Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Respondents in this case included Kaiser Foundation Health and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (collectively, Kaiser). Michael Siopes, a public school teacher, enrolled in a Kaiser health plan offered through the Hawaii Employer-Union Health Benefits Trust Fund (EUTF). Michael was later diagnosed with cancer by a Kaiser medical professional. Michael and his wife, Lacey, subsequently consulted a medical team at Duke University Medical Center. The Duke team determined that Kaiser's diagnosis was erroneous and recommended a different treatment plan. Michael received treatment at Duke that was ultimately successful. Kaiser denied Michael's request for coverage. Michael and Lacey sued Kaiser for, among other things, breach of contract and medical malpractice. Kaiser filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that a group agreement entered into Kaiser and the EUTF was applicable to Michael when he signed the enrollment form. The group agreement contained an arbitration provision. The circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's orders, holding (1) the arbitration provision was unenforceable based on the lack of an underlying agreement between Kaiser and Michael to arbitrate; and (2) accordingly, Lacey was also not bound to arbitrate her claims in this case.View "Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (RJFS), and its employee, Bernard Michaud appealed a trial court order vacating an arbitration award in their favor and entering a judgment in favor of Kathryn Honea. Honea had multiple investment accounts with Raymond James and sued RJFS alleging violations of the Alabama Securities Act and sought damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, and fraud. RJFS moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion. An arbitration panel unanimously entered an award in favor of RJFS on Honea's claims. Honea filed a motion at circuit court to vacate the award. The trial court ultimately vacated the award, and RJFS appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment vacating the arbitration award, holding that a provision in the arbitration agreement Honea signed when she opened the accounts required the trial court to conduct a de novo review of the arbitration award, and remanded the case for it to conduct such a review. Both parties acknowledged on appeal that the award had not been entered as a judgment of the trial court. Because the award to RJFS was not entered as a judgment of the trial court as required by statute, the Supreme Court could reach no other conclusion but that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the award on remand. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment purporting to vacate that award and to enter a judgment in favor of Honea was void. This appeal was dismissed.View "Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Honea " on Justia Law

Plaintiff took exceptions to the Master's Final Report which allowed for the withdrawal of an agreed-upon arbitrator because he had concluded that he could not fairly and objectively resolve plaintiff's dispute with defendant. The Master concluded that ordering arbitration before an arbitrator who admitted his conflicts would serve no useful purpose and that a substitute arbitrator should be designated to resolve the parties' dispute. The court concluded that plaintiff's exceptions to the Master's Final Report were overruled. The Master's Report, with its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended remedy were confirmed and adopted.View "Lynn v. Ullrich" on Justia Law

This matter involved the acquisition of R&S by KBR from ENI pursuant to a stock purchase agreement (SPA). At issue was whether the entire escrow fund should be released to ENI or whether it was entitled to a portion of this fund. KBR sought a preliminary injunction of any further proceedings before the arbitrator. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction because the issues involved in this request were largely mooted by clarification of the parties' positions during briefing and by clarification of the law by the Supreme Court in Viacom International v. Winchell, which was decided while this matter was being briefed.View "ENI Holdings, LLC v. KBR Group Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller represented a class of employees who worked for an armored car company Garda CL Northwest, Inc. They brought a wage and hour suit against the company, citing violations of the Washington Industrial Welfare Act, and the Washington Minimum Wage Act. After several months of litigation, Garda moved to compel arbitration under the terms of a labor agreement. The trial court granted the motion, but ruled that the employees could arbitrate as a class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order to compel arbitration, but that the employees must arbitrate individually notwithstanding the class certification. Both sides appealed the appellate court decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Hill v. Garda CL Northwest. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Schuiling hired Harris as his full-time, live-in housecleaner. Harris signed an arbitration agreement, a one-page, pre-printed form prepared for Schuling’s auto business, stating that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum under its code of procedure then in effect.” In 2011, Harris sued Schuiling, alleging multiple torts, statutory violations, and breach of contract. Schuiling moved to enforce arbitration under Code § 8.01-581.02(A), stating that the National Arbitration Forum was no longer available and requesting the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03. Harris argued that unavailability of the named arbitrator, coupled with the agreement’s failure to provide for a substitute arbitrator, rendered the agreement unenforceable. The circuit court agreed with Harris and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. Relying on the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the agreement, the court concluded that NAF’s designation as arbitrator was not integral and was severable in order to give effect to the arbitration requirement, the sole purpose of the agreement.View "Schuiling v. Harris" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to determine if an unsuccessful party in an arbitration proceeding could prevent the confirmation of an award by paying the award prior to the confirmation proceeding. Diane Henderson filed an action against Summerville Ford-Mercury, Inc. alleging the dealer made misrepresentations to her when she purchased a used vehicle. The circuit court granted the dealer's motion to compel arbitration, and an arbitrator found for Henderson on her claims for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act. Henderson moved to confirm the arbitration award, which was granted by the circuit court. The dealer appealed, arguing the circuit court erred: (1) in rejecting its assertion that payment of the award mooted the request for confirmation, leaving no "justiciable controversy"; and alternatively (2) in applying the provision for confirming awards contained in the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the unsuccessful party could not prevent confirmation of the award by paying it before confirmation. View "Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury" on Justia Law

Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants formed a limited liability company. The operating agreement contained an arbitration provision providing that any dispute arising out of the operating agreement shall be settled by arbitration. Plaintiff later filed suit against Defendants, alleging numerous claims, including breach of good faith and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration on those two issues under the operating agreement. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) the two claims in question did not arise out of the operating agreement or any breach or violation of the agreement, and (2) alternatively, Defendants waived any right they had to arbitration by engaging in discovery that would not have been available as a matter of right during the arbitration process and that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by these actions. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish prejudicial actions inconsistent with arbitration, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order finding waiver of contractual arbitration rights. Remanded.View "HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Employee Benefit Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The Aleut Corporation terminated its chief executive officer, Troy Johnson. He challenged the termination, and according to his employment contract, the matter was submitted to binding arbitration. That agreement contained a broad arbitration clause providing that "[a]ny and all disputes . . . arising out of, relating in any way to or in connection with this Agreement and/or Executive's employment with or termination of employment from the Company . . . shall be solely settled by an arbitration." The parties disputed whether the Corporation had violated the contract by terminating Johnson and whether Johnson's alleged breach of contract justified the termination. The arbitrator awarded damages to Johnson, finding the Corporation violated the contract. The Aleut Corporation petitioned the superior court to vacate the arbitrator's decision, claiming that the arbitrator had addressed an issue that was never submitted to arbitration and was thus not arbitrable. The superior court vacated the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority, and Johnson appealed. Because the dispute was arbitrable, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority, and therefore reversed the superior court's decision to vacate the award. View "Johnson v. The Aleut Corporation" on Justia Law