Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
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Plaintiff (K.D.) was a resident at Muirwoods when she suffered falls, resulting in a fractured hip and deteriorating health. She became bedbound and was allegedly left in unsanitary conditions and infected with scabies. Muirwoods alleged that K.D.’s daughter Tennier, signed an arbitration agreement pursuant to her authority to make health care decisions for K.D. when assisting in her placement at Muirwoods. The arbitration provision included a delegation clause providing that an arbitrator would decide whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated. The clause specified that the agreement to arbitrate could be withdrawn within 30 days and that “agreeing to arbitration is not a condition of admission to the Community.”The court of appeal affirmed the denial o the motion to compel arbitration. The initial determination of whether Tennier was authorized to agree to arbitration on K.D.’s behalf is one for the court, not the arbitrator. Tennier was not K.D.’s agent for purposes of binding her to arbitration. Because the arbitration provision was optional, with its own signature line, it was essentially a separate agreement, Muirwoods did not establish that Tennier, who did not act pursuant to a durable power of attorney or similar authorization, could bind K.D. to an arbitration agreement as part of authorizing her admission. View "Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court requiring the parties to arbitrate their dispute in this case, holding that the district court erred in compelling arbitration.In 2000, Air-Con signed a written distribution agreement with Daikin Industries, LTD to be an authorized distributor in Puerto Rico of air conditioning and refrigeration equipment. The agreement contained an arbitration provision requiring the parties to arbitrate any disputes in Japan. Also in 2000, Air-Con established a distribution relationship with Daikin Applied Latin America, LLC, Daikin Industries' subsidiary. In 2018, Air-Con filed suit against Daikin Applied seeking injunctive relief and damages under Puerto Rico's Dealer Protection Act. After the case was removed to federal court Daikin Applied filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the written agreement between Air-Con and Daikin Industries governed Daikin Applied's relationship with Air-Con. The district court agreed with Daikin Applied. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Air-Con agreed to arbitrate the claims at issue in this case. View "Air-Con, Inc. v. Daikin Applied Latin America, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court compelling arbitration in this suit alleging breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that there was no error.Three doctors, including Lisa Pasquarello and John Artz, formed a limited liability company for their veterinary clinic and adopted an operating agreement that contained an arbitration clause. When Pasquarello tried to sell her portion of the practice to Artz through an oral agreement and the sale failed, Pasquarello brought this lawsuit against Artz. The district court compelled arbitration, concluding that the claims fell under the arbitration clause in the operating agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) each of Pasquarello's claims related to the enforcement or interpretation of the operating agreement; and (2) therefore, court of appeals correctly held that the district court properly compelled arbitration. View "Hitorq, LLC v. TCC Veterinary Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appealsaffirming the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration in this insurance dispute, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to compel.Grace McGaughey, the trustee of a trust, entered into a contract with Money Concepts Capital Corporation and Legacy Consulting Group, LLC to purchase a variable annuity with Jackson National Life Insurance Company. The contract contained an arbitration agreement. Following McGaughey's death, the executrix of her estate sued Money Concepts, Legacy Conultants, and Jackson, alleging several common law and statutory claims. Money Concepts and Legacy Consulting moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that McGaughey's investment was insurance, and therefore, the arbitration provision was unenforceable under Ky. Rev. Stat. 417.050(2). View "Legacy Consulting Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appeals two concurrent orders denying his petition to confirm an arbitration award and granting Comerica Bank's petition to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator made a material omission or misrepresentation in his disclosure of prior cases involving the parties' lawyers.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the bank failed to seek the arbitrator's disqualification within 15 days of discovering the facts requiring disqualification and before the arbitrator decided the pending fee motion, it forfeited the right to demand disqualification. Accordingly, the court reversed the order vacating the award based on the arbitrator's disqualification. Because the bank identified no other grounds for denying the petition to confirm the award, the court granted that petition. View "Goodwin v. Comerica Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing a trial court’s order confirming an arbitration award against Interstate National Dealer Services, Inc. (“INDS”), in favor of Southern Mountain Adventures, LLC (“Dealer”), and Adventure Motorsports Reinsurance Ltd. (“Reinsurer”). The dispute arose from the parties’ contractual relationship pursuant to which Dealer sold motorsports vehicle service contracts, which were underwritten and administered by INDS, to Dealer’s retail customers, and Reinsurer held funds in reserve to pay covered repair claims. