Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC
Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law
Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co.
Armando Ballesteros purchased a new car from Fairview Ford Sales, Inc. (Fairview) under a retail installment contract. The contract included an arbitration provision applicable to disputes between Ballesteros and Fairview. After discovering defects in the car that were not repaired, Ballesteros sued Fairview and Ford Motor Company (Ford), the car manufacturer, under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Both defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration provision, but the trial court compelled arbitration only as to Fairview, denying the motion as to Ford.The trial court, San Bernardino County Superior Court, ruled that Ford, as a nonsignatory to the contract, could not compel arbitration. Ford appealed, arguing that Ballesteros's claims against it were intertwined with the contract and that equitable estoppel should apply to compel arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting Ford's arguments. The appellate court concluded that Ballesteros's statutory claims against Ford were based on warranties that fell outside the contract with Fairview. The court emphasized that Ford, not being a party to the contract, could not invoke the arbitration provision. The court also noted that equitable estoppel did not apply because Ballesteros's claims did not rely on the contract's terms but on independent warranties recognized by the Song-Beverly Act. The court joined other appellate courts in disagreeing with the precedent set by Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, which had allowed a nonsignatory manufacturer to compel arbitration under similar circumstances. The court highlighted broader equitable concerns, stating that arbitration cannot be imposed on a signatory plaintiff’s claims against a nonsignatory without a clear showing of inequity, which Ford failed to demonstrate. View "Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law
Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc.
Connie Lange purchased a fifth-wheel camping trailer from GMT Auto Sales in August 2020, which included a $199 administrative fee. Lange later filed a class action petition alleging that GMT violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by charging this fee, arguing that fifth-wheel camping trailers do not qualify as "motor vehicles," "vessels," or "vessel trailers" under the relevant statute. GMT initially moved to dismiss the case but later moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County overruled GMT's motion to dismiss and later granted GMT's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Lange $199 and $5,000 in attorney fees. Lange then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award and reconsider the order compelling arbitration, which the circuit court denied. Lange appealed, arguing that GMT waived its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss and that the arbitration provision was unenforceable.The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing with Lange that GMT waived its right to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and reviewed the case de novo. The court found that GMT did not waive its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss, as it timely moved to compel arbitration and raised it as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading. The court also found that the arbitration provision remained enforceable despite the assignment of the retail installment contract to a bank. Lange's argument regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration provision was deemed unpreserved for review.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law
Johnson v. Continental Finance Co., LLC
Tiffany Johnson and Tracy Crider, Maryland residents, obtained credit card accounts from Continental Finance Company, LLC and Continental Purchasing, LLC. They filed separate class-action lawsuits in Maryland state court, alleging that Continental violated Maryland usury laws by charging excessive interest rates through a "rent-a-bank" scheme. They sought statutory damages and declaratory judgments to void their loans. Continental removed the cases to the District of Maryland and moved to compel arbitration based on a cardholder agreement containing an arbitration provision.The District of Maryland consolidated the cases and denied Continental's motions to compel arbitration. The court held that it was responsible for determining whether the arbitration agreement was illusory, not the arbitrator. It also found that the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements could not be applied before establishing the existence of a valid contract. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law due to a "change-in-terms" clause allowing Continental to unilaterally alter any term at its sole discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the court, not the arbitrator, should determine the contract's formation. It also concurred that the choice-of-law provisions could not be enforced before establishing a valid contract. Finally, the court held that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law because the change-in-terms clause allowed Continental to escape its contractual obligations, rendering the agreement non-binding. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Continental Finance Co., LLC" on Justia Law
CHABOLLA V. CLASSPASS, INC.
The plaintiff, Katherine Chabolla, purchased a one-month subscription from ClassPass, a company offering access to gyms and fitness classes, in January 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ClassPass paused charges but resumed them when gyms reopened. Chabolla filed a lawsuit alleging that ClassPass violated California’s Automatic Renewal Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act by resuming charges without proper notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration, which argued that Chabolla had agreed to arbitrate any claims by using their website. The district court found that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use, which included the arbitration clause, and that Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest assent to those terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that ClassPass’s website, which resembled a sign-in wrap agreement, did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use on the landing page or the first screen. Even if the second and third screens provided such notice, Chabolla did not unambiguously manifest her assent to the Terms of Use on those screens. The court concluded that Chabolla’s use of the website did not amount to an unambiguous manifestation of assent to the Terms of Use, and therefore, she was not bound by the arbitration clause within those terms. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying ClassPass’s motion to compel arbitration. View "CHABOLLA V. CLASSPASS, INC." on Justia Law
Hussam Al-Nahhas v 777 Partners LLC
Eido Hussam Al-Nahhas, an Illinois resident, took out four loans from Rosebud Lending LZO, operating as ZocaLoans, with interest rates up to nearly 700%, far exceeding Illinois law limits. Al-Nahhas alleged that ZocaLoans was a front for two private equity firms, 777 Partners, LLC, and Tactical Marketing Partners, LLC, to evade state usury laws by claiming tribal sovereign immunity through the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. He sued ZocaLoans and the firms for violating Illinois usury statutes and the federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act.The defendants participated in litigation for fourteen months, including filing an answer, engaging in discovery, and attending status conferences. They later sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the loan agreements. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion, finding that the defendants had waived their right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the defendants waived their right to arbitrate through their litigation conduct. The court also found that the case was not moot despite the settlement between Al-Nahhas and ZocaLoans, as punitive damages were still at issue. The court granted the parties' motions to file documents under seal. View "Hussam Al-Nahhas v 777 Partners LLC" on Justia Law
