Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Unions, representing employees in five Sheriff’s Department bargaining units, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the County of Los Angeles that contained grievance procedures for resolving complaints concerning the interpretation or application of the agreements. The grievance procedures consisted of progressive steps culminating in arbitration. The Unions filed class grievances seeking overtime pay for “donning and doffing” and related activities (putting on, taking off, and maintaining their uniforms and equipment) and “off-the-clock” supervisory activities by certain employees. The county denied the grievances; the Unions filed requests for class arbitration of the grievances, which the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) granted. The County sought a declaratory judgment that ERCOM’s order granting class or consolidated arbitration violated the parties’ agreements. The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations. View "Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from five putative class actions filed against Wells Fargo and its predecessor, Wachovia Bank. At issue was whether Wells Fargo's waiver of its right to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims should be extended to preclude Wells Fargo from compelling arbitration of the unnamed putative class members' claims. The court concluded that because a class including the unnamed putative class members had not been certified, Article III's jurisdictional limitations precluded the district court from entertaining Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss those members' claims as subject to arbitration; contrary to the position they take in this appeal, the named plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek the court's affirmance of the district court's provision holding that if a class is certified, Wells Fargo will be estopped to assert its contractual rights to arbitration; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spears-Haymond v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Montano filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that it failed to offer all required meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt retail employees; failed to provide all regular and overtime pay when due or when employment terminated; and failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, in violation of the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. She included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act. Montano propounded discovery requests and Wet Seal responded with objections but no substantive information. Montano moved to compel discovery responses. Before the hearing, Wet Seal moved to compel arbitration of Montano’s individual claims and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration, based on a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims." The trial court ultimately denied the motion for arbitration and granted the discovery motion. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

When Richmont Holdings, Inc. bought the assets of Superior Recharge Systems, LLC the parties signed an asset Purchase Agreement that contained an arbitration provision. Superior Discharge’s part-owner, Jon Blake, signed an employment contract to continue as general manager of the business. The contract contained a covenant not to compete but not an arbitration provision. After Blake’s employment was terminated, Superior Recharge and Blake (together, Blake) sued Richmont in Denton County for fraud and breach of contract. Richmont then sued Blake individually in Dallas County to enforce the covenant not to compete. The Dallas County suit was subsequently abated. Nineteen months after being sued, Richmont moved to compel arbitration, asserting that Blake’s claims arose out of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that Richmont had waived arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circumstances of this case did not approach a substantial invocation of the judicial process. Remanded. View "Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Gilda filed for dissolution of marriage. She and former husband, Murray, agreed to resolve property and support issues through mediation, during which they purportedly exchanged financial disclosure declarations mandated by the Family Code. They executed a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into a stipulated judgment. Shortly after entry of judgment, Gilda learned that Murray recently sold a company he founded during the marriage. In the settlement agreement, Gilda relinquished her community share of the company for $10 million. Murray received approximately $75 million from the sale. Gilda sought to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud and duress and served discovery on Murray requesting the financial disclosure declarations that were exchanged prior to entry of judgment. Murray refused to produce the declarations, asserting they were covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, insofar as they constituted writings that were prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation. (Evid. Code, 1119(b).) The trial court a motion to compel on mediation confidentiality grounds. The court of appeal vacated, noting the Family Code’s stated public policy to promote “full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities” in dissolution proceedings View "Lappe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Nijjar hired Judge as a resident property manager. Nijjar terminated her employment. Judge filed claims for unpaid compensation, meal and rest period premiums, waiting time penalties, and wrongful termination. Under the Private Attorney General Act, Judge alleged similar claims on behalf of other employees. Judge also filed a class action, alleging similar claims on behalf of herself and class members. The trial court determined that the actions were related cases and designated the individual/PAGA action as the lead case, but denied Judge’s subsequent application to consolidate the cases. Based on an arbitration agreement that Judge had signed as an employee, the trial court granted a petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the individual and