Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Petitioners appeal the district court's order denying their petition to set aside an arbitral award issued by an ad hoc arbitral tribunal constituted under a bilateral investment treaty between Mongolia and the People's Republic of China, and granting Mongolia's cross-petition to confirm the award. Petitioners also challenge the district court's rejection of their petition to compel arbitration on the merits.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting the appeal and holding that petitioners were not entitled to de novo review of the arbitrability of their investment claims. While the bilateral investment treaty in this case does not contain a clear statement empowering arbitrators to decide issues of arbitrability, the court held that the parties nonetheless clearly and unmistakably agreed to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal in the course of the dispute between them. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly declined to determine independently the arbitrability of petitioners' investment claims; in reaching their decision on arbitrability, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers; and the court agreed with the district court's decision to confirm the award. View "Beijing Shougang Mining Investment Co., Ltd. v. Mongolia" on Justia Law

Continental’s primary insurance companies covered risks such as mass tort and pollution liability and purchased reinsurance policies from Underwriters. For over 40 years, the parties agreed on the methodology for calculating reinsurance obligations. In 2010, Continental outsourced its claims handling to Resolute, which made higher demands for payment from Underwriters under a new methodology. Underwriters objected and sought arbitration. A panel conducted a hearing and found Continental’s new methodology contrary to the parties’ established course of dealings. Concerned that the Final Award was not clear about Underwriters’ future reinsurance liability obligations, Continental asked the Panel to clarify whether the statement “Petitioners have paid the full amount due” related only to past bills or if it was meant to cover past and future billings. The Panel denied Continental’s motion for clarification but added that Underwriters had "fully and finally discharged its past, present and future obligations" for the accounts. Continental argued the award amounted to a sanction and that the Panel lacked the authority to issue sanctions or penalties.Continental then sought confirmation of the Final Award but vacatur of the subsequent Order, citing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 9–10. The district court confirmed everything. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the FAA’s narrow set of reasons that may support a court’s confirmation, vacatur, or modification of an award. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Romero, a truck driver employed by Watkins, an interstate trucking business, made deliveries only to retail stores in California. To complete paperwork and training, Romero periodically logged in to an online portal that required a unique employee identification number and password. Romero’s unique user account completed a set of “Associate Acknowledgements,” through which he clicked “I Agree,” signifying that he read and agreed to the Arbitration Policy, a stand-alone agreement that purports to waive any right to bring or participate in a class action; it states that the agreement is “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and purports to waive "any provision of the FAA which would otherwise exclude [the agreement] from its coverage.” However, if "this [agreement] and/or its Waiver Provisions are not subject to and governed by the FAA, then the laws of the State of Nevada . . . will be the applicable state law.” The Arbitration Policy was not a condition of employment. Romero did not opt-out. In August 2019, Watkins announced it would cease operations. Romero and other employees were laid off.Romero filed a putative class action under the California and federal WARN Acts, 29 U.S.C. 2101, which require advance notice to employees before being laid off. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration. The NInth Circuit affirmed, while noting that the Federal FAA exemption of employment contracts for transportation workers applies and cannot be waived by private contract. View "Romero v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration, holding that a fee agreement between a client and her attorney, especially where the attorney agrees to advance the costs of arbitration, is relevant to determining a plaintiff's ability to arbitrate her claims.Plaintiff signed two contracts with Defendants when arranging for her mother, Concetta Rizzio, to live at a nursing care facility. Each contract included an arbitration clause with a cost-shifting provision (the agreement) stating that Rizzio would be responsible for all costs of arbitration if she made a claim against the nursing home. When a fellow resident attacked Rizzio, Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence and abuse of a vulnerable adult. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was unduly oppressive, unenforceable, and unconscionable. The court of appeals reversed as to the issue of procedural unconscionability but agreed that the cost-shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and that it was enforceable. View "Rizzio v. Surpass Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, AmeriHome, in a putative class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime compensation and unlawful business practices. The superior court granted AmeriHome's motion to compel arbitration, ordered arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.In light of the uncertainty of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's appeal from the order compelling arbitration and the absence of any delay or prejudice our intervention at this stage would cause, the court found this an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretion to treat the appeal from that order as a petition for writ of mandate. The court denied the petition on the merits, concluding that Labor Code section 229 does not exempt plaintiff's wage claim from arbitration. In this case, neither the choice-of-law provision nor the arbitration agreement contains "unambiguous language" making it "unmistakably clear" that the parties intended to incorporate section 229 while agreeing to arbitrate "any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to" plaintiff's employment at AmeriHome.The court also concluded that the