Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Scott and Janet Lopas filed suit against, among others, Performance Builders, LLC, Chris White, Shana Tyler Clark, and DSKAT Holdings, LLC, d/b/a A-Pro Home Inspection Services Birmingham (collectively, "the movants") asserting various causes of actions based on the inspection, appraisal, and sale of a piece of real property purchased by the Lopases. The movants moved to compel arbitration of the Lopases' claims, which the circuit court denied. The movants appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the movants met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement containing an arbitration provision between the parties, and that that agreement involved a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, the arbitration provision dictated that the issue of enforceability raised by the Lopases had to be submitted to the arbitrator for determination. Therefore, the circuit court's order denying the movants' motion to compel arbitration was reversed. View "Performance Builders, LLC, et al. v. Lopas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Aerotek, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, holding that an alleged signatory's simple denial that he signed the record was insufficient to prevent attribution of an electronic signature to him.Plaintiffs, four individuals, were hired by Aerotek to work as contractors on a construction project. After all four were terminated, they sued Aerotek and others for racial discrimination and retaliation. Aerotek moved to compel arbitration based on an online-only hiring application that each employee had completed. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that they had completed the online hiring application but denying that they had ever seen or signed a mutual arbitration agreement (MAA) within the application. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Aerotek's argument that it had conclusively established the validity of the MAAs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Aerotek conclusively established that Plaintiffs signed, and therefore consented to, the MAAs; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Aerotek's motion to compel arbitration. View "Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the confirmation of an arbitration award had been issued prematurely, holding that although Ohio Rev. Code 2711.13 imposes a three-month deadline for motions to vacate, modify, or correct arbitration awards, that period is a maximum time that is not guaranteed.At issue was whether section 2711.13 requires a trial court to wait three months before confirming an arbitration award when the party opposing confirmation informs the trial court that it intends to file a motion to vacate, modify, or correct under section 2711.10 or 2711.11. The Supreme Court held that section 2711.13 does not operate as an automatic stay on confirmation of an arbitration award but, rather, requires parties opposed to the confirmation to be diligent in seeking to vacate, modify, or correct it. View "BST Ohio Corp. v. Wolgang" on Justia Law

At issue in this labor dispute case is who decides whether the arbitrator was validly (i.e., mutually rather than unilaterally) appointed: the challenged arbitrator himself, or instead a court. The district court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) assigns to the arbitrator himself the authority to determine the validity of his own appointment.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for the district court to determine whether the challenged arbitrator was validly appointed. The court concluded that the dispute over the arbitrator's appointment involves the kind of question that is presumptively for judicial rather than arbitral resolution. The court also concluded that the parties' CBA does not overcome this presumption through a clear and unmistakable assignment of power to the challenged arbitrator himself to decide the validity of his own appointment. View "District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. Liberty Maritime Corp." on Justia Law

Pillar hired Epiphyte to convert its cryptocurrency into Euros. Epiphyte informed Pillar that it used Payward’s online exchange to convert its clients’ cryptocurrencies. Pillar transferred its cryptocurrency into Epiphyte’s account on Payward’s platform. After Epiphyte converted the currency but before the exchanged funds were transferred to Pillar’s bank account, four million Euros belonging to Pillar were stolen from Epiphyte’s account.Pillar sued Payward, alleging Payward knew or should have known that Epiphyte was using its Payward account on Pillar's behalf, failed to use standard security measures that would have prevented the theft, and falsely advertised that it provided the best security in the business. Payward moved to compel arbitration, claiming that Epiphyte agreed to Payward’s “Terms of Service” when it created an account, as required for all users, that those Terms included an arbitration agreement, and that Pillar was bound by that agreement.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Payward’s motion. There is no evidence Epiphyte was acting as Pillar’s agent when it agreed to the Terms two years before Pillar hired it or that the agency relationship automatically bound the principal to the agent’s prior acts. There is no evidence Pillar knew the arbitration agreements existed or had a right to rescind them. No ratification occurred. There was no intent to benefit Pillar or similar parties. Pillar’s claims are not inextricably intertwined with the Terms. View "Pillar Project AG v. Payward Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