PAGA claims. The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement and that Judge’s employment-related claims and individual PAGA claims were covered. The arbitrator issued a clause construction award, finding that the agreement permitted arbitration of class and representative claims. The trial court granted the defendants’ petition to vacate the n award. The court of appeal dismissed, stating that because the arbitrator has not ruled on any substantive issues, the order did not vacate a final arbitration award and is not appealable. View "Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a declaratory and injunctive relief complaint. The defendant sent plaintiff a demand for mediation and arbitration pursuant to a dispute resolution provision in a February 27, 2008 servicing agreement between the parties. On October 9, 2013, plaintiff rejected defendant’s mediation and arbitration demand. On October 24, defendant moved to stay the action pending compliance with the arbitration demand. No petition or motion to compel arbitration was filed. No petition to compel compliance with the mediation provision of the parties’ servicing agreement was filed. The defendant stressed the stay motion was not a petition to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to stay. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal because the trial court’s denial of the stay motion unaccompanied by any motion or petition to compel arbitration or a pending arbitration is not an appealable order. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. The Best Service Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Safari Associates and real party in interest Alan Tarlov arbitrated a dispute pursuant to a written agreement. The arbitrator awarded Safari damages, attorney fees, and costs. Safari petitioned to confirm the arbitration award at the trial court. In response, Tarlov filed a motion to modify or correct the award on the ground that the arbitrator acted in excess of his powers in awarding Safari attorney fees. The trial court ruled that the arbitrator's decision to apply Civil Section section 1717 was subject to judicial review, and concluded that the arbitrator had erred in failing to apply the definition of "prevailing party" contained in the parties' agreement. The trial court corrected the award by ruling that the definition of prevailing party contained in the parties' agreement applied and remanding the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings to apply the agreement's definition of prevailing party in determining whether to award attorney fees. Safari filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting that the Court of Appeal direct the trial court to vacate its order correcting the arbitrator's award. The Court found that the record unambiguously demonstrated that Safari and Tarlov extensively briefed this very issue in the arbitration. In addition, there was no provision in the parties' arbitration agreement that "explicitly and unambiguously limited" the arbitrator's power to determine the applicability of section 1717 in awarding attorney fees. Under these circumstances, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his powers in applying the definition of prevailing party found in section 1717, subdivision (b)(1) in awarding Safari attorney fees. Further, any error that the arbitrator may have committed would have constituted legal error, which was not subject to correction in the trial court. Accordingly, the Court granted Safari's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order correcting the arbitration award, and to conduct further proceedings. View "Safari Associates v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated cases that arose out of an action brought by Guy Willis against three defendants: Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC ("Alaska Bush") and Hugh and Ryan Krank (collectively, the defendants). The Kranks are the owners and operators of Alaska Bush, an outfitter that provided guided hunting trips in Alaska. In December 2011, Willis entered into a written contract with Alaska Bush pursuant to which Alaska Bush would lead a guided hunting trip in Alaska. Willis also claimed that he entered into a separate oral contract to hunt black bears during that guided hunting trip. The guided hunting trip took place in September 2012. A few months after the trip, Willis sued the defendants in Alabama seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and suppression. Willis's claims against defendants centered primarily on his allegations that the equipment Alaska Bush provided for the hunting expedition was inadequate in number, unsafe, and inoperable, and he also alleged that he lost hunting time because the defendants were providing services to other hunters who were apparently not included in the guided hunting trip. Willis claimed that he lost most of his personal hunting equipment and had to leave the trip early because he "was caused to be thrown from an improperly repaired, inspected, and/or working motorized boat ...." Willis further alleged that the defendants misrepresented the quantity of wild game that would be available on the hunt. Willis filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Ryan, and, on the following day, he filed a similar application against Alaska Bush and Hugh. On December 21, 2012, defendants filed an answer to Willis's complaint and an objection to Willis's applications for entry of a default judgment. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion to compel Willis to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement found in the written contract. Defendants then each filed an individual motion to dismiss Willis's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court issued an order denying the defendants' respective motions to dismiss and their motion to compel arbitration. In case no. 1130184, defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; in case no. 1130231, they appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court concluded after review that defendants were not entitled to mandamus relief on the jurisdiction question, but met their burden in their motion to compel arbitration. View "Willis v. Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC et al." on Justia Law