Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In 2020, Loring De Martini agreed to sell a commercial property to Puja Gupta. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration. Subsequently, Gupta filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award and recorded a lis pendens on the property. Gupta obtained a judgment confirming the award, but abandoned the case after De Martini successfully moved to expunge the lis pendens. Gupta then filed a new action seeking to compel De Martini to complete the sale and recorded another lis pendens. De Martini moved to expunge the new lis pendens, arguing that Gupta needed the court's permission to record it under the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.36, as it was recorded by the same claimant and affected the same property. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that section 405.36 only applies to successive lis pendens filed in the same action and Gupta had established a prima facie case regarding the probable validity of a real property claim.De Martini petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three for a writ of mandate. The court granted the petition, concluding that the trial court erred both in its interpretation of section 405.36 and its application of the prima facie standard in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court held that section 405.36 requires a claimant to seek court permission before recording a lis pendens on the same property in a subsequent proceeding if a lis pendens in a prior, related proceeding has been expunged. Additionally, the court determined that the trial court should have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, not a prima facie standard, in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying expungement of the lis pendens and to enter a new order granting the requested expungement and ruling on De Martini's motion for attorney fees. View "Di Martini v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two, the plaintiff, a minor identified as J.R., filed a putative class action against Electronic Arts Inc. (EA), alleging causes of action for unlawful and unfair business practices, violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and unjust enrichment. J.R. claimed that EA deceptively induced players, particularly minors, to purchase in-game currency for its game, Apex Legends. EA sought to compel arbitration under the terms of its user agreement, which J.R. had accepted to play Apex Legends. The lower court denied EA's motion to compel on the grounds that J.R. had exercised his power under Family Code section 6710 to disaffirm all of his contracts with EA, including the arbitration agreement. EA appealed, arguing that an arbitrator, not the court, should decide issues of arbitrability due to a delegation provision within the agreement. The appellate court rejected EA's arguments, affirming the lower court's decision. The court held that J.R.'s disaffirmance of "any... contract or agreement" accepted through his EA account was sufficient to challenge the validity of the delegation provision specifically, thereby authorizing the court to assess the validity of J.R.'s disaffirmance. View "J.R. v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration agreement between an employee and her employer. The employee, Aljarice Hasty, was employed by the American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah (Association). After her employment ended, Hasty sued the Association for race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, wrongful discharge, and retaliation. The Association sought to compel arbitration per an agreement in Hasty's employment contract, but the trial court found the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and declined to sever the unconscionable terms. The Association appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was found due to the adhesive nature of the agreement, the lack of negotiation, and the hidden nature of the unconscionable provision within the complex document. Substantive unconscionability was found due to the agreement's one-sided nature, the overly broad confidentiality provision, and the waiver of the employee's right to bring representative actions under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable terms, as the arbitration agreement was permeated with unconscionability. View "Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. of Northern Cal., Nev. & Utah" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Kathryn Tornai, filed a lawsuit against her insurance company, CSAA Insurance Exchange, alleging breach of contract and bad faith for not paying her underinsured motorist claim. In response, CSAA filed a motion to compel arbitration, in line with a provision in Tornai's automobile policy. The trial court denied the motion, leading to CSAA's appeal. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision. It concluded that the parties disagreed over the amount of underinsured motorist damages owed to Tornai, leading to the requirement for arbitration under section 11580.2, subdivision (f) and the terms of the policy. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in denying CSAA's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, it instructed the lower court to grant CSAA's motion to compel arbitration of the underinsured motorist damages. View "Tournai v. CSAA Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

In this class action case, Nicole DeMarinis and Kelly Patire, current and former employees of Heritage Bank of Commerce, brought a case under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) against Heritage Bank for wage and hour and other Labor Code violations. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Heritage Bank’s argument to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims based on a waiver in their arbitration agreement.In the agreement, the plaintiffs had waived their right to bring any claims against each other in any class or representative proceeding. The bank argued that the denial of arbitration was erroneous because the waiver provision was enforceable, pertaining only to plaintiffs’ nonindividual PAGA claims. The court, however, found that the provision violated public policy as it required plaintiffs to completely abandon their right to bring both individual and nonindividual PAGA claims in any forum.The court also found that the waiver provision's nonseverability clause and a "poison pill" provision, which stated that if the waiver provision is found unenforceable, then the entire arbitration agreement is null and void, precluded severance of the unenforceable nonindividual PAGA claims waiver. Consequently, the court concluded that the unenforceability of the waiver provision rendered the entire arbitration agreement null and void, thereby affirming the trial court's decision denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "DeMarinis v. Heritage Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the plaintiff, Sally Ann Haydon, a former resident of Elegance at Dublin, a residential care facility for the elderly, sued the facility and its affiliated entities for elder abuse and other claims. The defendants attempted to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the resident agreement that Haydon had signed. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement to be unconscionable. The defendants appealed this decision.Haydon had lived at the facility for a few days and has dementia. The agreement she signed, which contained the arbitration clause, was over 40 pages long, and the arbitration clause was one of over 20 "miscellaneous" provisions at the end of the document. Haydon claimed she signed the agreement under duress and without understanding its contents.On appeal, the court found that there was a high degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in the arbitration clause, and therefore affirmed the trial court's decision not to enforce it. The court found procedural unconscionability in the circumstances of the agreement's formation, considering the pressure Haydon was under to sign the agreement, the lack of explanation about the arbitration clause, and the confusing presentation of the clause. The court found substantive unconscionability in the confidentiality provision of the arbitration agreement, the limitations on discovery under the applicable arbitration rules, and the requirement that parties bear their own costs and fees in connection with the arbitration. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions from the arbitration clause, given the extent of the unconscionability. View "Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin" on Justia Law