Bannister worked in the administrative offices at a skilled nursing facility, for approximately three decades before Marinidence purchased the facility. A year later, Marinidence terminated Bannister. She sued, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and defamation. Marinidence moved to compel arbitration, alleging that, when it took over the facility, Bannister electronically signed an arbitration agreement while completing the paperwork for new Marinidence employees. After Bannister presented evidence that she never saw the agreement during the onboarding process, the trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal affirmed. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. Where, as here, the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, the petitioner must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.” The court noted conflicting evidence, including Bannister’s evidence that she was not the only person who could have executed the arbitration agreement and the onboarding process was completed for other employees without their participation. View "Banister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's request for attorney's fees in this appeal arising from a grievance arbitration, holding that the State "incurred" attorney's fees for the purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A-25.In the arbitration, the State was represented by an attorney employed by the State's Department of Attorney General. The union requested attorney's fees and costs, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Thereafter, the State filed a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs, citing section 658A-25 and Haw. R. App. P. 39(a). The ICA granted the State's request for costs but denied its request for attorney's fees on the grounds that the State "failed to demonstrate that it incurred, as an expense, liability, or legal obligation to pay, appellate attorney's fees[.]" The Supreme Court reversed and granted the State's request for attorney's fees, holding that the fees were erroneously denied on the grounds that they were not "incurred." View "In re Arbitration between United Public Workers and State" on Justia Law

Stafford used his third-party insurance coverage to purchase prescription drugs from Rite Aid’s pharmacies. Rite Aid submits a claim for a prescription drug to an insurance company through a “pharmacy benefits manager” (PBM). The claim form that Rite Aid submits includes the “usual and customary” price of the relevant prescription drug.Stafford brought a class action, alleging that Rite Aid fraudulently inflated the reported prices of prescription drugs, which resulted in class members paying Rite Aid a higher co-payment for the drugs than they would have paid if Rite Aid had reported the correct price. After litigating several motions to dismiss, Rite Aid moved to compel arbitration. Although Rite Aid and Stafford had no contract between them containing an arbitration clause, Rite Aid did have such contracts with the PBMs who coordinated insurance reimbursements and co-payment calculations.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Under California law, Stafford’s claims did not depend on Rite Aid’s contractual obligations to the PBMs. Consequently, equitable estoppel did not apply to bind Stafford to the arbitration agreements in those contracts. View "Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Franklin, a nurse, was employed by a staffing agency, USSI, and had signed an Arbitration Agreement. USSI assigned Franklin to work at the Hospital. Franklin signed a Travel Nurse Assignment Contract that also includes an arbitration provision. The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement or the Assignment Contract. There is no contract between Franklin and the Hospital nor between the Hospital and USSI. The Hospital contracts with RightSourcing, which contracts with USSI to provide the contingent nursing staff. The Hospital retains supervision over the provision of clinical services. RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI.Franklin brought a class and collective action against the Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code, alleging that the Hospital required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but failed to pay her for that work and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or reimburse travel expenses.The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Hospital, a nonsignatory, could compel arbitration because Franklin’s claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with her contracts with USSI; under California law, she was equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions. View "Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center, FKA" on Justia Law

Foremost provided insurance for McIsaac's motorcycle. The uninsured motorist coverage endorsement included an arbitration provision. McIsaac was involved in an accident. The other driver’s insurance policy provided $15,000 of coverage. McIsaac’s policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of up to $100,000 per person per accident. McIsaac initiated an uninsured motorist claim. Foremost opened an investigation and sent a settlement offer. McIsaac served Foremost with an arbitration demand. Foremost suggested proceeding with discovery and sent McIsaac interrogatories and a deposition notice.Months later, McIsaac filed suit, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith. Foremost filed a petition to compel arbitration. McIsaac argued his dispute was not solely about damages, but whether Foremost breached the contract and acted in bad faith. Foremost argued arbitration was a “condition precedent” to McIsaac’s lawsuit. The trial court denied the petition, stating that arbitration does not apply to claims of bad faith by the insurer.The court of appeal reversed. Under Insurance Code section 11580.2(f), disputes between insureds and insurers over entitlement to recover damages caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, or the amount of damages, must be resolved by agreement or arbitration. Foremost made a showing that the parties dispute the amount of damages. View "McIsaac v. Foremost Insurance Co." on Justia Law