Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are foreign nationals participating in an au pair program, and Cultural Care, Inc., a Massachusetts company that places au pairs with host families in the U.S. The plaintiffs allege that Cultural Care violated their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various state wage and hour laws by failing to pay them legal wages. They also claim violations of state deceptive trade practices laws.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Cultural Care's motion to dismiss the complaint, including its defense of derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Company. Cultural Care appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Cultural Care had not established entitlement to protection under Yearsley. After the case returned to the District Court, Cultural Care filed a motion to compel arbitration based on agreements in contracts signed by the au pairs with International Care Ltd. (ICL), a Swiss company. The District Court denied this motion, ruling that Cultural Care had waived its right to compel arbitration and that it could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that Cultural Care, as a nonsignatory to the ICL Contract, could not enforce the arbitration agreement under either third-party beneficiary theory or equitable estoppel. The court emphasized that the arbitration agreement did not demonstrate with "special clarity" that the signatories intended to confer arbitration rights on Cultural Care. Additionally, the plaintiffs' statutory claims did not depend on the ICL Contract, making equitable estoppel inapplicable. View "Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc." on Justia Law

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Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Crystal Krueger, who was driving a vehicle owned by Whataburger Restaurants LLC. Ferchichi sued Krueger and Whataburger for negligence. During mediation, Whataburger's counsel revealed the existence of a surveillance video of the plaintiffs, which they refused to share outside of mediation. Ferchichi filed a motion to compel the video and for sanctions. Whataburger responded with a motion to dismiss the sanctions request under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).The trial court denied Whataburger's TCPA motion, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion for sanctions was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Ferchichi failed to establish a prima facie case for the sanctions request. The court remanded the case to the trial court to award Whataburger its costs and attorney’s fees and to consider sanctions against Ferchichi.In a separate case, Haven at Thorpe Lane, a student-housing complex, was sued by students for fraud and deceptive trade practices. Haven filed a motion to compel discovery from two mothers of the plaintiffs, who had created a Facebook group criticizing Haven. The mothers filed a TCPA motion to dismiss Haven's motion to compel. The trial court denied the TCPA motion, but the Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion to compel was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Haven failed to establish a prima facie case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both cases and held that motions to compel and for sanctions are not "legal actions" under the TCPA. Therefore, the TCPA does not apply. The court reversed the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "HAVEN AT THORPE LANE, LLC v. PATE" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law

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Armando Ballesteros purchased a new car from Fairview Ford Sales, Inc. (Fairview) under a retail installment contract. The contract included an arbitration provision applicable to disputes between Ballesteros and Fairview. After discovering defects in the car that were not repaired, Ballesteros sued Fairview and Ford Motor Company (Ford), the car manufacturer, under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Both defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration provision, but the trial court compelled arbitration only as to Fairview, denying the motion as to Ford.The trial court, San Bernardino County Superior Court, ruled that Ford, as a nonsignatory to the contract, could not compel arbitration. Ford appealed, arguing that Ballesteros's claims against it were intertwined with the contract and that equitable estoppel should apply to compel arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting Ford's arguments. The appellate court concluded that Ballesteros's statutory claims against Ford were based on warranties that fell outside the contract with Fairview. The court emphasized that Ford, not being a party to the contract, could not invoke the arbitration provision. The court also noted that equitable estoppel did not apply because Ballesteros's claims did not rely on the contract's terms but on independent warranties recognized by the Song-Beverly Act. The court joined other appellate courts in disagreeing with the precedent set by Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, which had allowed a nonsignatory manufacturer to compel arbitration under similar circumstances. The court highlighted broader equitable concerns, stating that arbitration cannot be imposed on a signatory plaintiff’s claims against a nonsignatory without a clear showing of inequity, which Ford failed to demonstrate. View "Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

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Connie Lange purchased a fifth-wheel camping trailer from GMT Auto Sales in August 2020, which included a $199 administrative fee. Lange later filed a class action petition alleging that GMT violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by charging this fee, arguing that fifth-wheel camping trailers do not qualify as "motor vehicles," "vessels," or "vessel trailers" under the relevant statute. GMT initially moved to dismiss the case but later moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County overruled GMT's motion to dismiss and later granted GMT's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Lange $199 and $5,000 in attorney fees. Lange then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award and reconsider the order compelling arbitration, which the circuit court denied. Lange appealed, arguing that GMT waived its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss and that the arbitration provision was unenforceable.The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing with Lange that GMT waived its right to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and reviewed the case de novo. The court found that GMT did not waive its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss, as it timely moved to compel arbitration and raised it as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading. The court also found that the arbitration provision remained enforceable despite the assignment of the retail installment contract to a bank. Lange's argument regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration provision was deemed unpreserved for review.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

