Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Court of Appeal
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Plaintiffs were hired by U-Haul as customer service representatives and, as a condition of their employment, they signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs filed a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Lab. Code, 2698 et seq., alleging that U-Haul violated several provisions of the Labor Code, including overtime and meal break requirements. The trial court denied U-Haul's motion to compel plaintiffs to individually arbitrate whether they qualified as "aggrieved employees" and thus had standing to pursue a PAGA claim. The court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs are not required to individually arbitrate whether they qualify as aggrieved employees where whether plaintiffs have standing to pursue a PAGA claim is not an issue that falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; even if the agreement does require plaintiffs to arbitrate whether they have standing to bring a PAGA claim, the provision is unenforceable under California law; and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., does not preempt state law rules applicable to PAGA claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez v. U-Haul Co. of CA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, primarily low-income mobile home owners who rent the land owned by Westmont, filed suit against Westmont and others (collectively, appellants) alleging contract, tort and statutory causes of action. Appellants filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate the claims but the trial court denied the motion to compel. The court concluded that the arbitration provision contained in the rental agreements was procedurally unconscionable because it failed to disclose prohibitively expensive arbitration fees and was neither provided in a Spanish-language copy nor explained to respondents who did not understand written English; the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable as it imposed arbitral fees that were unaffordable or would have substantially deterred plaintiffs from asserting their claims; and the provision’s unreasonably shortened limitations periods for many of the asserted causes of action and its limitation on the remedies available in arbitration for statutory claims further support a finding of substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Penilla v. Westmont Corp." on Justia Law

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Royal Alliance, a securities brokerage firm, petitioned to confirm an arbitration award recommending expungement of an allegation of misconduct from the record of one of its employees. Sandra Liebhaber, the individual who made the allegation, petitioned to vacate the same arbitration award. FINRA also petitioned to vacate the award. The trial court denied Royal Alliance’s petition to confirm the award and granted Liebhaber’s and FINRA’s petitions to vacate. The court concluded that the arbitrators denied Liebhaber a full and fair opportunity to introduce and challenge evidence material to the expungement proceedings to which she was a party; the arbitrators’ refusal to hear Liebhaber’s evidence and cross-examination deprived Liebhaber of a fair hearing and substantially prejudiced her rights within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2; and thus the court affirmed the judgment. View "Royal Alliance Assoc. v. Liebhaber" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging causes of action for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At issue is whether an arbitration in her employee handbook is legally enforceable. In this case, the employee handbook containing the arbitration provision included a welcome letter as the first page, which stated, “[T]his handbook is not intended to be a contract (express or implied), nor is it intended to otherwise create any legally enforceable obligations on the part of the Company or its employees.” Plaintiff signed a form acknowledging she had received the handbook, which mentioned the arbitration provision as one of the “policies, practices, and procedures” of the company. The acknowledgement form did not state that plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision, and expressly recognized that she had not read the handbook at the time she signed the form. The court found, under these circumstances, that the arbitration provision in the employee handbook did not create an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the employer's petition to compel arbitration. View "Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law

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Defendants-appellants Thomas and Lynn Hazelbaker owned a condominium in the Rancho Mirage Country Club development. Defendants made improvements to an exterior patio, which plaintiff-respondent Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association contended were in violation of the applicable covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The parties mediated the dispute pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, the results of which were memorialized in a written agreement. Subsequently, the Association filed this suit alleging that defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the mediation agreement to modify the property in certain ways. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants made modifications to the patio to the satisfaction of the Association. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach agreement regarding attorney fees, which the Association asserted it was entitled to receive as the prevailing party. The Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, seeking an award of $31,970 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, awarding the Association $18,991 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court’s award, as well as its subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider the issue, was erroneous in various respects. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award. View "Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker" on Justia Law

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Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law

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JAMS, Inc. provided private alternative dispute resolution services by promoting, arranging and handling the hiring of neutral individuals, such as retired judges, to assist with resolution of disputes. This action arose out of representations made on the JAMS Web site regarding the background of the Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine (Retired), and JAMS's operations in offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. Kevin Kinsella alleged he relied upon certain representations made on the Web site when he agreed to stipulate to hire Sonenshine as a privately compensated judge to resolve issues related to his marital dissolution case and later discovered the representations were either untrue or misleading. JAMS and Sonenshine filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Kinsella's complaint. The court found the action exempt from the anti-SLAPP procedure under the commercial speech exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c). JAMS and Sonenshine filed a petition for writ of mandate or other relief. The Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to allow the Court an opportunity to consider the issues raised in the petition related to the scope of the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c). After consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed the commercial speech exemption applied and precluded the use of the anti-SLAPP procedure in this case. The petition was accordingly denied. View "JAMS, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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The College Network, Inc. (TCN) appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of a consumer fraud and breach of contract action brought by Plaintiffs Bernadette Magno, Rosanna Garcia, and Sheree Rudio. TCN argued the arbitration provision in Plaintiffs' purchase agreements was valid and enforceable and contended the trial court erred when it ruled the provision unconscionable. Alternatively, TCN argued that if the forum selection clause was unconscionable, the court abused its discretion in voiding the arbitration provision altogether rather than severing the objectionable provisions and enforcing the remainder. After review of the provision at issue, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined the arbitration provision to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable and did not abuse its discretion in voiding it in its entirety. View "Magno v. The College Network, Inc." on Justia Law

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Panoche, a producer of electricity, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a utility that purchases its electricity, disputed which of them should bear the costs of complying with a legislatively-mandated program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to the Global Warming Solutions Act (Assem. Bill 32 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.). PG&E invoked the arbitration clause in its agreement with Panoche. Panoche resisted arbitration, arguing that the controversy was not ripe for resolution because ongoing regulatory proceedings at the California Air Resources Board and the California Public Utilities Commission would at least provide guidance in the arbitration and could render the proceeding unnecessary. The arbitration panel denied Panoche’s motion, and after a hearing determined that Panoche had assumed the cost of implementing AB 32 under the agreement and understood that at the time of signing. The arbitrators also concluded that the parties “provide[ed] for recovery of GHG costs” by Panoche through a “payment mechanism” in the agreement. The trial court agreed with Panoche, ruled that the arbitration was premature, and vacated the award. The court of appeal reversed and ordered confirmation of the award. Panoche identified no procedural disadvantage it suffered in going forward with the arbitration as scheduled and failed to meet the “sufficient cause” prong under Code of Civil Procedure 1286.2(a)(5). View "Panoche Energy Ctr. v. Pac. Gas & Elec." on Justia Law