Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Union represented the workers at the Old Brookville campus. In 2016, LIU contracted out that work to A&A, which became the employer of those workers and assumed an existing collective bargaining agreement, set to expire in August 2017. A&A and the Union entered into a successor CBA, which requires Union membership after 30 days but allows A&A to hire “substitute employees” “to fill in for employees who are out on disability or worker’s compensation or approved extended leaves.” The Union rejected a provision that would have permitted A&A to use non-union “temporary employees” at will for up to 90 days. The agreement has an arbitration provision.Union members noticed new, non-union employees in late 2017. A&A indicated that they were "substitute employees." The Union determined that the number of claimed substitutes exceeded the number of members out on disability, worker’s compensation, and other approved leaves of absence and sent a written grievance. The Union framed the arbitration issue: whether A&A violated the CBA by utilizing temporary employees ... to perform bargaining unit work. A&A argued that the Arbitrator was confined to the issue proposed by the Union in its original grievance, which mentioned only “substitute employees.”The arbitrator held that A&A had violated the CBA and issued an award of $1,702,263.81. The Second Circuit affirmed. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority. While worded differently, the issue that the arbitrator ruled on was substantially identical to the issue in the grievance letter. A party that has previously agreed to arbitrate cannot frustrate the process by refusing to agree on the form of the issue. The arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was more than colorable. View "A&A Maintenance Enterprise, Inc. v. Ramnarain" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the trial court's order denying their petition to compel arbitration of a lawsuit brought by respondent, individually and as successor in interest to her deceased husband, Ramiro Garcia, regarding Ramiro's treatment at appellants' hospitals.The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that appellants failed to meet their burden to establish the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement. The court relied on generally applicable law conditioning the validity of an arbitration agreement executed by a purported agent -- like any other contract executed by a purported agent -- on an adequate evidentiary showing that the agreement falls within the scope of authority, if any, conferred by the principal. Furthermore, the court did not apply this law in a fashion disfavoring arbitration contracts, and thus did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC" on Justia Law

Hale, employed by Morgan Stanley since 1984, was disciplined on several occasions between 2013 and 2016. Hale initiated an arbitration action and requested damages for his claims of negligence, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following a four-day hearing, the arbitrator issued an award denying all of Hale’s claims. Hale filed suit, requesting that the arbitration award be vacated pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1. The district court dismissed, holding that it lacked diversity and federal question jurisdiction over the suit.The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. There is complete diversity of citizenship between the disputing parties as required by 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and the amount in controversy is met because Hale requested a damages award of $14.75 million in his complaint (filed as a motion to vacate). In actions where a party seeks to vacate a $0 arbitration award pursuant to section 10 of the FAA, courts should look to the complaint, including the amount sought in the underlying arbitration, for purposes of assessing whether the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement has been met. View "Hale v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC" on Justia Law

Dylan filed suit in district court seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The district court converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion to compel arbitration and granted the motion, dismissing Dylan's complaint without prejudice.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal; clarified that the district court had federal question jurisdiction to decide whether Dylan was entitled to the declaratory relief requested; and held that, because the Funds have adequately initiated arbitration, regardless of timing, Dylan is required to arbitrate by the terms of the CBA. The court also agreed with the district court's analysis that it was proper in this case to compel arbitration and dismiss Dylan's complaint without prejudice. The court considered Dylan's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Dylan 140 LLC v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Sandoval-Ryan signed admission documents on behalf of her brother, Jesus Sandoval, following his admission to Sacramento Post-Acute (Post- Acute), a skilled nursing facility owned by Oleander Holdings, LLC (Oleander) and Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (Plum Healthcare). Among the documents plaintiff signed were two agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of the facility’s care for Sandoval. Sandoval’s condition deteriorated while being cared for at the facility, and he was transferred to a hospital where he later died. Plaintiff sued defendants Post-Acute, Oleander, and Plum Healthcare in superior court; she brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of Sandoval. Defendants moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims. The trial court denied the motion on the basis the agreements were invalid because they were secured by fraud, undue influence, and duress. Defendants appealed the trial court’s ruling, contending the parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide threshold questions of arbitrability, and the trial court erred by deciding the issue instead. Absent clear and unmistakable language delegating threshold arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the Court of Appeal concluded defendants’ claim lacked merit. View "Sandoval-Ryan v. Oleander Holdings" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying a petition to compel arbitration and awarding attorney fees to respondent. The court held that the trial court could reasonably determine that there was no agreement to arbitrate where the form of the rental agreement is deceptive. In this case, the arbitration clause is not above the purchaser's signature, where one would expect to find it. Rather, it is after the purchaser's signature, on the back of the agreement, which is filled from top to bottom with closely spaced lines of small type. Furthermore, appellant's sales representatives are not trained to bring attention to the arbitration clause and there is no mention of arbitration in the personal guaranty.The court agreed with respondent that, under the circumstances, Civil Code section 1717 should apply to make the attorney fee clause mutual, and to award fees to the prevailing party in the contract action. Furthermore, the court concluded that Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 515, does not prohibit the award of attorney fees. Finally, the court rejected appellant's claim under the doctrine of unclean hands. View "Domestic Linen Supply Co., Inc. v. L J T Flowers, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Falligant, as next friend of Michelle McElroy, who Falligant alleged was an incapacitated person, filed an action against TitleMax of Alabama, Inc. ("TitleMax"), alleging that TitleMax wrongfully repossessed and sold McElroy's vehicle. TitleMax filed a motion to compel arbitration of Falligant's claims, which the circuit court denied. TitleMax appealed. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined TitleMax met its burden of proving that a contract affecting interstate commerce existed, and that that contract was signed by McElroy and contained an arbitration agreement. The burden then shifted to Falligant to prove that the arbitration agreement was void. But the Court concluded Falligant failed to present substantial evidence indicating that McElroy was permanently incapacitated and, thus, lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contracts. Because Falligant failed to create a genuine issue of fact, the circuit court erred in ordering the issue of McElroy's mental capacity to trial. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision was reversed, and the matter remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "TitleMax of Alabama, Inc. v. Falligant" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the interaction between Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-133, a compulsory arbitration statute, and the Fast Trial and Alternative Resolution (FASTAR) Pilot Program the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's motion for arbitration, holding that there was no conflict between the statute and this Court's orders and rules establishing FASTAR.Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages against the Tucson Police Department. Plaintiff filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration under section 12-133. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to order section 12-133 arbitration, asserting that FASTAR was unconstitutional as applied to her because it denied her right to a trial de novo and appeal following arbitration. The trial court denied the motion and concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to section 12-133 arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no conflict exists between section 12-133 and the FASTAR rules. View "Duff v. Honorable Kenneth Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sarah Coughenour worked for defendant-appellant Del Taco, LLC, starting when she was 16 years old. When she was first employed by Del Taco, she signed a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate” (Agreement). After Coughenour reached the age of 18, she continued working for Del Taco for four months. Coughenour quit and filed a lawsuit against Del Taco for sexual harassment committed by one of their employees, wage and hour claims brought pursuant to the Labor Code, and other claims under the Fair Housing and Employment Housing Act. Del Taco moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the Motion, finding that Coughenour’s filing of the lawsuit was a disaffirmance of the Agreement within the meaning of Family Code section 6710, which allowed a person upon reaching majority age to disaffirm a contract entered into while a minor. Del Taco appealed the denial of its motion, arguing that by working for Del Taco for four months after she reached the age of majority, Coughenour ratified the Agreement, which estopped her power to disaffirm the Agreement. In the alternative, Del Taco argued that Coughenour did not disaffirm the Agreement within a “reasonable time” after reaching the age of 18 as required by Family Code section 6710. The Court of Appeal affirmed denial of Del Taco's motion: [t]he filing of the lawsuit was notice that [Coughenour] disaffirmed the Agreement." The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Coughenour disaffirmed the Agreement within a reasonable time. View "Coughenour v. Del Taco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the arbitration agreement put forth by Petitioners was not authentic.After her employment ended, Respondent filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful and discriminatory discharge. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss/compel arbitration, asserting that this matter was subject to a valid and binding arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that significant questions existed with regard to the authenticity of the arbitration agreement. Petitioners then filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent enforcement of the circuit court's order. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the circuit court committed clear legal error in denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration by finding the arbitration agreement was not authentic. View "State ex rel. Troy Group v. Honorable David J. Sims" on Justia Law