Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Aronow sued Emergent for legal malpractice. Based on an arbitration provision in the retainer agreement, the trial court granted Emegent's motion to compel arbitration after finding the agreement was valid. Aronow and Emergent agreed on an arbitrator. Aronow was required to make a $1,500 advance payment for the arbitrator’s fee. At the initial conference with the arbitrator, Aronow, currently receiving public assistance relief in Alaska, advised that he was unable to pay the arbitration fees. In the trial court, Aronow sought a waiver of arbitration fees and costs or alternatively to lift the court stay.The court of appeal addressed a certified question and held that a trial court that granted a defendant’s petition to compel arbitration has jurisdiction to lift the stay of court proceedings where a plaintiff demonstrates financial inability to pay anticipated arbitration costs. Aronow must be allowed to attempt to demonstrate his inability to pay the arbitrator’s fees. If the trial court finds Aronow is unable to pay that fee, it should give Emergent the choice either to pay Aronow’s share of the fee or to waive the right to arbitrate. View "Aronow v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court ordering the parties to arbitrate their dispute, holding that the lower courts did not err.The arbitration agreement at issue in this case did not specify an arbitration service. When Respondent refused to cooperate to start the arbitration proceedings, Petitioner petitioned to compel arbitration. The circuit court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute, thus denying Respondent's argument that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when the contract is silent on the issue, a petition to compel arbitration under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 3-207 is not subject to a defense under CJ 5-101; (2) the court of special appeals did not err in applying Gannett Fleming in affirming the circuit court; and (3) a petition to compel arbitration under CJ 3-207 is not subject to the limitations period set forth in CJ 5-101. View "Park Plus v. Palisades of Towson, LLC" on Justia Law

K.F.C., age 11, signed up for a Snapchat account. Snapchat's terms specify that a person must be at least 13 to have an account. K.F.C. lied about her age. Before she turned 18, K.F.C. sued, alleging that Snapchat’s features amount to facial recognition, which violates the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, K.F.C. acknowledges that she accepted Snapchat’s terms but denies that its arbitration clause binds her although she continued using Snapchat after turning 13.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. An arbitrator, not a court, must decide whether K.F.C.’s youth is a defense to the contract’s enforcement. While even the most sweeping delegation cannot send the contract-formation issue to the arbitrator, state law does not provide that agreements between adults and children are void but treats such agreements as voidable (capable of ratification), so the age of the contracting parties is a potential defense to enforcement. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration is enforceable to the extent any promise is enforceable as a matter of state law, 9 U.S.C. 2. A challenge to the validity (as opposed to the existence) of a contract goes to the arbitrator; K.F.C.’s arguments about her youth and public policy concern the contract’s validity, not its existence. View "K.F.C. v. Snap Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concluding that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Tribeca Asset Management, Inc., holding that the parties' agreement did not provide for arbitration in Florida.Tribeca and Ancla International, S.A. entered into a confidentiality agreement. Ancla later filed a petition to compel arbitration. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that a provision in the parties' agreement did not contain a forum selection clause and merely contained a choice of law provision. The Third District reversed, concluding that the provision contained a forum selection clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement did not provide for arbitration in Florida. View "Tribeca Asset Management, Inc. v. Ancla International, S.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an action seeking a determination that an oil and gas lease has expired by its own terms is a controversy "involving the title to or the possession of real estate" so that the action is exempt from arbitration under Ohio Rev. Code 2711.01(B)(1).Appellants brought an action for declaratory judgment alleging that oil and gas leases between the parties had terminated because Appellee failed to produce oil or gas or to commence drilling operations within the terms of the lease. Appellee moved to stay pending arbitration. The trial court denied the request, concluding that Appellants' claims involved the title to or the possession of real property, and therefore, were exempt from arbitration under Ohio Rev. Code 2711.01(B)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court correctly declined to stay the action in this case pending arbitration. View "French v. Ascent Resources-Utica, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondents Louise McGraw and Charlotte Rodgers, by and through their daughters, Nancy Reuschel and Loretta Holcomb, filed a complaint against Petitioner, Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd., arguing that Petitioner defrauded their mothers by making misrepresentations and misleading statements and concealing material facts, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). See W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 to -8-102. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision set forth in the residency agreement Reuschel and Holcomb signed on behalf of their motions. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement could not be enforced as written. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that the arbitration agreement could not be enforced as written because it did not "comply with its own stated standards." View "Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that the parties' contract in this case and its arbitration provision were unenforceable on the grounds that the parties never had a meeting of the minds on the contract, holding that the parties formed the agreement reflected in the contract they signed.Plaintiffs, members of the family of a woman killed in a high-speed crash while riding in a car driven by an intoxicated adult entertainer employed by Defendant, sued for wrongful death and survival damages, alleging that Defendant continued serving the driver alcohol after knowing she was clearly intoxicated. Defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract containing an arbitration provision that the decedent and Defendant had signed almost two years earlier. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the terms in the contract were not perfectly clear, and therefore, there was no meeting of the minds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract terms were sufficient to constitute an enforceable contract. View "Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court in this case, holding that the district court applied an overly narrow legal standard in denying a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award but did not err in refusing to grant attorney fees.Sutey Oil Company brought a complaint against Monroe's High County Travel Plaza and Marvin Monroe (collectively, Monroe), and the parties stipulated to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator entered judgment for Sutey and awarded $220,750. Monroe moved to either modify or vacate the arbitration award. The district court denied the motion and refused to grant Sutey's request for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) remand was required for clarification of the amount of the award pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 25-5-217; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Sutey's motion for an award of attorney fees. View "Sutey Oil Co. v. Monroe's High Country Travel Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

Robinson submitted an “uninsured driver” claim to State Farm for injuries sustained in an accident involving her car and an unidentified vehicle. Coverage was available only if the two cars came into contact. (Ins. Code 11580.2(b)(1).) In arbitration, State Farm propounded requests for admissions that there was either no contact between the two cars or that no damage resulted from any contact. Robinson failed to respond by the due date. After finding that Robinson had not “substantially complied” with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.220 or 2015.5, the court deemed the requests admitted and awarded sanctions. Robinson unsuccessfully moved to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions, citing inadvertence. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of State Farm, relying on the established admissions.The trial court confirmed the award. The court of appeal affirmed. In typical arbitration proceedings, discovery disputes are resolved by the arbitrator but in uninsured-motorist arbitration proceedings, discovery disputes are resolved by a trial court. Trial court discovery orders in these proceedings are not reviewable on appeal from a judgment confirming the arbitration award. A party’s recourse to challenge an allegedly improper discovery ruling in an uninsured-motorist arbitration proceeding is through a timely petition for a writ of mandamus. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After P&ID petitioned for confirmation of an arbitral award against Nigeria, Nigeria moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court denied the motion on the ground that Nigeria impliedly waived sovereign immunity by joining The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).Following its determination that it has appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the DC Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Nigeria's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on different grounds, concluding that a foreign court's order ostensibly setting aside an arbitral award has no bearing on the district court's jurisdiction and is instead an affirmative defense properly suited for consideration at the merits stage. In this case, because the requirements of the arbitration exception under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6) are satisfied, Nigeria’s sovereign immunity has been abrogated. View "Process and Industrial Developments Limited v. Federal Republic of Nigeria" on Justia Law