Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to construe Western Bagel's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and granted the petition, directing the trial court to enter a new order compelling the parties to arbitrate their dispute via binding arbitration in accordance with the terms of their arbitration agreement.In this case, the trial court found that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs the parties' arbitration agreement, concluded that the inconsistency between the Spanish and English severability clauses creates an ambiguity regarding whether the parties consented to binding or nonbinding arbitration, resolved this ambiguity against Western Bagel pursuant to the constructive canon of contra proferentem, and ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute on a nonbinding basis.Upon reaching the merits of Western Bagel's writ petition, the court concluded that the FAA preempted the trial court's use of contra proferentem. Assuming arguendo there is an ambiguity regarding whether the parties consented to binding or nonbinding arbitration, the court employed the FAA's default rule that any ambiguities about the scope of an arbitration agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, a fundamental attribute of which is a binding arbitral proceeding. View "Western Bagel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Borough of Carteret and the Firefighters Mutual Benevolent Association, Local 67 (FMBA) executed a collectively negotiated agreement (CNA) governing the terms and conditions of employment for the Borough’s firefighters. As of 2013, the Borough employed four captains and generally staffed each shift with one captain, who was charged with managing subordinate firefighters also on duty. Under the CNA, if no captains were scheduled to work a particular shift, the senior firefighter on duty would assume the captain’s responsibilities and be compensated at the captain’s rate of pay. Almost two years after the CNA went into effect, the Borough created a new position -- fire lieutenant -- falling between captain and firefighter in the chain of command. After the creation of the lieutenant position, if no captains were scheduled for a given shift, the lieutenant on duty would assume the captain’s responsibilities. In those instances, however, the Borough paid lieutenants their regular salary, not the higher rate an acting captain would have been paid. In 2017, the FMBA filed a grievance alleging that the Borough’s failure to pay lieutenants at the rate of an acting captain when a lieutenant assumed a captain’s responsibilities violated the terms of the CNA. An arbitrator sided with the FMBA. The Chancery Division upheld the award, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the difference between the Civil Service Commission’s job descriptions for firefighters and fire lieutenants created uncertainty as to Section 5 of the CNA's application to lieutenants. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the arbitrator’s award was supported by a reasonably debatable interpretation of the disputed provision, and therefore, the award should have been upheld on appeal. View "Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mutual Benevolent Association, Local 67" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's July 8, 2020 Order granting an application for discovery assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 and the August 25, 2020 Order denying reconsideration of the same. The Fund, a Russian corporation, sought assistance from the district court to order discovery from AlixPartners for use in an arbitration proceeding brought by the Fund against Lithuania before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty between Lithuania and Russia.The court concluded that an arbitration between a foreign state and an investor, which takes place before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty to which the foreign State is a party, constitutes a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" under 28 U.S.C. 1782; the Fund, as a party to the arbitration for which it seeks discovery assistance, is an "interested person" who may seek discovery assistance for such an arbitration under section 1782; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the Fund's discovery application under section 1782. View "The Application of the Fund v. AlixPartners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sixt on behalf of a putative class of Sixt customers, alleging that Sixt breached its own contract with him and violated two state consumer-protection statutes. In this case, plaintiff had used Orbitz.com to book a rental car from Sixt. When plaintiff picked up the rental car from Sixt, he signed an entirely separate agreement with Sixt which did not contain an arbitration provision.The Eleventh Circuit explained that a customer making an airline, hotel, or car-rental reservation on Orbitz.com agrees to a contract that includes an arbitration provision, and that provision requires the customer to arbitrate disputes related to, among other things, "any services or products provided." At issue is whether that phrase refers to services and products provided by Orbitz or by anyone.Reading the "any services or products provided" clause in the light of neighboring provisions and the larger contractual context—and applying a dose of common sense—the court concluded that it refers only to services and products provided by Orbitz. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Sixt's motion to compel arbitration because the underlying dispute does not relate to services or products provided by Orbitz. Rather, it relates only to those provided by Sixt, a company that does business through Orbitz. View "Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC" on Justia Law

