Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
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Plaintiff sued The Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. (“SCAD”) for race discrimination and retaliation after he was fired from his job as Head Fishing Coach. As part of his employment onboarding, however, Plaintiff signed a document agreeing to arbitrate—not litigate—all legal disputes that arose between him and SCAD. Accordingly, SCAD moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court, approving and adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), granted SCAD’s motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by ignoring that his agreement with SCAD was unconscionable and that SCAD waived its right to arbitrate. He also argued that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his early discovery request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting SCAD’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s arbitration agreement is neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. Further, the court found that SCAD did not waive its right to enforce arbitration and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff’s request for early discovery. In short, the court concluded that Plaintiff is bound by his agreement to arbitrate his legal claims against SCAD. View "Isaac Payne v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc." on Justia Law

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Housing Authority of the City of Calexico (the Housing Authority) and AMG & Associates, LLC (collectively, the plaintiffs) appealed a superior court confirming an arbitration award, declining to undertake a review of the award on the merits for errors of fact or law (review on the merits) and declining to grant their petition to partially reverse or vacate the award. They contended the superior court should have undertaken a review on the merits because the parties had agreed to such a review. They further contended that, had the superior court undertaken such a review, it would have concluded that no substantial evidence supported the award and that the award was contrary to law. Additionally, plaintiffs contended that, in denying their motion to partially reverse or vacate the award, the superior court left in place a finding by the arbitrator that not only exceeded the arbitrator’s powers but worked as a forfeiture against the Housing Authority. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court erred in declining to undertake a review on the merits. "[I]n instances in which the parties have agreed that an arbitration award may be subjected to judicial review, it is the superior court and not the Court of Appeal that has original jurisdiction to undertake that review in the first instance, that the superior court is without power to yield that original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal, and that the superior court should thus have performed the review." View "Housing Auth City of Calexico v. Multi-Housing Tax Credit Partners" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this administrative appeal brought by Brittain Kovac from a final decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor of Regulation's Reemployment Assistance Division (RAD) determining that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this administrative appeal.An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Kovac was ineligible to have received $20,278 in federal pandemic unemployment benefits and ordered her to repay them. Kovac attempted to filed notices of appeal, but the pleadings were returned unfiled for not meeting the requirements set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 1-26-31. Kovac then appealed with assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Kovac's failure to timely perfect an appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a notice of appeal is considered filed under section 1-26-31 on the date of receipt by the clerk of courts' office, regardless of the date the office formally accepts notice of appeal; and (2) Kovac's notice of appeal was sufficient to constitute a timely "filing" under the statute. View "Kovac v. S.D. Reemployment Assistance Division" on Justia Law

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Following the disclosures of the new information, Grupo Unidos challenged the impartiality of the arbitrators before the International Court of Arbitration (“ICA”) of the International Chamber of Commerce. The ICA agreed that some arbitrators failed to make a few disclosures but, notably, did not find any basis for removal and rejected Grupo Unidos’s challenges on the merits. Thereafter, Grupo Unidos moved -- unsuccessfully -- for the vacatur of the awards in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Autoridad del Canal de Panama, in turn, cross-moved for confirmation of the awards, which the district court granted. Grupo Unidos appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the International Court of Arbitration and the district court that Grupo Unidos has presented nothing that comes near the high threshold required for vacatur. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of vacatur and the confirmation of the awards. The court wrote that there is no indication in this record that Grupo Unidos did not have a robust opportunity to present evidence and confront the other side’s evidence. View "Grupo Unidos por el Canal, S.A., et al. v. Autoridad del Canal de Panama" on Justia Law

