Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Mary Rodgers-Rouzier, worked as a bartender on steamboats operated by American Queen. She alleged that she and her coworkers were wrongly denied overtime wages. Rodgers-Rouzier filed a suit as a collective action, and over one hundred of her coworkers joined her proposed collective action. Meanwhile, American Queen moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. The district court denied the motion, but American Queen moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections.The district court had previously denied American Queen's motion to dismiss the case for improper venue because Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. However, American Queen then moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections that American Queen had waived its argument and the court lacked authority to apply Indiana law in this context. The court further determined that all the workers who had filed consent forms were not parties to the action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that although American Queen’s arguments were not waived and the court had authority to enforce the arbitration agreement under Indiana law, Indiana law would hold American Queen to its bargain that its arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Therefore, Rodgers-Rouzier’s case may continue in federal court. The court did not decide whether it may do so as a collective action and left that question for further litigation. View "Rodgers-Rouzier v. American Queen Steamboat Operating Company, LLC" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Charlotte Blair executed a power of attorney (POA) appointing her daughter, Annette Wiley, as her attorney in fact. The POA was not signed by two disinterested witnesses as required by Kentucky law at the time. In December 2019, Wiley signed admission documents and an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement on Blair's behalf for Blair's admission to a long-term care facility. Blair passed away in June 2020. In July 2020, the Kentucky legislature amended the law to remove the two-witness requirement for POAs.Wiley and her sister, Melanie Persson, sued the care facility, Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc., for various claims. Masonic Homes argued that some of these claims were subject to the ADR agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the POA was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of the law at the time of its execution and that the 2020 amendment was not retroactive. Therefore, the ADR agreement was unenforceable. Masonic Homes appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the POA was valid because the 2020 amendment to the law was retroactive. Wiley sought review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2020 amendment to the law was not retroactive. Therefore, the POA was invalid at the time of its execution and the ADR agreement was unenforceable. The court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Wiley v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC, doing business as Burger King, and its employees Lesley McLaughlin, Sheila Spaulding, and Teresa Stephens (collectively, the Petitioners) against Kenna Bishop (the Respondent). The dispute arose from allegations of sexual harassment and other violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act during Bishop's employment at a Burger King franchise. As part of her hiring process, Bishop signed an arbitration agreement with Ampler Burgers LLC, an affiliated company of her actual employer, Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC. The agreement required all disputes related to her employment to be arbitrated.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration, citing five reasons: Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC was not a party to the arbitration agreement; the agreement lacked mutual consideration; the dispute was not subject to the agreement; the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and the Petitioners had waived their right to arbitration.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the arbitration agreement could be enforced by Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC as it was an affiliated entity of the signatory, Ampler Burgers LLC. The court also determined that the agreement was supported by mutual consideration and covered the disputes raised in the complaint. The court disagreed with the lower court's finding of unconscionability, stating that the agreement's requirements applied equally to all parties. Finally, the court concluded that the Petitioners did not waive their right to arbitration by engaging in limited litigation activities prior to filing the motion to compel arbitration. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), and one of its drivers, Jonas Yohou. Good, a chef, used Uber's mobile application to secure a ride. On April 25, 2021, when Good opened Uber's app, he was presented with a screen notifying him of Uber's updated terms of use. The screen required Good to check a box indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms before he could continue using the app. Five days later, Good used Uber's app to order a ride home from work. During the ride, Yohou's car collided with another vehicle, causing Good to suffer severe injuries.Good filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and Yohou in the Superior Court Department. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the terms of use that Good had agreed to. The motion judge denied the motion, finding that a contract had not been formed because Good neither had reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use nor had manifested assent to the terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process provided Good with reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use, including the agreement to arbitrate disputes. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. The court remanded the case for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Illinois Casualty Company (ICC) and thirty-three models who contested whether arbitration was appropriate based on the assignment of several business insurance policies that ICC issued to B&S of Fort Wayne, Inc., Showgirl III, Inc., and Reba Enterprises, LLC (collectively, "Insured Clubs"). The models alleged that the Insured Clubs used their images for social media advertisements without their consent. The Insured Clubs had insurance policies with ICC, which they tendered for defense and indemnification. ICC denied coverage, leading to a settlement agreement between the Insured Clubs and the models, assigning the Insured Clubs’ rights against ICC to the models.The trial court compelled arbitration between ICC and the models. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding that none of the models’ claims fell within the provision of the arbitration agreement. The models sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court held that an agreement to arbitrate in accordance with American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules constitutes “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator. However, the court found that because no agreement to arbitrate existed between ICC and the Insured Clubs before 2016, the models could not compel arbitration for claims deriving from this period. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that models with claims from 2016 and later could compel arbitration, but those with pre-2016 claims could not. View "Illinois Casualty Co. v. Burciaga" on Justia Law

