Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A property-insurance dispute arose between a condominium association and its insurer after storms damaged the property. The association demanded an appraisal of the loss, and both parties selected appraisers who then chose an umpire. The association's appraiser disclosed, on the day of final negotiations, that he believed he had a financial stake in the award due to a contingency-fee retainer. The insurer did not object at that time, and the appraisal panel issued an award over a month later. Subsequently, the insurer moved to vacate the award, claiming the appraiser's partiality.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the insurer's motion to vacate the award, ruling that the insurer had waived its objection by not raising it sooner. The court also confirmed the appraisal award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the insurer waived its objection to the appraiser's partiality by failing to object at the time of the disclosure. The court emphasized that a party must timely object to an arbitrator's or appraiser's partiality when it becomes aware of a potential conflict of interest. By waiting over two months and until after the award was issued, the insurer forfeited its right to challenge the appraiser's impartiality. The court did not address other arguments related to the choice of law or the appraiser's partiality, as the waiver issue was dispositive. View "Biscayne Beach Club Condominium Association, Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Brent Electric Company (Brent) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 584 (the Union) have had a long-standing relationship since 1996. In 2018, they entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that included an interest-arbitration clause allowing either party to unilaterally submit unresolved issues to arbitration if negotiations for a new CBA failed. In 2020, Brent terminated its authorization for the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) to negotiate on its behalf and later stopped contributing to the Union pension fund. The Union filed a grievance, and the Labor Management Committee ruled in favor of the Union. In 2021, Brent and the Union failed to negotiate a new CBA, leading the Union to unilaterally submit the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator imposed a new CBA, which included both mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed Brent’s complaint to vacate the arbitration award and granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment to enforce the award. The district court found that the interest-arbitration clause in the 2018 CBA was broad and unambiguous, covering all unresolved issues, including permissive subjects of bargaining. The court also rejected Brent’s argument that the arbitration award violated public policy or the Federal Arbitration Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the presumption of arbitrability applied because the interest-arbitration clause was validly formed and unambiguously covered both mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. The court rejected Brent’s argument that it had a statutory right to refuse the imposition of permissive subjects, noting that Brent had contractually agreed to the interest-arbitration clause. The court also found no violation of public policy, as the arbitration award did not include a self-perpetuating interest-arbitration clause. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed its powers under the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Brent Electric Company v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Charlotte Erdmann, a massage therapist insured by Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), was sued by a patient, Kristin Schantzen, and her husband, Jay, for injuries sustained during a massage session. Erdmann's employer, Valley Chiropractic Clinic, was insured by NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). APIC and Erdmann requested NCMIC to cover the claims, but NCMIC refused and instead filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify Erdmann. The Schantzens settled with Erdmann and Valley, with NCMIC agreeing to pay $250,000 of the settlement, leaving the dispute over who would pay Erdmann’s $1.6 million settlement.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied APIC's motion to compel arbitration based on a clause in APIC’s policy with Erdmann. APIC argued that NCMIC should be compelled to arbitrate under the theory of direct-benefits estoppel. The district court concluded that Minnesota law did not support APIC's position, as NCMIC did not seek direct benefits from the APIC-Erdmann policy and was not a third-party beneficiary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court predicted that the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt a limited version of direct-benefits estoppel, only allowing a nonsignatory to be compelled to arbitrate if they directly benefited from the contract containing the arbitration clause. The court found that NCMIC did not directly benefit from the APIC-Erdmann policy and thus could not be compelled to arbitrate. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that APIC could not compel NCMIC to arbitrate its claims under Minnesota law. View "NCMIC Insurance Company v. Allied Professionals Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Eniola Famuyide filed a lawsuit against Chipotle Mexican Grill and its subsidiary, alleging sexual assault and harassment in the workplace. Famuyide claimed that a co-worker began harassing her shortly after she started working in May 2021 and sexually assaulted her in November 2021. She reported the incident to her manager, took a leave of absence, and later faced issues accessing the company’s online portal, leading her to believe she had been terminated. Chipotle later informed her that the termination was an error. Famuyide's complaint included claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, and other related charges under Minnesota law.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and denied Chipotle's motion to compel arbitration. The court determined that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 applied, as the dispute arose after the Act's enactment date of March 3, 2022. Chipotle argued that the dispute arose before this date, pointing to the initial harassment and assault in 2021 and letters from Famuyide’s counsel in February 2022. However, the court found that no formal dispute existed between the parties until after the Act's enactment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that a "dispute" under the Act did not arise until after March 3, 2022, as there was no conflict or controversy between Famuyide and Chipotle before that date. The court rejected Chipotle's arguments that the dispute arose either at the time of the assault or upon receipt of the February 2022 letters from Famuyide’s counsel. The court also declined to consider a March 1, 2022, letter from Chipotle’s counsel, as it was not part of the record. The district court's order was affirmed. View "Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC) sought to compel arbitration in a dispute with NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). The dispute arose after a patient sued Charlotte Erdmann, a massage therapist insured by APIC, for injuries sustained during a massage. Erdmann's employer, Valley Chiropractic Clinic, was insured by NCMIC. NCMIC declined to defend or indemnify Erdmann and instead filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to cover Erdmann or, alternatively, that its coverage was secondary to APIC's. The patient settled with Erdmann and Valley, leaving the question of whether NCMIC or APIC was responsible for Erdmann's $1.6 million settlement.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied APIC's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Minnesota law did not support APIC's argument for direct-benefits estoppel, which would have allowed APIC to compel NCMIC to arbitrate based on a clause in APIC's policy with Erdmann. The district court found that NCMIC did not seek or obtain direct benefits from the APIC-Erdmann policy and thus could not be compelled to arbitrate under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Minnesota law would likely adopt a limited version of direct-benefits estoppel, which only applies when a nonsignatory directly benefits from the contract containing the arbitration clause. The court found that NCMIC did not directly benefit from the APIC-Erdmann policy and therefore could not be compelled to arbitrate. The court also noted that neither the Eighth Circuit nor the Minnesota Supreme Court had applied direct-benefits estoppel in a similar fact pattern, where a signatory sought to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Osorio" on Justia Law