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Mark Kielar challenged a superior court’s decision to grant Hyundai Motor America’s (Hyundai) motion to compel arbitration of his causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement arising from alleged mechanical defects in the condition of his 2012 Hyundai Tucson. The superior court’s ruling followed Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) and concluded Hyundai, a nonsignatory manufacturer, could enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract between Kielar and his local car dealership under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court of Appeal joined recent decisions that have disagreed with Felisilda and concluded the court erred in ordering arbitration. Therefore, it issued a preemptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its June 16, 2022 order and enter a new order denying Hyundai’s motion. View "Kielar v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Petitioner is a former employee of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) who signed a separation agreement requiring confidential arbitration of any claims arising from her termination. Petitioner arbitrated an age-discrimination claim against IBM and won. She then filed a petition in federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to confirm the award, attaching it to the petition under seal but simultaneously moving to unseal it. Shortly after she filed the petition, IBM paid the award in full. The district court granted Petitioner’s petition to confirm the award and her motion to unseal. On appeal, IBM argued that (1) the petition to confirm became moot once IBM paid the award, and (2) the district court erred in unsealing the confidential award.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s confirmation of the award and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot. The court reversed the district court’s grant of the motion to unseal. The court explained that Petitioner’s petition to confirm her purely monetary award became moot when IBM paid the award in full because there remained no “concrete” interest in enforcement of the award to maintain a case or controversy under Article III. Second, any presumption of public access to judicial documents is outweighed by the importance of confidentiality under the FAA and the impropriety of Petitioner’s effort to evade the confidentiality provision in her arbitration agreement. View "Stafford v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal from a district court order granting a motion to stay arbitration proceedings between the codefendants in the underlying negligence action, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable.Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. contracted with Ferrandino & Son, Inc. to provide services at various locations through the United States. Ferrandino contracted with Patera Landscaping, LLC to perform snow removal services at three Walgreens locations in Omaha. Yvonne McPherson was injured when she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside an Omaha Walgreens and filed a negligence action against Patera, Ferrandino, and Walgreens. Ferrandino filed a demand for arbitration seeking a determination that under the terms of the subcontract, Patera had a contractual duty to defend and indemnify both Ferrandino and Walgreens against McPherson's claims. Petera moved to stay the arbitration based on Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2603. The district court granted the motion to stay arbitration, and Ferrandino appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable. View "McPherson v. Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

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Alliance Pipeline L.P. (“Alliance”) entered into contracts with four states (“State Agreements”) as well as contracts with individual landowners in order to build a natural gas pipeline. The contracts with landowners provide easements for the pipeline right-of-way. In 2018, some landowners on the pipeline right-of-way filed a class-action lawsuit against Alliance. After the class was certified, Alliance moved to compel arbitration for the approximately 73 percent of plaintiffs whose easements contain arbitration provisions. Alliance appealed, arguing the district court erred by not sending all issues to arbitration for the plaintiffs whose easements contain arbitration provisions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that the district court that the damages issues are subject to arbitration for the plaintiffs whose easements contain an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs make two arguments against sending any issues to arbitration: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be within the scope of the arbitration provisions because the claims allege lack of compensation for “ongoing yield losses,” not “damages to crops” and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the State Agreements, which do not have arbitration provisions. The court found the arbitration agreements to be enforceable and to cover all issues. The court held that as to the arbitration class members, the claims should be dismissed without prejudice. As to the members of the class without arbitration provisions, the court saw no reason why these class members cannot proceed with the lawsuit in the normal course at the district court. View "H&T Fair Hills, Ltd. v. Alliance Pipeline L.P." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

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Prospect Funding Holdings (NY), LLC, won arbitration awards against Ronald Palagi and his law firm, Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC. Palagi and his firm filed an application to vacate the awards in federal court, which the district court granted.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that applicants seeking to vacate or confirm awards under Section 9 and Section 10 must identify an “independent jurisdictional basis” for their actions. The court wrote that the dispute between Prospect and Palagi and his firm does not contain a federal question, so diversity of citizenship between the parties must exist. Here, the application to vacate the 2021 awards does not identify any jurisdictional basis whatsoever. Crucially, Palagi and his firm failed to plead the parties’ citizenship in the application. Palagi’s individual citizenship has never been pleaded before the court. Diversity of citizenship has not been established so the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. View "Prospect Funding Holdings (NY) v. Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., L.L.C." on Justia Law