Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Consumers who purchased an advertised product that promised they could "eat all you want and still lose weight" were dissatisfied with the results and filed a class action against the manufacturers for false advertising. The parties entered into mediation, where they drafted and signed a document outlining the terms of a settlement. They then informed the district court that the mediation had been successful and, in subsequent months, exchanged several drafts further documenting the settlement. During the drafting, the parties could no longer agree on terms and defendants informed the district court they no longer intended to settle. The plaintiff class then filed a motion to enforce the settlement achieved at the mediation, and the district court granted that motion because it concluded the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement. On appeal, the plaintiffs contested the Tenth Circuit's interlocutory jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the merits of the district court’s conclusion that the parties had, in fact, reached a binding settlement. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the case was an impermissible interlocutory appeal because the district court's judgment was not a final one. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Miller, et al v. Basic Research, et al" on Justia Law

Cleo Boler was admitted to Grace Living Center - Norman, in January 2010 and was a resident there until January 2012. Judy Little, as Cleo Boler's attorney in fact, signed the admission documents which included a three-page Dispute Resolution Provision. The arbitration agreement provided that any claim, controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of or in connection with the care rendered to Cleo Boler would be determined by submission to neutral, binding arbitration. It purported to bind not only Cleo Boler, but any future legal representatives, heirs, successors, etc., who might assert a claim against Grace. Cleo Boler, individually, and Judy Little and Johnnie Boler as attorneys in fact, sued Grace and others for negligence, violation of the Nursing Home Care Act and breach of contract regarding the care and treatment of Cleo Boler. Grace filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, asserting that the contract was one involving interstate commerce and was valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which preempted contrary state law. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The trial judge held that the wrongful death claim belonging to Cleo Boler's statutory claim was not subject to an agreement to arbitrate contained in her nursing home's admission contract. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that the personal representative and the next of kin were not bound by the arbitration agreement in the contract signed on Cleo Boler's behalf. They did not sign the nursing home contract in their personal capacities and their claim was not wholly derivative of Cleo Boler's claim. View "Boler v. Security Health Care, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether federal law preempts Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2602.01(f)(4), which generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Here, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), which is registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group, issued a professional liability insurance policy to Dr. Brett Speece that included a provision requiring binding arbitration. After Speece filed an action seeking a declaration that APIC was obligated to provide coverage for his defense in a Medicaid proceeding, APIC filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court overruled the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause in the policy was not valid and enforceable pursuant to section 25-2602.01, and that neither the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA) preempted the state statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order overruling APIC’s motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) the FAA does not preempt section 25-2602.01(f)(4), but the LRRA does preempt application of the Nebraska statute to foreign risk retention groups; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it determined that section 25-2602.01(f)(4) prohibited enforcement of the arbitration clause in the parties’ insurance contract in this case. View "Speece v. Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co." on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment, Employee signed an agreement to arbitrate claims with Employer. Employee later filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), alleging that Employer had discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. The ICRC subsequently filed a statement of charges with the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA). Employer filed a motion to dismiss the ICRC’s charges or, in the alternative, compel arbitration. The DIA denied Employer’s motion on the ground that ICRC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and, consequently, not bound by it. On judicial review, the district court remanded instructions for the ICRC to dismiss the matter pending arbitration by the parties, concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the FAA did not require arbitration of this proceeding because it was brought by an entity that was not bound to arbitrate under generally applicable principles of contract law, where the ICRC was not a party to the agreement and its interest was not derivative of Employee’s. View "Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to determine if an unsuccessful party in an arbitration proceeding could prevent the confirmation of an award by paying the award prior to the confirmation proceeding. Diane Henderson filed an action against Summerville Ford-Mercury, Inc. alleging the dealer made misrepresentations to her when she purchased a used vehicle. The circuit court granted the dealer's motion to compel arbitration, and an arbitrator found for Henderson on her claims for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act. Henderson moved to confirm the arbitration award, which was granted by the circuit court. The dealer appealed, arguing the circuit court erred: (1) in rejecting its assertion that payment of the award mooted the request for confirmation, leaving no "justiciable controversy"; and alternatively (2) in applying the provision for confirming awards contained in the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the unsuccessful party could not prevent confirmation of the award by paying it before confirmation. View "Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was the narrow question of whether an arbitration agreement signed by respondents was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under California law. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the forum selection and punitive damages clauses at issue were not unconscionable, but that the arbitrator selection, statute of limitations and fee shifting provisions were. Therefore, because the agreement was "permeated with unconscionability," it was unenforceable.View "Brown v. MHN Gov't Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed.View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

A snowplow driver for the City of Alexandria collided with Donald Fernow's vehicle. Fernow brought a personal injury action against the City. At the same time, Fernow's insurance company (Insurer) sought arbitration against the City, seeking repayment in basic economic loss benefits paid to Fernow. In the personal injury action, the district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Fernow's claim was barred by statutory discretionary immunity, common law official immunity, and statutory snow and ice immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. Meanwhile, the arbitrator awarded Insurer basic economic loss benefits, concluding that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter because of the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court confirmed the award. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she determined that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that claims of immunity, including necessary questions of fact, should be determined by the district court prior to arbitration on the merits under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Remanded.View "Fernow v. Gould" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment. Employee's union filed a grievance against Employer, and the parties submitted the controversy to arbitration. The arbitrator reduced the dismissal to a one year suspension without pay, finding the dismissal was without just cause. Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitral award, claiming that enforcement of the award violated public policy. The trial court granted the application and vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the award violated the public policy against workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required nothing less than Employee's termination. View "State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391" on Justia Law