Carlos Ramirez, an employee, filed a class action lawsuit against his former employer, Golden Queen Mining Company, alleging various violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition. The employer moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, stating that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The employer appealed, arguing that it had made a prima facie showing that a written arbitration agreement existed and that Ramirez’s statements that he did not recall being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement were insufficient to rebut its initial showing.The Superior Court of Kern County had initially denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The court found that the employer's evidence, which included an unsigned arbitration agreement and a handbook acknowledgement purportedly signed by Ramirez, was insufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Ramirez did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the employer’s initial showing that an arbitration agreement existed. The court found that Ramirez's failure to recall signing the document did not create a factual dispute about the signature’s authenticity. The court also noted that Ramirez’s declaration did not state whether he had reviewed the arbitration agreement or other documents purportedly signed by him, nor did it address whether he recalled signing the handbook acknowledgement, which included a statement that he agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The court therefore reversed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Ramirez’s unconscionability defense. View "Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co." on Justia Law

The Choctaw Nation and several pharmacies it owns and operates entered into agreements with Caremark, LLC, and its affiliates to facilitate insurance reimbursements for the Nation’s costs for pharmacy services for its members. The Nation filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that Caremark unlawfully denied pharmacy reimbursement claims in violation of the Recovery Act. After the matter was stayed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Caremark petitioned to compel arbitration of the Nation’s claims in the District of Arizona. The district court granted the petition, concluding that the parties’ agreements included arbitration provisions with delegation clauses and therefore an arbitrator must decide the Nation’s arguments that its claims are not arbitrable.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that most of the Nation’s arguments challenging the district court’s arbitration order were foreclosed by a previous case, Caremark, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation, which addressed the enforceability of identical arbitration provisions. The court also held that the Nation’s remaining argument that the District of Arizona lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to compel arbitration failed because the Nation contractually agreed to arbitrate its claims against Caremark in Arizona, and in those contracts specifically “agree[d] to such jurisdiction.” Thus, the Nation expressly waived its tribal sovereign immunity as a bar to arbitration in the District of Arizona. View "CAREMARK, LLC V. CHOCTAW NATION" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber). Good, a user of Uber's ride-hailing service, suffered severe injuries in a car accident while riding in a vehicle driven by an Uber driver. He filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and the driver. Uber moved to compel arbitration based on its terms of use, which Good had agreed to when he used the Uber app.The Superior Court denied Uber's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Uber had not provided Good with reasonable notice of its terms of use, and that Good had not reasonably manifested his assent to those terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process, which required Good to click a checkbox indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms and then to activate a button labeled "Confirm," put Good on reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. Therefore, the court concluded that a contract had been formed between Good and Uber, and that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration as per the terms of that contract. The case was remanded for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorced couple, Bradley Carter (father) and Rachel Carter (mother), who have two children. Following their divorce, the mother, who had an alcohol use disorder, was granted supervised visits with her children twice a month. After two years of sobriety and the impending closure of their visitation center, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with her children, which the father opposed.The Circuit Court initially sent the parties to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. At the final hearing, the mother requested two modifications of her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an expansion of her parenting time. The Circuit Court denied her request, maintaining the schedule of two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually agreeable supervisor. The mother appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The mother argued that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their mother. The Supreme Court agreed with the mother, stating that the children’s “present environment” is determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children now exist, which includes their daily activities, mental and emotional states, and their needs.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the mother’s request for a modification of parenting time and remanded for the trial court to reconsider her request. The Supreme Court also vacated the court’s denial of her request for unsupervised visitation, allowing the parties to clarify the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting on remand. View "In the Matter of Carter & Carter" on Justia Law