Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved two different statutory schemes awarding attorney fees. One scheme, RCW 7.06.050-.060, discourages frivolous appeals from mandatory arbitration. The other scheme, RCW 4.84.250-.300, encourages parties to settle before going to court in cases where the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less by allowing a plaintiff to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement at least 10 days before the initial trial, the offer is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The question before the Court was whether the second scheme may be invoked for the first time 10 days before a trial de novo, rather than 10 days before the arbitration hearing, by a plaintiff that appealed an arbitration decision. After success at the trial de novo, Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Andrea Harris applied for and received prevailing party attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Plaintiffs argued that although they offered to settle for under $10,000 after the mandatory arbitration, RCW 4.84.250-.300 allowed them to recover attorney fees as long as they made their offers 10 days before the trial de novo. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that RCW 4.84.250-.300 applies only to a plaintiff that seeks recovery of $10,000 or less and makes an offer of settlement 10 days before the initial hearing whether it is a trial or an arbitration. View "Williams v. Tilaye" on Justia Law

In an arbitration proceeding between Respondent SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc. (SunOpta) and Colorado Mills, LLC, an arbitrator, at SunOpta's request, issued subpoenas to petitioners SK Food International and Adams Vegetable Oil, Inc. SK Food and Adams were not parties to the underlying arbitration. Neither company was incorporated in Colorado, was registered as a foreign corporation in Colorado, or maintained a principal office in Colorado. The subpoenas, which requested business records, were served on SK Food and Adams at their places of business in California and North Dakota. When SK Food and Adams refused to comply with the arbitration subpoenas, SunOpta asked the district court to enforce them. The district court issued an order enforcing the subpoenas.In response, SK Food and Adams filed a petition for a rule to show cause, which the Supreme Court issued. The nonparties appealed the district court's order enforcing the subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that Colorado courts, as a matter of state sovereignty, have no authority to enforce civil subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's enforcement order, and remanded case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Colorado Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc." on Justia Law

This case returned to the South Carolina Supreme Court from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." The underlying action originally came to the Court on appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellant Century BMW's motion to compel arbitration. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel. Following that decision, Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, contending the Supreme Court's opinion was inconsistent with the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp." which found that the federal Arbitration Act preempted South Carolina law. The South Carolina Court emphasized that its opinion was based on state law grounds, and admonished Appellant for "attempting to reframe the issues and miscast [the Court's] holding as disingenuous to the opinion and a holding [it] never made." Thereafter, Appellant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The South Carolina Court's opinion was vacated by the federal Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." Respondents Heather Herron and several others "individually and for the benefit of all car buyers who paid 'administrative fees'" argued that the matter of preemption was not preserved in the South Carolina proceedings. The South Carolina Court agreed and therefore adhered to its initial opinion. View "Herron v. Century BMW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court denying her petition to vacate an arbitration decision that rejected her claims, which asserted principally that defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal plaintiff principally contended that the arbitrators' decision should be vacated in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Fair Pay Act), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The court reviewed the district court's conclusions of law de novo and found plaintiff's contentions to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidating several appeals, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of a municipality's financial distress and recovery planning on an arbitration award agreed to pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act). For approximately twenty years, the City of Scranton has been designated a distressed municipality under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act. Pursuant to the Recovery Act, the City has its Commonwealth-mandated financial advisors who assist in creating a financial recovery plan (essentially a budget). In the most recent collective bargaining agreements between the City of Scranton and its Police and Firefighter Unions expired at the close of 2002. Negotiations as to future terms and work conditions for union members resulted in impasses. Accordingly, pursuant to the Act, arbitrators were selected to establish appropriate terms and conditions. Throughout the arbitrations, the City maintained that the arbitrators lacked legal authority to award relief impinging on the City's financial recovery plan. The City attempted to resist paying the ensuing award that resulted from the arbitration. The Commonwealth Court found that it was required to vacate the awards, holding that they did not conform to the City's Recovery Plan and would result in increased financial and operational burdens on an already distressed municipality. The Unions appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court focused on the distinction between the terms "arbitration award" and "arbitration settlement": the City argued that it was not mandated to pay "awards" but "settlements." The Supreme Court found the term "settlement" ambiguous, and the plain meaning could include the "award" given by the arbitrators in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order that the award negatively impacted the City's Recovery Plan. View "City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union" on Justia Law

Appellant Marcus Minix received documents from the county mediator stating that the county court had received a complaint against him for a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 514.030 and directing Appellant to mediation. After attending mediation, Appellant was informed he may need to return to mediation. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ prohibiting the county attorney from referring felony criminal complaints, including a felony complaint against him, to a mediator before presenting the complaints to a district court for review and issuance of a summons or warrant. The court of appeals denied the petition, finding it was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition may not be issued against non-judicial parties such as the Appellees, the county attorney and the mediator, and the substantive relief Appellant sought was within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, not the court of appeals. View "Minix v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Respondent filed a sex discrimination suit against petitioner alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code 21.001-.556, where petitioner terminated its employment of respondent citing as the basis for its decision a reduction in force due to worsening business conditions. The parties sought arbitration and petitioner appealed the arbitrator's reward. At issue was whether the Texas General Arbitration Act ("TAA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 171.001-.098, precluded an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if not, whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, preempted enforcement of such an agreement. The court held that the TAA presented no impediment to an agreement that limited the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus allowed for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error. The court also held that the FAA did not preempt enforcement of an agreement to expanded judicial review of an arbitration award enforceable under the TAA. The court further held that, on remand, the court of appeals must determine whether the record was sufficient to review petitioner's complaints. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of petitioner's challenges to the arbitration award.