Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this arbitration dispute, holding that direct benefits estoppel cannot be invoked in a garnishment action to bind the judgment creditor to the terms of the contract because applying the doctrine in this context would contravene Arizona's statutory garnishment scheme.Specifically, the Court answered that in a garnishment action by a judgment creditor against the judgment debtor's insurer claiming that coverage is owed under an insurance policy where the judgment creditor is not proceeding on an assignment of rights, the insurer cannot invoke the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel to bind the judgment creditor to the terms of the insurance contract. View "Benson v. Casa De Capri Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration, holding that a fee agreement between a client and her attorney, especially where the attorney agrees to advance the costs of arbitration, is relevant to determining a plaintiff's ability to arbitrate her claims.Plaintiff signed two contracts with Defendants when arranging for her mother, Concetta Rizzio, to live at a nursing care facility. Each contract included an arbitration clause with a cost-shifting provision (the agreement) stating that Rizzio would be responsible for all costs of arbitration if she made a claim against the nursing home. When a fellow resident attacked Rizzio, Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence and abuse of a vulnerable adult. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was unduly oppressive, unenforceable, and unconscionable. The court of appeals reversed as to the issue of procedural unconscionability but agreed that the cost-shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and that it was enforceable. View "Rizzio v. Surpass Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the interaction between Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-133, a compulsory arbitration statute, and the Fast Trial and Alternative Resolution (FASTAR) Pilot Program the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's motion for arbitration, holding that there was no conflict between the statute and this Court's orders and rules establishing FASTAR.Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages against the Tucson Police Department. Plaintiff filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration under section 12-133. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to order section 12-133 arbitration, asserting that FASTAR was unconstitutional as applied to her because it denied her right to a trial de novo and appeal following arbitration. The trial court denied the motion and concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to section 12-133 arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no conflict exists between section 12-133 and the FASTAR rules. View "Duff v. Honorable Kenneth Lee" on Justia Law

In this employment dispute, Employee filed an action in superior court alleging an unjust enrichment claim against Employee. Employee moved to compel arbitration under the parties’ employment contract’s arbitration provision and brought a claim for severance pay. The superior court granted the motion. Employer asserted various counterclaims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Employer, finding that Employer properly rescinded the contract based on Employee’s underlying misrepresentations and omissions. The final arbitration award fully settled all claims and counterclaims submitted. The superior court confirmed the award but also granted Employer leave to amend its complaint to reassert its counterclaims. The superior court granted Employer’s motion to amend its complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer, having not specifically challenged the contract’s arbitration provision, may not amend its complaint and litigate its various claims against Employee in this action. View "Hamblen v. Honorable Ralph Hatch" on Justia Law

The Moras sued Pauline Cosper for damages arising from a car accident. After mandatory arbitration, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Moras. The next day, Cosper filed a notice of appeal seeking a trial de novo and a list of witnesses and exhibits. Approximately two months later, Cosper filed a supplemental witness list designating an expert and disclosing her report. The superior court struck the supplemental disclosures as untimely, noting that Cosper had not attempted to show good cause for the later disclosure under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77. The court of appeals granted relief, holding that Rule 77 permits supplemental disclosure within eighty days after the filing of an appeal from compulsory arbitration without requiring that parties show good cause. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court, holding that Rule 77(g)(1) requires that those appealing from arbitration awards simultaneously with the filing of the appeal file a list of witnesses and exhibits intended to be used at trial, and this list can only be supplemented for good cause under Rule 77(g)(4). View "Cosper v. Superior Court" on Justia Law