurance Authority (MACo/JPIA) obtained catastrophic property insurance from Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company to cover damages over $100,000. The Lincoln County Port Authority (Port) insured a building in its industrial facility through the MACo/JPIA self-insured risk pool. After the building's roof collapsed, MACo/JPIA informed the Port that it would no longer insure the building. The building was subsequently destroyed by a fire, and MACo/JPIA and Allianz refused to cover the loss. The Port filed this suit against Allianz. The district court concluded that the Allianz policy insured the Port and awarded $6,060,980 based on the findings of an appraisal panel. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's determination that Allianz's policy provided coverage for the building; (2) affirmed the district court's refusal to reform the Allianz policy; (3) reversed the district court's award of "replacement cost" for those portions of the building that the Port had slated for demolition; and (4) remanded to allow the district court to calculate post-judgment interest owed to the Port for the damages owed under the policy. View "Lincoln County Port Auth. v. Allianz Global Risks US Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former high school instructor, was terminated from her employment for insubordination. Plaintiff appealed her termination to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator denied Plaintiff's grievance. The district court upheld the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator had not exceeded his powers and that Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that a ground for vacating, correcting, or modifying the award existed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award.View "Roberts v. Lame Deer Sch. Dist. No. 6" on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded.View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2006, Respondents obtained an adjustable rate mortgage loan from a mortgage company. Respondents executed a deed of trust on the real property being purchased and separately executed an arbitration rider. Respondents later defaulted on the loan, and Petitioner, which serviced the loan, assessed a number of fees. Respondents filed an action against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the Dodd-Frank Act and that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's requested writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court's order, holding (1) the Dodd-Frank Act did not apply to the mortgage loan because the loan was executed prior to the Act's enactment; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.View "State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Circuit Court of Kanawha County" on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner and Ajmal Khan, principal of Verus Investment Holdings, purchased securities in a company to arbitrage a merger between that company and another company (the trade). Petitioner and Khal used Verus' account at Jefferies & Co. and Winton Capital Holding to complete the purchase. After the merger, Jefferies wired to Verus the original investment and profits attributable to the Winton funds. Verus wired the investment money to Winton and the profits to Doris Lindbergh, a friend of Petitioner. Tax authorities later informed Jefferies it owed withholding tax on the trade. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in an agreement between Jefferies and Verus, Jefferies commenced an arbitration against Verus for the unpaid taxes. Verus, in turn, asserted thirty-party arbitration claims against Petitioner, Lindbergh, and others for their share of the taxes. After a hearing, Supreme Court determined that nonsignatories Petitioner and Lindbergh could not be compelled to arbitrate. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Petitioner should be estopped from avoiding arbitration because he knowingly exploited and received direct benefits from the agreement between Jefferies and Verus. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive a direct benefit from the arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate.View "Belzberg v. Verus Invs. Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

At a foreclosure mediation, Homeowners and representatives of Lender agreed that foreclosure proceedings would be halted while Homeowners were being considered for a loan modification. Several months later, Homeowners petitioned for judicial review, asserting that Lender breached the parties' agreement. The district court granted the petition, finding Lender had violated the agreement and directing Lender to participate in and pay for further mediation. The Supreme Court dismissed Lender's appeal, holding (1) to preserve and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, an order remanding for further mediation generally is not final and appealable; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal because, given the remand for additional mediation, the district court's order was not final and appealable.View " Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Saxon Special Servicing serviced a promissory note that secured a home loan for Appellants. After Appellants stopped making payments to Saxon, a notice of default was recorded. Appellants elected to mediate in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). Saxon provided all of the required documents for the mediation, including an eighty-three-day-old broker's price opinion (BPO). The mediator ultimately determined that Saxon failed to provide "an appraisal within sixty days of mediation" because the BPO was not prepared within sixty days of the mediation. The district court concluded that the parties had negotiated in good faith with valid authority and that there was no reason to withhold the FMP certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the mediation rule requiring an appraisal or broker's price opinion that is no more than sixty days old at the time of the mediation requires substantial, rather than strict, compliance; and (2) Saxon substantially complied with the foreclosure mediation rule requiring a current appraisal. View " Markowitz v. Saxon Special Servicing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a last will and testament from LegalZoom.com. Before receiving the requested document, Plaintiff agreed to LegalZoom.com's terms of service, which included an arbitration provision. The agreement also provided that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed the interpretation and enforcement of the agreement's provisions. Plaintiff later filed a class-action lawsuit, alleging that LegalZoom.com engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, among other claims. LegalZoom.com filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion based upon the allegations concerning the unauthorized practice of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred because Arkansas law does not prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements requiring resolution through arbitration of private claims when a dispute concerns allegations of the unauthorized practice of law; and (2) any rule prohibiting arbitration of unauthorized practice-of-law claims were preempted by the FAA in this case. View "Legalzoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain" on Justia Law

Stephanie Lee and Benjamin Redus were the parents and joint managing conservators of their minor daughter. A 2007 order adjudicating parentage gave Stephanie the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence. Benjamin sought to modify that order. The parties executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) modifying the 2007 order. Stephanie moved to enter judgment on the MSA, but Benjamin withdrew his consent to the MSA, arguing that it was not in the best interest of the child. The district court refused to enter judgment on the MSA, concluding that it was not in the best interest of the child. Stephanie unsuccessfully petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to enter judgment on the MSA. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a properly executed MSA on the grounds that the MSA was not in a child's best interest; and (2) because the MSA in this case met the Family Code's requirements for a binding agreement, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to enter judgment on the MSA.View "In re Lee" on Justia Law