Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appeals two concurrent orders denying his petition to confirm an arbitration award and granting Comerica Bank's petition to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator made a material omission or misrepresentation in his disclosure of prior cases involving the parties' lawyers.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the bank failed to seek the arbitrator's disqualification within 15 days of discovering the facts requiring disqualification and before the arbitrator decided the pending fee motion, it forfeited the right to demand disqualification. Accordingly, the court reversed the order vacating the award based on the arbitrator's disqualification. Because the bank identified no other grounds for denying the petition to confirm the award, the court granted that petition. View "Goodwin v. Comerica Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendants Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (Pinnacle) and Jennifer Stewart (Stewart) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion because it determined the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As to the former, the court noted the agreement was unconscionable because plaintiff Anthony De Leon was required to sign the arbitration agreement as a precondition to his employment. As to the latter, the court found the agreement was substantively unconscionable because of its limits on discovery and because it shortened the statute of limitations to one year on all claims. On appeal, defendants contended the arbitration agreement had low procedural unconscionability and contained only one substantively unconscionable provision: the statute of limitations provision. They alternatively claimed the court erred by failing to sever any unconscionable provisions. After careful consideration of the agreement at issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court’s unconscionability findings. Further, the Court held the trial court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever any portion of the arbitration agreement. View "De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Clinic hired Gamboa, who signed several onboarding documents. Weeks later, Gamboa sustained an injury to her hand that affected her work. After Gamboa requested medical accommodations, the Clinic terminated her employment. Gamboa sued for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The Clinic moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Gamboa had signed an arbitration agreement as part of her required onboarding documents.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of that motion. The Clinic failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence after Gamboa produced evidence disputing an agreement. The Clinic may have met its burden on the first step by attaching to Lopez’s (the Clinic’s director of human resources) declaration a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear Gamboa’s signature but Gamboa met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it. Lopez did not explain how she knew Gamboa had seen, much less signed, the arbitration agreement. View "Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic" on Justia Law

In her complaint, plaintiff Pamela Chambers alleged that she received a written communication from a debt collector contracted by Crown that failed to comply with the CFDBPA’s notice formatting requirement. She filed a putative class action lawsuit against Crown Asset Management, LLC. Crown moved to compel arbitration, relying on an affidavit from an employee of Chambers’s original creditor, Synchrony Bank (Synchrony), who stated in part that “Synchrony’s records” showed a credit card account agreement containing an arbitration clause was mailed to Chambers. Chambers objected to the affidavit on various evidentiary grounds. The trial court sustained the objections and denied Crown’s motion to compel arbitration. Crown appealed, contending the trial court erred by sustaining Chambers’s evidentiary objections and denying the motion to compel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Union Square owns the San Francisco building where Saks has operated a store since 1991. The lease's initial 25-year term was followed by successive options to renew; it mandates arbitration to determine Fair Market Rent for renewals. Section 3.1(c)(iv) states that “[e]ach party shall share equally the fees and expenses of the arbitrator. The attorneys’ fees and expenses of counsel for the respective parties and of witnesses shall be paid by the respective party engaging such counsel or calling such witnesses.” Section 23.10 permits a prevailing party to recover costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, “Should either party institute any action or proceeding to enforce this Lease ... or for damages by reason of any alleged breach ... or for a declaration of rights hereunder,The parties arbitrated a rent dispute in 2017. The trial court vacated the First Award, in favor of Union Square. To avoid re-arbitration, Union Square sought mandamus relief, which was summarily denied. While discussions concerning another arbitration were pending, Union Square filed a superior court motion to appoint the second arbitrator. The court-appointed arbitrator ruled in favor of Saks.The court of appeal affirmed the orders vacating the First Award and confirming the Second Award. Saks sought $1 million in attorneys’ fees for “litigation proceedings arising out of the arbitration,” not for the arbitrations themselves, citing Section 23.10. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion. Each party agreed to bear its own attorneys’ fees for all proceedings related to settling any disagreement around Fair Market Rent under Section 3.1(c). View "California Union Square L.P. v. Saks & Company LLC" on Justia Law

Janet signed a Durable Power of Attorney and Nomination of Conservator (DPOA), appointing Randall as her attorney-in-fact. The DPOA advised that it “does not authorize anyone to make medical and other health care decisions,” authorized Randall to “demand, arbitrate, and pursue litigation on [Janet’s] behalf, authorized Randall to “do all things and enter into all transactions necessary to provide for the Principal’s personal care,” including the provision of institutional residential care. Janet later moved into a residential care facility, Atria; Randall signed a one-page “Agreement to Arbitrate.”While living at Atria, Janet allegedly fell and broke her hip. Janet, through Randall as her guardian ad litem, sued Atria under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600), asserting elder neglect and abuse, negligence, fraud, financial elder abuse, and unfair business practices, alleging that Atria failed to assist with her activities of daily living, failed to supervise her, and failed to check on her after knowing she felt dizzy and unwell. Atria sought to compel arbitration. Janet argued the arbitration clause was not enforceable because it was not signed by Janet or an agent pursuant to a valid power of attorney for healthcare. The court of appeal reversed the denial of Atria’s petition, holding that Randall was authorized to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Gordon v. Atria Management Co." on Justia Law