Martin Brauner transmitted HPV to M.O. through sexual activity in Brauner’s GEICO-insured automobile. M.O. threatened to sue Brauner for negligence and demanded $1,000,000 from GEICO, which denied the claim and sought a federal court declaration that the policy did not cover M.O.’s injuries. Brauner and M.O. settled the threatened lawsuit, agreeing that M.O. would collect only from GEICO if an arbitrator found Brauner negligent. The arbitrator awarded M.O. $5,200,000, which M.O. sought to confirm in Missouri state court. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the confirmation and remanded the case to allow GEICO to intervene.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially handled the case but transferred it to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri due to lack of personal jurisdiction over M.O. The district court granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required bodily injury to arise out of the use of the automobile, and that sexual activity in an automobile did not constitute “use” under Kansas insurance law. Brauner and M.O. appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the insurance policy unambiguously required bodily injury to arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile. The court found that sexual activity in an automobile did not meet this requirement, as the automobile was merely the situs of the injury and not causally connected to the negligent act. Therefore, M.O.’s injuries were not covered under the policy. View "GEICO General Insurance Co. v. M.O." on Justia Law

In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law

Peter Quach filed a lawsuit against California Commerce Club (Commerce Club) after being terminated from his job at the casino where he had worked for nearly 30 years. Quach's complaint included claims of wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and he demanded a jury trial. Commerce Club had previously provided Quach with a signed arbitration agreement from 2015, which mandated binding arbitration for employment-related disputes. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Commerce Club answered the complaint and engaged in extensive discovery, including propounding interrogatories and taking Quach’s deposition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Commerce Club’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Commerce Club had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation for 13 months. The court noted that Commerce Club had actively participated in discovery and requested a jury trial, actions inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. Commerce Club appealed, and the Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Quach had not shown sufficient prejudice from Commerce Club’s delay in seeking arbitration.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and abrogated the state’s arbitration-specific prejudice requirement, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The court held that under California law, as under federal law, courts should apply the same principles to determine waiver of the right to compel arbitration as they do for other contracts. The court concluded that Commerce Club had waived its right to compel arbitration by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc." on Justia Law