superior court properly exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure 1281.2 to order arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims. The court explained that the superior court reasonably concluded the conditions for invoking the third-party litigation exception did not exist because plaintiff's lawsuit did not arise out of the same transaction as the Brooks action, and there was no likelihood of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. Furthermore, even when the third-party litigation exception applies, the superior court has discretion to "order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration." Therefore, the court affirmed the order dismissing the putative class claims, dismissed the order compelling arbitration, and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss this amended complaint brought by Plaintiff seeking a determination that Defendants - the City of Wilmington, the Wilmington Police Department, and the mayor of the City - breached the collective bargaining agreement between the police union and the City when he was terminated for an alleged violation of the City's resident requirement, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Specifically, the Court of Chancery held that Plaintiff's claims fell within the grievance procedure and were therefore subject to arbitration, and where Plaintiff did not follow the grievance process that was provided in the collective bargaining agreement, a complete remedy otherwise existed in the form of the grievance process outlined in the agreement. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed an arbitration award that reinstated a member of the union to her former position after she was discharged by the company. The court concluded that the parties agreement authorized the arbitrator to determine whether there has been a violation of the parties' agreement within the allegations set forth in the grievance. In this case, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement's just cause provision and the provision does not specify that the same just cause is sufficient to justify all types of adverse action.The court also concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the record does not establish that the employee committed abuse as defined by the cited statutes, or that allowing her to return to work after a suspension violates public policy. View "WM Crittenden Operations, LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers" on Justia Law

After an arbitration panel issued its award in a dispute between J.B. Hunt and BNSF, the district court confirmed the award but denied Hunt's request for additional relief.The Eighth Circuit focused on the substance of Hunt's request for additional relief rather than how Hunt captioned it, concluding that the request was not premature. The court also concluded that, assuming Hunt's interpretation of the award is correct, it was entitled to a declaratory judgment to that effect once the district court had confirmed the award. BNSF's argument to the contrary is unavailing. Although the court agreed with BNSF that it need not reach the merits of the parties' dispute about the interpretation of the award to conclude that the district court properly denied Hunt's request for "enforcement" insofar as it was a request for an order of specific performance, the court did not need to reach the merits of the parties' dispute about the interpretation of the award to determine whether the district court properly denied Hunt's request for "enforcement" insofar as it was a request for a declaratory judgment. Finally, the court concluded that the parties' arguments expose a genuine ambiguity in the award, describing BNSF's obligations under the award. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Lim, formerly a TForce California delivery driver, alleged that TForce employs delivery drivers and misclassifies them as independent contractors in violation of California law. The drivers sign an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement, providing that the agreement is governed by the laws of Texas, that “any legal proceedings … shall be filed and/or maintained in Dallas, Texas,” that all disputes “arising under, out of, or relating to this Agreement … including any claims or disputes arising under any state or federal laws, statutes or regulations, … including the arbitrability of disputes … shall be fully resolved by arbitration," that any arbitration will be governed by the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, that class actions are prohibited, and that the parties shall share the costs except in the case of substantial financial hardship--the prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, referring to the Agreement as an adhesion contract. Based on the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions, the district court correctly concluded the delegation clause, which requires the arbitrator to determine the gateway issue of arbitrability, the agreement was substantively unconscionable as to Lim. View "Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1949, the government of Saudi Arabia transferred certain land in that country to an official named Khalid Abu Al-Waleed Al-Hood Al-Qarqani, who leased it to an affiliate of what later became Chevron. Five of Al-Qarqani's heirs now claim that Chevron owes them billions of dollars in rent. Plaintiffs contend that an arbitration clause contained in a separate 1933 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Chevron's predecessor, SOCAL, applies to their dispute. An Egyptian arbitral panel agreed and awarded plaintiffs $18 billion. Plaintiffs then petitioned for enforcement of the arbitral award, but the district court found that the parties had never agreed to arbitrate and therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit, disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, that the absence of an agreement to arbitrate was a reason to deny enforcement on the merits, rather than to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The panel held that so long as a party makes a non-frivolous claim that an arbitral award is covered by the New York Convention, the district court must assume subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to Chevron USA because it was not named in the arbitral award and plaintiffs advanced no non-frivolous theory of enforcement. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the enforcement petition on the merits as to Chevron Corporation where there was no binding agreement to arbitrate between the parties. View "Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law