Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a dispute over the adequacy of concrete work Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. performed on a condominium construction project as a subcontractor to LPIHGC, LLC. The parties proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator selected by the parties issued an arbitration award in favor of LPIHGC. LPIHGC moved to confirm, and Nordic moved to vacate, the arbitration award. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate and granted the motion to confirm. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to disclose various relationships with the law firms of LPIHGC’s attorneys. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s final judgment, thereby vacating the associated orders granting LPIHGC’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying Nordic’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, holding that because the factual and/or legal bases upon which the circuit court denied the motion to vacate were unascertainable, the Supreme Court was unable to appropriately review the circuit court’s ruling. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on Nordic’s motion to vacate. View "In re Arbitration of Nordic PCL Constr., Inc. v. LIPHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In April 2008, plaintiffs Shannon and Eric Walker requested several samples of hardwood flooring from BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc., a Canadian corporation, through BuildDirect's website. The next month they arranged, over the telephone, to purchase 113 boxes of flooring from BuildDirect. BuildDirect emailed a two-page written Contract entitled "Quotation" to Ms. Walker, who signed and dated the Contract and returned it to BuildDirect via fax. The Contract described the type, amount, and price of the flooring purchased by the Walkers. And, it included 14 bullet points setting forth additional terms. The sixth bullet point stated: "All orders are subject to BuildDirect's 'Terms of Sale.'" The Walkers alleged that after they installed the flooring, they discovered that their home was infested with nonindigenous wood-boring insects. According to the Walkers, the insects severely damaged the home, and caused the home to be subject to quarantine and possible destruction by the United States Department of Agriculture. The question the federal appeals court posed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a written consumer contract for the sale of goods incorporated by reference a separate document entitled "Terms of Sale" available on the seller's website, when the contract stated that it was "subject to" the seller's "Terms of Sale" but did not specifically reference the website. In response, the Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law did not recognize a "vague attempt at incorporation by reference" as demonstrated in this case. Under the Oklahoma law of contracts, parties may incorporate by reference separate writings, or portions thereof, together into one agreement where: (1) the underlying contract makes clear reference to the extrinsic document; (2) the identity and location of the extrinsic document may be ascertained beyond doubt; and (3) the parties to the agreement had knowledge of and assented to its incorporation. View "Walker v. BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Atwood Health Properties, LLC contracted with Calson Construction Company to construct a medical office building. Calson engaged Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. (GEM) as a subcontractor to design and install a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. Five years after the project was completed, Atwood sold the building to Atwood Medical Properties, LLC (AMP). When AMP experienced compressor failures in the HVAC system, AMP filed suit against Atwood. Atwood paid for a new HVAC system and initiated arbitration proceedings against Calson to recover its costs. Calson, in turn, initiated an arbitration proceeding against GEM for indemnification under the parties’ contract. The two arbitration proceedings were consolidated. The arbitrator concluded that Calson should pay Atwood $358,223 and that GEM should pay Calson that same amount. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award. GEM appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly confirmed the arbitration award. View "Atwood Health Props., LLC v. Calson Constr. Co." on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute arising from the construction of a large house. Interstate Mechanical, Inc. initiated an arbitration action to recover payments it claimed as a result of its work on the house project. Abbey/Land LLC and Glacier Construction Partners LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) then filed suit against Interstate in Montana District Court in Flathead County. Thereafter, Glacier asserted counterclaims in the Interstate arbitration proceeding and obtained a positive arbitration award against Interstate. Abbey/Land subsequently filed an amended complaint dismissing Glacier as a plaintiff and naming it as a defendant. Glacier tendered the Abbey/Land claims to its insurer, James River Insurance Company. James River refused to provide defense or indemnity. Glacier and Abbey/Land settled the Flathead County action as between themselves. James River moved to intervene in the Flathead County action to challenge the reasonableness of the confessed judgment against Glacier. Meanwhile, Abbey/Land and Glacier entered settlements with all other parties. The district court never ruled on James River’s motion to intervene and entered final judgment against Glacier. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entering judgment without considering either its motion to intervene or the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. View "Abbey/Land LLC v. Interstate Mechanical, Inc." on Justia Law