Isabel Garibay appealed a trial court's confirmation of a class action settlement reached between Josue Uribe and Crown Building Maintenance Company (Crown). Uribe sued Crown as an individual regarding alleged Labor Code violations for failure to reimburse him for the cost of uniform cleaning and required footwear as a day porter doing janitorial-type work. Uribe’s suit also included a cause of action in a representative capacity for civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The parties reached a settlement conditioned on Uribe filing an amended complaint converting his lawsuit into a class action on his Labor Code claims and including unreimbursed employee cell phone usage costs as an additional basis for both his Labor Code and PAGA causes of action. Garibay, an unnamed member of the class once it was formed, had earlier filed in the Alameda County Superior Court a putative class action asserting Labor Code claims for unreimbursed cell phone use by Crown employees, together with a representative PAGA cause of action on that basis. When Uribe and Crown sought preliminary approval of their agreement to settle Uribe’s lawsuit on a class-wide basis, the trial court authorized Garibay to intervene as a named party in the lawsuit to oppose the settlement. The trial court later granted Uribe’s motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, and then Crown and Uribe’s joint motion for final approval. Meanwhile, the Judicial Council had referred Crown’s petition to coordinate Uribe’s and Garibay’s lawsuits to the presiding judge of the Alameda court to appoint a judge to hear the petition; that appointment remained pending at the time the judgment in Orange County was entered. After the parties advised the Alameda court no stay had been entered in the coordination proceedings, the court subsequently entered judgment. Garibay challenged the settlement after the trial court declined to rule on both Crown’s motion to dismiss Garibay’s complaint in intervention and Garibay’s motion to vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal found Uribe's PAGA notice did not encompass a claim for unreimbursed cell phone expenses, making the notice was inadequate to support Uribe’s PAGA cause of action on that theory in his lawsuit. And because Uribe and Crown’s agreement did not allow for severance of nonviable settlement terms, judicial approval of a settlement that included Uribe’s PAGA cause of action could not survive review. The Court therefore reversed the judgment. View "Uribe v. Crown Building Maintenance Co." on Justia Law

In this California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, the Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to vacate its order awarding attorney fees to Charter and to conduct a new hearing to reconsider Charter's motion for attorney fees. At issue is whether an employer's arbitration agreement authorizes the recovery of attorney fees for a successful motion to compel arbitration of a FEHA lawsuit even if the plaintiff's opposition to arbitration was not frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.The court concluded that, because a fee-shifting clause directed to a motion to compel arbitration, like a general prevailing party fee provision, risks chilling an employee's access to court in a FEHA case absent Government Code section 12965(b)'s asymmetric standard for an award of fees, a prevailing defendant may recover fees in this situation only if it demonstrates the plaintiff's opposition was groundless. In this case, no such finding was made by the superior court in the underlying action before awarding real party in interest Charter its attorney fees after granting Charter's motion to compel petitioner to arbitrate his FEHA claims. View "Patterson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant RGIS, LLC (RGIS) appealed a trial court’s order denying its petition to compel arbitration of representative claims under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). In denying the petition, the trial court followed the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014), which held that individual employees cannot contractually waive their right to bring a representative action under the PAGA, and this state law rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). RGIS argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian was subsequently abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, __ U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 1612] (2018). The Court of Appeal found, however, that Epic Systems did not consider the same issue concerning the nonwaivable nature of PAGA claims decided by Iskanian. Accordingly, and along with every published appellate decision that has decided this issue, the Court rejected the argument and followed Iskanian. Although it agreed with the multitude of reported cases addressing this issue, the Court published this opinion because this was an issue of first impression for this district. View "Williams v. RGIS, LLC" on Justia Law

Caballero, who reads and writes only in Spanish, signed a two-page “RESIDENT FACILITY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT” when his mother, Maria, was admitted to Premier Care. The Arbitration Agreement is in English. Three years after signing the agreement Caballero and his siblings brought a wrongful death action against Premier Care and others. In denying Premier Care’s petition to compel arbitration, the trial court found it had failed to sufficiently inform Caballero of the Arbitration Agreement’s contents.The court of appeal reversed. A party who does not understand English sufficiently to comprehend the contents of a contract in that language is required to “have . . . it read or explained to him.” Caballero signed the Arbitration Agreement notwithstanding his limited English skills and that neither Caballero nor any family member provided evidence of the circumstances surrounding the signing. The Premier Care representative also had no specific recollection of the transaction, so there is no evidence that Caballero either requested assistance in understanding the document or was prevented from obtaining such assistance. The Arbitration Agreement complies with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 for arbitration clauses in medical service contracts and “is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise improper.” View "Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley, LLC" on Justia Law