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the confirmation of the award because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in rendering the award. In Case No. S21G0015, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the order confirming the arbitration award on that basis, and remanded for resolution of INDS’s argument that the arbitrator overstepped his authority in making the award. In Case No. S21G0008, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing as moot Dealer and Reinsurer’s appeal of the trial court’s failure to enforce a delayed-payment penalty provided in the arbitration award, and remanded for reconsideration of that issue. View "Adventure Motorsports Reinsurance, Ltd., et al. v. Interstate National Dealer Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against IML in state court, alleging claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, and fraudulent misrepresentation. After removal to federal court, the district court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate and then denied IML's motion to compel arbitration.The Eighth Circuit remanded to the district court for a trial to determine whether an arbitration agreement exists. In this case, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the district court found that material facts remain in dispute as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. The court explained that the next step should have been to hold a trial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 4. View "Duncan v. International Markets Live, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendants Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (Pinnacle) and Jennifer Stewart (Stewart) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion because it determined the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As to the former, the court noted the agreement was unconscionable because plaintiff Anthony De Leon was required to sign the arbitration agreement as a precondition to his employment. As to the latter, the court found the agreement was substantively unconscionable because of its limits on discovery and because it shortened the statute of limitations to one year on all claims. On appeal, defendants contended the arbitration agreement had low procedural unconscionability and contained only one substantively unconscionable provision: the statute of limitations provision. They alternatively claimed the court erred by failing to sever any unconscionable provisions. After careful consideration of the agreement at issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court’s unconscionability findings. Further, the Court held the trial court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever any portion of the arbitration agreement. View "De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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Beginning in 1986, Arabian was the sole authorized dealer for Ford brands in Kuwait. In a 2005 Agreement, the companies agreed to use “binding arbitration” as the “exclusive recourse” for any dispute. Ford ended the Agreement in 2016 and applied to the American Arbitration Association for a declaration that it permissibly ended the Agreement. Arabian sued, seeking an injunction prohibiting Ford from proceeding with arbitration and asserting breach of contract and fraud. Arabian argued that the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. 1226, requires that arbitration between dealers and car manufacturers requires that the parties consent to it after the dispute arises. The district court denied the motion, deciding that the arbitrator must resolve the gateway issue.The arbitral tribunal decided that the Act did not deprive it of authority and held that Ford permissibly terminated the Agreement; it taxed Arabian $1.35 million for fees and costs. Arabian brought counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud but withdrew them before the award. The Sixth Circuit confirmed the award. On remand, Ford moved to stay the federal action to allow the arbitrator to resolve Arabian’s common law claims. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Act’s command, 9 U.S.C. 3, that a district court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial,” conveys a mandatory obligation. Dismissal, unlike a stay, permits an objecting party to file an immediate appeal; a dismissal order undercuts the Act's pro-arbitration appellate-review provisions. View "Arabian Motors Group W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

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This case stems from plaintiffs' claim of rights under a 1933 agreement between Standard Oil of California and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a 1949 agreement between the purported ancestors of plaintiffs and the Arabian American Oil Company. Plaintiffs seek to enforce an arbitral award against defendant, Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), which they were awarded by an Egyptian arbitration panel.After determining that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration tolled the period for filing a notice of appeal, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)(2), the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the case based on lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that Saudi Arabian Oil Company is an instrumentality of a foreign state and is therefore immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The court stated that the arbitral proceedings give every appearance of having been a sham, and there exists no agreement among these parties to arbitrate this dispute, or anything else for that matter. The court decided that, instead of denying the petition for enforcement, the case is more properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, given that Saudi Aramco qualifies as a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. View "Al-Qarqani v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co." on Justia Law