Property owner Crescent City Property Partners, L.L.C., and a builder, Greystar Development and Construction, LP, entered into a contract in March, 2002 for the construction of a mixed-use development in Lafayette. Alleging defects in the builder's performance, and pursuant to the arbitration clause in the construction contract, Crescent filed an arbitration claim against Greystar in 2008, also naming as a defendant Greystar's surety, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company. In response, Greystar filed a third party demand against various subcontractors. The Supreme Court granted writs in consolidated cases to consider whether the court of appeal correctly vacated the arbitration award, which had been confirmed by the district court. The court of appeal vacated the award on the basis the arbitration panel, in applying a statute of peremption incorrectly, disturbed a vested right of the plaintiff and, thus, the panel violated the plaintiff's due process rights. The court of appeal found the arbitration panel's interpretation of the law placed an impossible burden on the plaintiff, a burden the panel deemed fundamentally unfair, thereby requiring vacatur of the arbitration panel's award. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeal essentially misinterpreted the laws concerning arbitration, and, thus, erred in failing to limit its review to the factors mandating vacatur articulated in La. Rev. Stat. 9:4210. In reversing the court of appeal's decision, the Court reiterated well-settled law that otherwise fairly and honestly obtained arbitration awards may not be overturned merely for errors of fact or law. View "Crescent Property Partners, LLC v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, filed a first amended class action complaint alleging that Gentry Homes, Ltd. constructed Plaintiffs’ home without adequate high wind protection. Gentry filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty (HBLW) between Gentry and Plaintiffs. The circuit court ordered Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Gentry but severed and struck an arbitrator-selection provision for potential conflict of interest. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court should have enforced the HBLW’s arbitrator-selection provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court orders, holding (1) the ICA erred in required a party challenging an arbitrator-selection provision to show evidence of “actual bias”; and (2) in resolving a challenge to an arbitrator-selection provision, the “fundamental fairness” standard should be applied, and under this standard, the arbitrator-selection provision was fundamentally unfair. View "Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd." on Justia Law

America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration. View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law

Guardian Builders, LLC, and E. Wayne Tackett appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Randy Uselton and his wife Melissa. In 2010, the Useltons sued Guardian alleging several claims arising from Guardian's construction of a house for the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted that motion. In late 2011, the arbitrator entered a final award in favor of the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award to the circuit court, to which it attached a copy of the arbitration award. The Useltons filed a 'motion to confirm' the arbitration award. The circuit court entered an order purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award, purporting to grant the Useltons' motion to confirm the arbitration award, and purporting to order Guardian to pay $1,421.75 in Better Business Bureau fees and facility costs related to the arbitration. Guardian objected only to a subset of the damages that were awarded the Useltons that were not directly related to the poorly constructed house, specifically, attorney fees and arbitration fees (including both the arbitrator fee and the forum fee charged by the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama ("the BBB"), which administered the arbitration). Furthermore, Guardian argued the arbitrator lacked the authority to award the Useltons attorney fees and arbitration fees. The Supreme Court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding those remedies. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment subtracting attorney fees and arbitration fees from the award made to the Useltons. View "Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton " on Justia Law

After losing millions of dollars because of delays and coordination failures in building a hospital, W.J. O’Neil Company sued its construction manager in state court. In subsequent arbitration, the architect and a design subcontractor (defendants) were added to the arbitration on indemnity claims. In the arbitration, O’Neil did not formally assert claims against those defendants, but O’Neil’s claims against its construction manager arose from the defendants’ defective and inadequate design of the hospital. O’Neil won the arbitration against its construction manager, but the construction manager did not establish its indemnity claims, so the defendants were not held liable. No party sought judicial confirmation or review of the arbitration award. O’Neil then sued the defendants in federal court. The district court dismissed, finding the claims barred by Michigan’s doctrine of res judicata. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An arbitration award cannot bar a claim that the arbitrator lacked authority to decide, and an arbitrator lacks authority to decide a claim that the parties did not agree to arbitrate. O’Neil did not agree to arbitrate the claims at issue. View "W.J. O'Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bulfinch, Richardson & Abbott, Inc." on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed.View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law