Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision. View "Natural Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, seeking indemnity and/or contribution based on the damage defendant allegedly caused through gross negligence in removing plaintiff's vessel from a coral reef. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., where defendant alleged that the district court erred in refusing to apply English arbitrability law. The court held that based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, courts should apply non-federal arbitrability law only if there was clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to apply such non-federal law. Because there was no clear and unmistakable evidence in this case, federal arbitrability law applied. Under federal arbitrability law, the court's decisions in Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Construction Co. and Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services, Co., mandated a narrow interpretation of a clause providing for arbitration of all disputes "arising under" an agreement. Under this narrow interpretation, the present dispute was not arbitrable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose when the SEC brought suit against Stanford Group Company (SGC), along with various other Stanford entities, including Stanford International Bank (SIB), for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction that the receiver subsequently obtained against numerous former financial advisors and employees of SGC, freezing the accounts of those individuals pending the outcome of trial. The court held that the district court had the power to decide the motion for preliminary injunction before deciding the motion to compel arbitration; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction; the preliminary injunction was not overbroad; and the district court acted within its power to grant a Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 24.005(a)(1), injunction rather than an attachment; and that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded the motion to compel arbitration for a ruling in the first instance. View "Janvey v. Alguire, et al." on Justia Law

The district court entered an order to enforce a settlement agreement against a partner, which the partner signed after mediation of several lawsuits concerning six family-run real estate partnerships. The partner had filed no objection within the 14-day period required under the local rules. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting the partner's challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. The court's order that the partner sign a release was within its power and claims that the settlement was ambiguous were too late.

Alabama Title Loans, Inc., Accurate Adjustments, LLC and Kevin Sanders all appealed a trial court order that denied their motions to compel arbitration filed against them by Plaintiff Kimberly White. In 2009, Ms. White borrowed money from Alabama Title Loans (ATL), securing the loan with an interest in her automobile. ATL required Ms. White to surrender the title to the automobile. The title-loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Ms. White subsequently paid off her loan and borrowed more money against her car several more times. In August 2009, Ms. White said she went to ATL ready to pay off her loan in full. In January 2010, ALT contracted with Accurate Adjustments to conduct a "self-help" repossession of Ms. White's automobile. The police were called, and Accurate and ATL were required to release the automobile when it could not produce the title they claimed gave them the right to repossess. Ms. White filed suit alleging multiple theories: assault and battery, negligence, wantonness, trespass, wrongful repossession and conversion. At trial, the court denied the title-loan parties' motion to compel arbitration without making any findings of fact. Based on the broad language of the arbitration clause in the title-loan agreements executed by Ms. White, the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have granted the title-loan parties' motions to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A 1997 coal supply contract provided that "[a]ll disputes under" the agreement would be referred to arbitration in Charleston. The parties extended the 1997 Agreement until 2006, but disagree as to whether a series of emails effectuated extension through 2008. In July 2008, buyer and supplier signed a new contract with an increased price, providing for arbitration in Richmond and containing a merger clause. Buyer paid the higher price under protest, claiming that the 1997 agreement remained in effect and filed for arbitration in Charleston; supplier filed for arbitration in Richmond under the 2008 agreement. The Charleston panel found that the parties had extended the 1997 agreement and that the 2008 agreement was "a glaring breach" of the extension. The Richmond panel stayed proceedings. A Virginia district court dismissed supplier's suit. A West Virginia district court granted summary judgment for buyer. The Fourth Circuit upheld the West Virginia award under the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. 10(a). The issue of which panel should decide the validity of the 2008 agreement was procedural, not jurisdiction, and did not require a decision in court. The Charleston panel based its jurisdiction on a plausible reading of the 1997 agreement.

This case stemmed from an Engagement Agreement entered into by petitioner, a developer and manufacturer of military technology, with respondent, an independent broker dealer, by which respondent agreed to act as petitioner's exclusive placement agent in an anticipated $20 million private offering of petitioner's securities to finance its anticipated development of a field-deployable vehicle. Petitioner subsequently appealed the district court's final order and judgment compelling arbitration of the claims of respondent before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The court held that because the parties expressly agreed to adjudicate their disputes before a court, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court.

This case arose out of a dispute over the construction of a yacht where the parties subsequently entered into binding arbitration pursuant to their own written agreement. At issue was whether the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" - thereby justifying vacatur of their award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4) - when they purportedly failed to provide a "reasoned award" as agreed to by the parties. The court concluded that three validly-appointed arbitrators oversaw a five day hearing and rendered a thoughtful, reasoned award. The court declined to narrowly interpret what constituted a reasonable award to overturn an otherwise apparently seamless procedure. The parties received precisely what they bargained for and to vacate the award and remand for an entirely new proceeding would insufficiently respect the value of the arbitration and inject the courts further into the arbitration process than Congress had mandated. Accordingly, the court held that the award should be confirmed and the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded for reinstatement the award.

The Pasillases purchased a home with a loan from American Brokers Conduit. The note and deed of trust were assigned to HSBC, and later, Power Default Services became a substitute trustee. The servicer for the loan was American Home Mortgage Servicing (AHMSI). After defaulting on their mortgage, the Pasillases elected to mediate pursuant to the foreclosure mediation program provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. Two mediations occurred but neither resulted in a resolution. Afterwards, the mediator filed a statement indicating that the respondents HSBC, Power Default, and AHMSI failed to participate in good faith and failed to bring to the mediation each document required. The Pasillases subsequently filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions. The district court refused the request. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the respondents did not bring the required documents to the mediation and did not have access to someone authorized to modify the loan during mediation, the district court erred in denying the Pasillas's petition for judicial review. Remanded to determine sanctions.

Appellant Moises Leyva received a quitclaim deed in exchange for taking over monthly mortgage payments on a house. Leyva did not expressly assume the mortgage note. After defaulting on the mortgage, Leyva elected to pursue mediation with the lender, Wells Fargo, through the state foreclosure mediation program. Leyva then filed a petition for judicial review in district court, claiming that Wells Fargo mediated in bad faith and should be sanctioned because it failed to produce essential documents. The district court concluded that Wells Fargo did not act in bad faith. On appeal, the Supreme Court held, as a threshold matter, that the foreclosure mediation statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086, and the foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) dictate that a homeowner, even if he is not the named mortgagor, is a proper party entitled to request mediation following a notice of default. The Court then concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Leyva's petition for judicial review, holding that (1) Wells Fargo failed to produce the documents required under the statute, and (2) Wells Fargo's failure to bring the required to the documents to the mediation is a sanctionable offense under the statute and FMRs. Reversed and remanded.