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Tiffany Johnson and Tracy Crider, Maryland residents, obtained credit card accounts from Continental Finance Company, LLC and Continental Purchasing, LLC. They filed separate class-action lawsuits in Maryland state court, alleging that Continental violated Maryland usury laws by charging excessive interest rates through a "rent-a-bank" scheme. They sought statutory damages and declaratory judgments to void their loans. Continental removed the cases to the District of Maryland and moved to compel arbitration based on a cardholder agreement containing an arbitration provision.The District of Maryland consolidated the cases and denied Continental's motions to compel arbitration. The court held that it was responsible for determining whether the arbitration agreement was illusory, not the arbitrator. It also found that the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements could not be applied before establishing the existence of a valid contract. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law due to a "change-in-terms" clause allowing Continental to unilaterally alter any term at its sole discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the court, not the arbitrator, should determine the contract's formation. It also concurred that the choice-of-law provisions could not be enforced before establishing a valid contract. Finally, the court held that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law because the change-in-terms clause allowed Continental to escape its contractual obligations, rendering the agreement non-binding. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Continental Finance Co., LLC" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Katherine Chabolla, purchased a one-month subscription from ClassPass, a company offering access to gyms and fitness classes, in January 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ClassPass paused charges but resumed them when gyms reopened. Chabolla filed a lawsuit alleging that ClassPass violated California’s Automatic Renewal Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act by resuming charges without proper notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration, which argued that Chabolla had agreed to arbitrate any claims by using their website. The district court found that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use, which included the arbitration clause, and that Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest assent to those terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that ClassPass’s website, which resembled a sign-in wrap agreement, did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use on the landing page or the first screen. Even if the second and third screens provided such notice, Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest her assent to the Terms of Use on those screens. The court concluded that Chabolla’s use of the website did not amount to an unambiguous manifestation of assent to the Terms of Use, and therefore, she was not bound by the arbitration clause within those terms. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration. View "CHABOLLA V. CLASSPASS, INC." on Justia Law

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Eido Hussam Al-Nahhas, an Illinois resident, took out four loans from Rosebud Lending LZO, operating as ZocaLoans, with interest rates up to nearly 700%, far exceeding Illinois law limits. Al-Nahhas alleged that ZocaLoans was a front for two private equity firms, 777 Partners, LLC, and Tactical Marketing Partners, LLC, to evade state usury laws by claiming tribal sovereign immunity through the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. He sued ZocaLoans and the firms for violating Illinois usury statutes and the federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act.The defendants participated in litigation for fourteen months, including filing an answer, engaging in discovery, and attending status conferences. They later sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the loan agreements. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion, finding that the defendants had waived their right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the defendants waived their right to arbitrate through their litigation conduct. The court also found that the case was not moot despite the settlement between Al-Nahhas and ZocaLoans, as punitive damages were still at issue. The court granted the parties' motions to file documents under seal. View "Hussam Al-Nahhas v 777 Partners LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Darren Kramer, Manish Aggarwal, Mostafa El Bermawy, and Amish Shah filed a complaint against Coinbase, Inc. for public injunctive relief under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the California False Advertising Law (FAL), and the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). They alleged that Coinbase misrepresented its security features, which led to financial losses. The plaintiffs had accepted Coinbase’s user agreement, which included an arbitration provision. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiffs sought private injunctive relief, which should be subject to arbitration.The San Francisco Superior Court denied Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the plaintiffs sought public injunctive relief, which is not subject to arbitration under California law. The court noted that the complaint exclusively sought public injunctive relief and did not request any relief that would solely benefit the plaintiffs or existing Coinbase customers. The court also referenced a related federal action (Aggarwal I) where the plaintiffs sought individual relief, further supporting the conclusion that the current complaint sought public injunctive relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint sought public injunctive relief, as it aimed to prohibit Coinbase from continuing its allegedly deceptive practices that misled the general public about its security features. The court distinguished this case from others where the relief sought was primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs or a specific group of individuals. The court concluded that the requested injunctive relief had the primary purpose and effect of protecting the public, thus falling under the definition of public injunctive relief as established in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. Consequently, the arbitration provision could not be enforced to compel arbitration of the public injunctive relief claims. View "Kramer v. Coinbase, Inc." on Justia Law

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A home improvement and solar panel salesperson visited the home of senior citizens Harold and Lucy West, who lived with their adult daughter Deon. The salesperson, Ilai Mitmiger, discussed a solar installation and bathroom renovation, leading to a loan agreement package being completed electronically with Harold’s signature. Harold and Lucy, both in their 90s and suffering from dementia, did not use email, computers, or mobile phones. Deon believed the renovations would be paid for by a government program, as suggested by Mitmiger. The loan documents were sent to Deon’s email, opened on a mobile device, and signed electronically in Harold’s name within seconds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Solar Mosaic LLC’s petition to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the loan agreement. The court found that Mosaic had not proven the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, specifically that Harold was the person who completed the loan documents or that Deon had the authority to bind Harold to an arbitration agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the evidence strongly suggested Harold lacked the technical ability to execute the electronic signatures and demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Harold actually signed the loan documents. The court also found that Mosaic had not proven Deon had the authority to bind Harold to the agreement or that Harold ratified the agreement through a recorded telephone call. The court concluded that the recorded call did not demonstrate Harold’s awareness or understanding of the loan agreement, and thus, there was no ratification. View "West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC" on Justia Law