When Selden signed up for Airbnb, an online home rental platform, he was presented with a sign-in webpage that informs the user he is agreeing to certain terms by signing up. Airbnb’s Terms of Service required that all disputes be resolved by arbitration. After Selden signed up for Airbnb, he attempted to rent a listed room and suspected that the host denied his request because of his race, which the host could see from Selden’s profile picture. Selden created two fake Airbnb accounts with profile pictures of white individuals and used his fake accounts to request renting the same property for the same dates. According to Selden, the host accepted both requests. Selden posted his claims on social media where they went viral.Selden sued, citing Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a), the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. The district court compelled arbitration of his claims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Airbnb. The court refused to vacate the arbitration award. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting Selden’s arguments that he did not agree to arbitrate because Airbnb’s sign-up screen failed to put him on notice of the arbitration clause in its Terms of Service, that his discrimination claims were not arbitrable, and that the arbitrator committed misconduct by failing to provide for sufficient discovery and by refusing to consider his expert report. View "Selden v. Airbnb, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary injunction to the American Institute for Foreign Study, Inc. to enjoin class arbitration in this dispute with an au pair, holding that the agreement between the parties did not authorize class arbitration, and the au pair's claim was moot.The Institute, which places au pairs with host families in the United States, entered into a contract with Plaintiff, an au pair from Spain, that required the parties to arbitrate their disputes. Plaintiff filed a class arbitration demand against the Institute and its CEO, William Gertz (together, Defendants). Defendants subsequently filed suit seeking to enjoin class arbitration. The district court denied relief to Gertz and granted a preliminary injunction to the Institute. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the agreement did not provide an affirmative basis to conclude that the parties agreed to class arbitration; and (2) Gertz's claim was moot. View "American Institute for Foreign Study, Inc. v. Fernandez-Jimenez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writ relief in this case concerning whether the district court has authority to intervene in binding arbitration to sanction a party's misconduct, holding that the district court improperly intervened in this matter.The parties agreed to Plaintiff filing a complaint, staying the action, selecting an arbitrator, and allowing the case to proceed through arbitration. After an improper sweep of Plaintiff's technology, Defendant filed a motion for discovery sanctions. The arbitrator fined Plaintiff but declined to strike Plaintiff's claims at that time, as requested by Defendant. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court for provisional relief, requesting that the court take action to remedy the misconduct. The district court found that it had the authority to address the issues raised in the motion. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for writ relief, holding (1) where Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.222 provides limited authority to intervene in an arbitration only where the district court orders a provisional remedy and where the court did not order a provisional remedy in this case, the district court lacked authority under section 38.222 to intervene in the arbitration; and (2) the district court did not have inherent authority to intervene in the arbitration because the alleged litigation misconduct was squarely before the arbitrator. View "Direct Grading & Paving v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiff's motion to vacate an arbitration award and denying Defendant's corresponding application to confirm the award, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority or manifestly disregard the law, but the inclusion of issues related to child support in the award was improper.Before the parties were married they executed a premarital agreement. Years later, Plaintiff brought this action to dissolve the marriage, and the parties executed a binding agreement to arbitrate the dissolution action. At issue was the validity of the arbitrator's award dividing the equity in the parties' marital home and assigning responsibility for certain expenses related to child support. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion to vacate the portion of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the arbitrator's award exceed the scope of the parties' submission; (2) any error in distributing the equity in the marital home would not permit a court to vacate the arbitration award; and (3) because Connecticut law prohibits the inclusion of issues related to child support in arbitration awards, this portion of the award is reversed. View "Blondeau v. Baltierra" on Justia Law

In a prior opinion, the Ninth CIrcuit held that SS Mumbai could not equitably estop SS Bangalore from avoiding arbitration. Mumbai, a non-signatory to a partnership deed that contained an arbitration provision, argued that, based on the arbitration provision, Indian law applied to the question of whether it could compel Bangalore to arbitrate.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded based on its holding that the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with the enforcement of arbitration agreements by non-signatories under domestic law equitable estoppel doctrines.On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Mumbai’s motion to compel arbitration. While a nonsignatory can compel arbitration in a Convention case, the allegations, in this case, do not implicate the arbitration clause—a prerequisite for compelling arbitration under the equitable estoppel framework. The court declined to apply Indian law because whether Mumbai could enforce the partnership deed as a non-signatory was a threshold issue for which it did not look to the agreement itself. The deed’s arbitration provision applied to disputes “arising between the partners” and not also to third parties such as Mumbai. View "Setty v.. Shrinivas Sugandhallayah, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the district court, and not the arbitrator, was to decide whether the parties' dispute was subject to arbitration, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the parties' dispute was not subject to arbitration.Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC alleged that United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) aided and abetted a breach of the fiduciary duty of Great Northern Iron Ore Properties Trust and sought recession of a lease that U.S. Steel signed with the Trust. Glacier Park filed a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration and to compel the parties to engage in arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the court, not arbitrators, should decide the meaning of the arbitration clause at issue in this case and, thus, the arbitrability of the dispute. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was not clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator, whether the parties' breach of fiduciary claim was arbitrable was a question for the court. View "Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC, v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law