Salvatore Baglione, insured under Health Net of California Inc. through his employer, the County of Santa Clara, brought a lawsuit against Health Net alleging breach of contract and bad faith. This followed Health Net's inconsistent authorization of a medication prescribed for Baglione's chronic condition. Health Net moved to compel arbitration of Baglione's claims based on an arbitration provision in the enrollment form Baglione had signed. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Health Net's motion, finding that the agreement between Health Net and the County did not satisfy the disclosure requirements of Health and Safety Code section 1363.1, and therefore, the arbitration provision was unenforceable. Health Net appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court ruled that the enrollment form did not comply with the requirements of section 1363.1. It found that the form was not clear in its disclosure of which disputes were subject to arbitration, particularly with references to additional documents and laws that did not pertain to the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the form did not place the arbitration provision immediately before the signature line, as required by the statute. The court also agreed with the lower court that the agreement between Health Net and the County was non-compliant. It ruled that an arbitration agreement, which is part of a health plan, is not enforceable unless both the enrollment form and the County agreement are compliant. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying Health Net's motion to compel arbitration. View "Baglione v. Health Net of Cal." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a foreign worker hired by defendant Alco Harvesting LLC to work at farms owned by defendant and appellant Betteravia Farms. He later brought employment claims against appellants. Alco moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement presented to and signed by Plaintiff at his orientation. The trial court found the agreement void and denied the motion. It considered arbitration a “material term and condition” of Plaintiff’s employment and as such, a job requirement that Alco should have disclosed during the H-2A certification process.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Alco’s arbitration agreement required Plaintiff to forfeit his right to a jury trial in “any claim, dispute and/or controversy that [any] Employee may have against the Company . . . arising from, relating to or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with [or to the] Employee’s . . . employment by, or other association with the Company . . . .” The arbitration agreement also prohibited him from participating in any class action claims against Alco. Thus, the court considered the relinquishing of these rights as “material terms and conditions” of his employment. View "State of Cal. v. Alco Harvest" on Justia Law

Lai, an engineer, had access to Applied’s trade secrets and participated in highly confidential meetings. Mattson, Applied's direct competitor, recruited 17 Applied employees. Lai accepted a job with Mattson. Before his last day at Applied, Lai accessed proprietary information from Applied’s cloud-based storage system and sent e-mails attaching highly confidential Applied documents—many clearly marked as such—to his personal email accounts. He signed a separation certificate stating he had not retained any Applied information and confirmed this in two exit interviews. After starting his new job, Lai logged into his personal email accounts on his Mattson computer. Lai claims never disclosed any Applied information to Mattson. Mattson denies any knowledge of Lai’s actions.Applied sued Mattson and Lai, citing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code 3426) and breach of Lai’s employment agreement. Lai then deleted the emails he had sent to one account, and, after communicating with Mattson’s lawyers, downloaded a confidential Applied document to his Mattson laptop, deleting it a moment later. Mattson put Lai on leave. cut off his access to his personal email accounts. and sequestered his iPhone and computers. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Applied-Lai employment contract. The court of appeal affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from accessing or using Applied’s confidential information and an order compelling arbitration as to Lai. Mattson, a non-party, is not entitled to arbitration. The litigation should be stayed pending arbitration. View "Mattson Technology, Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

An arbitrator found the seller in breach based largely on an assessment of witness credibility. In the arbitrator’s view, defendant Phuong Pham lacked credibility because she used an interpreter during the arbitration proceedings. Reasoning that she had been in the country for decades, engaged in sophisticated business transactions, and previously functioned in some undisclosed capacity as an interpreter, the arbitrator felt that her use of an interpreter at the arbitration was a tactical ploy to seem less sophisticated. The Court of Appeal found here, the arbitrator’s credibility finding rested on unacceptable misconceptions about English proficiency and language acquisition. "These misconceptions, in turn, give rise to a reasonable impression of possible bias on the part of the arbitrator requiring reversal of the judgment and vacating the arbitration award." View "FCM Investments v. Grove Pham, LLC" on Justia Law