Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court concluding that Mountain Glacier properly reserved its arbitration claim in its dispute with Nestle Waters after Mountain Glacier filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy automatically stayed the companies’ arbitration. After the bankruptcy proceedings ended, Mountain Glacier attempted to resume arbitration, but Nestle Waters objected, arguing that Mountain Glacier failed properly to reserve the arbitration in its reorganization plan. The lower courts disagreed, as did the Sixth Circuit, holding (1) Mountain Glacier’s reservation enabled creditors to identify its claim and evaluate whether additional assets might be available for distribution; and (2) neither Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 772 (6th Cir. 2002) nor 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3) required Mountain Glacier to provide more information than it did. View "Nestlé Waters North America. Inc. v. Mountain Glacier LLC" on Justia Law

Oteria Moses borrowed $1,000 under a loan agreement that was illegal under North Carolina law. When Moses filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, CashCall, Inc., the loan servicer, filed a proof of claim. Moses subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against CashCall seeking a declaration that the loan was illegal and also seeking money damages for CashCall’s allegedly illegal debt collection activities. CashCall filed a motion to compel arbitration. The bankruptcy court denied CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration and retained jurisdiction over both Moses’ first claim for declaratory relief and second claim for damages. On appeal, the district court affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction to retain in bankruptcy Moses’ first claim; but (2) erred in retaining in bankruptcy Moses’ claim for damages and denying CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration of that claim, as this claim was not constitutionally core. Remanded with instruction to grant CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration on Moses’ second claim for damages. View "Moses v. CashCall, Inc." on Justia Law

Doe settled his sexual abuse claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for $80,000 after participating in a voluntary mediation program. He later filed a claim against the Archdiocese in its bankruptcy proceedings for the same sexual abuse. Doe responded to the Archdiocese’s motion for summary judgment by contending that his settlement was fraudulently induced. The argument depends upon statements made during the mediation, but Wisconsin law prohibits the admission in judicial proceedings of nearly all communications made during mediation. Doe argued that an exception applies here because the later action is “distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation,” Wis. Stat. 904.085(4)(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese. Doe’s bankruptcy claim is not distinct from the dispute settled in mediation. The issue in both proceedings, which involved the same parties, is the Archdiocese’s responsibility for the sexual abuse Doe suffered. Doe sought damages in both the mediation and bankruptcy for the same sexual abuse; he did not seek separate or additional damages for the alleged fraudulent inducement. View "Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs sued Payday Financial, Webb, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and other entities associated with Webb, alleging violations of civil and criminal statutes related to loans that they had received from the defendants. The businesses maintain several websites that offer small, high-interest loans to customers. The entire transaction is completed online; a potential customer applies for, and agrees to, the loan terms from his computer. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that the loan agreements required that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe on their Reservation in South Dakota. Following a limited remand, the district court concluded that, although the tribal law could be ascertained, the arbitral mechanism detailed in the agreement did not exist. The Seventh Circuit held that the action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. Rejecting an alternative argument that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation, the court stated that tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. View "Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

The multinational telecommunications firm Nortel declared bankruptcy in 2009 and various debtors comprising the Nortel brand auctioned their business lines and intellectual property, raising $7.5 billion. The debtors subsequently disputed whether they had agreed to allocate the auction funds through arbitration. The Bankruptcy Court held that they had not agreed to arbitrate their disputes about allocation. The Third Circuit affirmed: the contract at issue does not reflect the debtors’ intent to arbitrate disputes about the auction funds. The court declined to consider the Joint Administrators’ related challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to allocate the contested funds, noting that the Bankruptcy Court has not yet held the hearing to allocate the funds, so that review would be premature. View "In Re: Nortel Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("the BAP") certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "In Alabama, is a 'default' judgment premised upon discovery sanctions or other post-answer conduct of the defendant sufficient to support the application of issue preclusion in a later proceeding?" Debtor-Defendant Anthony Malfatti was one of three principals of TA Financial Group ('TAF') purportedly designed to assist credit card holders in arbitration of disputes with the card issuers. The arbitration providers were selected by the card holders from a list provided by TAF. Among the arbitration providers was Arbitration Forum of America, Inc. ('AFOA'). AFOA was not conducting legitimate arbitrations; every arbitration resulted in an award in favor of the card holder, which was then reduced to judgment. Malfatti claims he was unaware that AFOA's practices and the judgments stemming therefrom were illegitimate. At some time after the banks involved learned of the judgments, they filed cross-complaints against the card holders to set aside the judgments as fraudulently obtained. In September 2005, the banks, including Bank of America, N.A. (USA) filed Amended Third Party Complaints against, among others, Malfatti and TAF, alleging tortious interference with contract, abuse of process, wantonness, and civil conspiracy, and sought an injunction against further arbitrations. The Banks moved for default judgments against Malfatti and TAF for failing to comply with discovery orders, repeated failures to appear for depositions, and failure to respond to written discovery. Malfatti and TAF filed a motion to set aside the defaults. The court found Malfatti and TAF to be jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages, awarded punitive damages against Malfatti, and found Malfatti to be liable for punitive damages awarded against TAF under the alter ego doctrine. Malfatti filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy the Banks filed an adversary proceeding alleging the debt owed to them by Malfatti was nondischargeable. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: "[f]or purposes of determining whether an issue is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Alabama law makes no distinction between a simple default and a penalty default." View "Malfatti v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Debtor, a former company officer, allegedly attempted to obtain one million dollars by falsely claiming an ownership interest in the company and threatening public exposure of alleged illegal activity. After the debtor lost an arbitration proceeding, he then filed for bankruptcy. At issue was whether the company's attorneys' fees for the arbitration represented a nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) or (a)(6). The court reversed and remanded the summary judgment rendered against creditors because the debt may have arisen for willful and malicious injury and may therefore be excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(6). View "Rapid Settlements Ltd, et al. v. Shcolnik" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Continental's pursuit of a breach of contract claim against Thorpe in Thorpe's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim. The court held that the bankruptcy court had discretion not to enforce the arbitration clause at issue and that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Continental further opportunity for discovery and Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections of 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the lower courts correctly disallowed Continental's claim. View "Continental Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co." on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's order granting creditor relief from the automatic stay to proceed with arbitration of its claim against debtor's bankruptcy estate. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court erred by not ruling on the issue of whether the agreement to arbitrate between the parties was obtained by fraud and whether the bankruptcy court should have tailored its order to require creditor's claim to be arbitrated by allegedly, then-pending class action arbitration. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that debtor's challenge to the contract between the parties was subject to arbitration where debtor's failure to raise an independent challenge before the bankruptcy court to the agreement to arbitrate was basis alone to affirm the bankruptcy court's order. The court also held that debtor failed to appreciate that separately alleging that an agreement to arbitrate was obtained through fraud was different from offering a separate basis for the fraud and the only fraud debtor alleged was that creditor misrepresented that it was affiliated with Ford Motor, Co., that this fraud induced the arbitration, and that this fraud induced the contract as a whole. Consequently, there was no need for the bankruptcy court to intervene or, in this case, deny creditor's motion for relief from the stay. The court further held that the bankruptcy court was not required to tailor its order to require arbitration in the class action arbitration in Texas where the arbitration panel in Texas declined to certify the class and the issue was therefore, moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order granting creditor relief from the automatic stay to proceed with the arbitration of its claim against debtor's bankruptcy estate.