Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Union, representing certain employees at ExxonMobil's Baton Rouge refinery and chemical plant, brought suit to compel ExxonMobil to arbitrate two labor grievances pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court held that it was within the province of the courts to decide whether "a good faith claim by one party that the other party had violated a written provision" of the bargaining agreement had been asserted. The court also held that, in light of the clairty of the parties' agreement, the Union's claim that ExxonMobil violated Section 1131 of the agreement when the language of that section explicitly authorized its actions was not colorable and could not constitute a good faith claim within the meaning of the arbitration clause. The court agreed with ExxonMobil that Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp foreclosed reliance on Section 1151 of the agreement as an independent basis for the arbitrability of the contracting-out grievance. The court further held that for the same reasons that the court held that the contracting-out grievance was not arbitrable under Section 1151, Section 1151 could not serve as a basis for requiring arbitration of the post-reduction claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the contracting-out grievance, affirmed the district court's denial of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the post-reduction grievance, and reversed the district court's denial of ExxonMobil's motion for summary judgment. View "Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, John and Colm Farrell, were allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident with an insured of Defendant, Twenty-First Century Insurance Company. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant, seeking damages for personal injuries arising out of the accident. During a pretrial conference, the parties agreed to settle Plaintiffs' claims and, allegedly, further agreed to arbitrate Plaintiffs' claims. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant seeking a court order to compel arbitration. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that there was no clear manifestation of an agreement to arbitrate. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, after drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether the parties had an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. View "Farrell v. Twenty-First Century Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Don Drennen Motor Co., Inc. ("Drennen"), an automobile dealership, appealed a Jefferson Circuit Court order requiring it to pay the costs of arbitration stemming from an action filed by one of Drennen's former employees, William B. McClung. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's decision "is due to be reversed insofar as it orders Drennen to pay the entire costs of arbitration." The arbitration agreement provided that the parties must "share equally the costs, fees and expenses incurred by arbitration." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Don Drennen Motor Co.,Inc. v. William B. McClung" on Justia Law

Employee injured her wrist as a result of an equipment malfunction while performing her job and was sent to the hospital, where she was tested for drugs in accordance with a drug policy negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement. She tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently terminated. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The arbitrator sustained the Union's grievance, finding that employer lacked just cause to terminate a nine-year and otherwise satisfactory employee, who was not given adequate advance notice of the drug policy and the consequences. The district court ruled in favor of the Union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The outcome reached by the arbitrator was based on his interpretation of the relevant contractual language, which is all a court is asked to determine in conducting "exceedingly deferential," "very limited" review. View "TitanTire Corp.of Bryan v. United Steelworkers of Am," on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order denying its motion to compel plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The district court held that defendant had, by participating in the litigation for nine months prior to requesting that the case be submitted to arbitration, waived its contractual right to compel arbitration. The court found that defendant's right to compel arbitration, even if waived with respect to the claims in the Original Complaint, was revived by plaintiff's filing of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings, remanding for further proceedings. View "Krinsk v. Suntrust Bank, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Appellants, current and former shuttle bus drivers at the Minneapolis-St.Paul International Airport, brought suit against appellees in Minnesota state court alleging misclassifications of its drivers as franchisees rather than employees. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the motion to compel arbitration, erred in enforcing the class action waiver clauses in the drivers' contracts, and erred in dismissing the federal action instead of staying it pending arbitration. The court held that the district court did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration where appellants agreed to have an arbitrator determine threshold questions of arbitrability and therefore, appellants agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, transportation worker exemption applied. The court also held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion foreclosed appellants' claim that the district court erred in concluding the class action waivers were enforceable where the Supreme Court recently held that the FAA preempted a state-law-based challenge to the enforceability of class action waivers. The court held that, under the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action rather than staying it pending completion of the arbitration. View "Green, et al. v. SuperShuttle Int'l, et al." on Justia Law

Synoran and e-Pin (appellants) appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Wells Fargo, which had prevailed on its claims for breach of contract and for misappropriation of trade secrets. Appellants maintained that the district court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award, erred in confirming the award, and abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend or terminate a permanent injunction issued as part of the award. The court rejected appellants' claim that Wells Fargo was a citizen of both South Dakota and California and concluded that the district court did not err in determining that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The court also held that the district court did not err in determining that appellants had waived their right to challenge the award of injunctive relief; in declining to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitration panel exceeded the scope of its arbitral mandate; and in confirming the award of attorneys' fees against e-Pin. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to terminate or amend the permanent injunction. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e-PIN, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as a nurse by defendant in October 2006, had to take leave for cancer treatment, then was informed that she had been terminated on December 12, 2006 because she did not have "any accrued PTO time or FMLA." The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding that plaintiff assented to a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The employee handbook stated: "Dispute Resolution Process Please refer to the Eby Companies Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) for details." That policy does refer to arbitration and contains a signature line. Plaintiff claims she did not receive or sign the policy and defendant did not provide a signed acknowledgment. There was no indication that plaintiff was notified of the existence of the arbitration agreement, much less that she manifested an intent to agree to its terms.View "Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., L.L.C." on Justia Law