West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC
A home improvement and solar panel salesperson visited the home of senior citizens Harold and Lucy West, who lived with their adult daughter Deon. The salesperson, Ilai Mitmiger, discussed a solar installation and bathroom renovation, leading to a loan agreement package being completed electronically with Harold’s signature. Harold and Lucy, both in their 90s and suffering from dementia, did not use email, computers, or mobile phones. Deon believed the renovations would be paid for by a government program, as suggested by Mitmiger. The loan documents were sent to Deon’s email, opened on a mobile device, and signed electronically in Harold’s name within seconds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Solar Mosaic LLC’s petition to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the loan agreement. The court found that Mosaic had not proven the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, specifically that Harold was the person who completed the loan documents or that Deon had the authority to bind Harold to an arbitration agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the evidence strongly suggested Harold lacked the technical ability to execute the electronic signatures and demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Harold actually signed the loan documents. The court also found that Mosaic had not proven Deon had the authority to bind Harold to the agreement or that Harold ratified the agreement through a recorded telephone call. The court concluded that the recorded call did not demonstrate Harold’s awareness or understanding of the loan agreement, and thus, there was no ratification. View "West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC" on Justia Law
21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson
In January 2019, Raymond Robinson and his son sued Emerald Homes, L.L.C., and 21st Mortgage Corporation in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Robinson had contracted with Emerald to purchase a mobile home, financed by a loan from 21st Mortgage. After tearing down his existing house in preparation for the new mobile home, the loan was not completed, allegedly due to Emerald and/or 21st Mortgage's refusal to finalize the transaction. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, suppression, and negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The trial court compelled arbitration for claims against Emerald and granted summary judgment in favor of 21st Mortgage on Raymond's claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Robinson's claims against 21st Mortgage. The jury found in favor of Robinson on promissory fraud and the tort of outrage, awarding him $2,980,000 in total damages. 21st Mortgage's post-trial motions, including for judgment as a matter of law (JML), were denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that Robinson did not present substantial evidence of promissory fraud, as he failed to prove that 21st Mortgage had no intention to perform the loan promise at the time it was made or intended to deceive him. The court also found that Robinson did not meet all the conditions required for the loan, and the failure to close the loan was not due to any fraudulent intent by 21st Mortgage.Regarding the tort of outrage, the court held that the conduct of 21st Mortgage did not meet the extreme and outrageous standard required for such a claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson" on Justia Law
Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. vs. Woldeyohannes
Sky Moore rented a car from Budget Car and Truck Rental of Las Vegas, owned by Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. Sky named Daniel Moore as an additional driver, who later rear-ended Alelign Woldeyohannes while intoxicated. Alelign sued Daniel for negligence and Malco for negligent entrustment. Daniel did not respond, resulting in a default judgment against him. The case proceeded to arbitration, where Alelign was awarded $32,680.26. Malco requested a trial de novo, leading to a short trial where the judge entered a default judgment against Daniel for $37,886.82.Alelign moved to apply the default judgment against Malco under NRS 482.305(1), which holds short-term lessors liable for damages if they fail to provide minimum insurance coverage. Malco opposed, arguing that NRS 482.305 is preempted by the Graves Amendment, which prohibits states from holding vehicle lessors vicariously liable without negligence or wrongdoing. The short trial judge granted Alelign’s motion, and the district court affirmed, concluding that NRS 482.305 is a financial responsibility law preserved by the Graves Amendment’s savings clause.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that NRS 482.305 is not preempted by the Graves Amendment because it is a financial responsibility law preserved by the savings clause under 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b). The court emphasized that NRS 482.305 imposes a legal requirement for lessors to provide minimum coverage, rather than a mere financial inducement, and does not impose strict vicarious liability on lessors. View "Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. vs. Woldeyohannes" on Justia Law
Bluebird v. World Business Lenders
Bluebird Property Rentals, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, and its sole member, Alaina Garcia, received a $450,000 loan from World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) and its subsidiaries in December 2020. The loan, secured by real property in Gallatin County, had an annual percentage rate of approximately 85% and required weekly payments. Bluebird signed several agreements, including a Business Promissory Note and Security Agreement, which listed Axos Bank as the lender, although Bluebird had no prior dealings with Axos. After falling behind on payments, Bluebird sold the collateral property in a distress sale and paid off the loan in October 2022, having paid a total of $945,990.39.Bluebird sued WBL, alleging that WBL engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme to evade Montana's usury laws, claiming that Axos Bank was merely a front and that WBL was the true lender. Bluebird sought a declaration that Montana law applied and sought double the interest paid above the maximum allowable rate under Montana law. WBL filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration based on the agreements' arbitration and choice-of-law provisions.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court denied WBL's motion, ruling that Montana law must be applied to determine the enforceability of the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions. The court treated WBL's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the validity of the arbitration clause was for the court to decide, not an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the general rule that courts determine arbitrability was not overcome by the facts of this case. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, despite WBL's arguments regarding the incorporation of AAA rules. The court did not address the merits of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement or the choice-of-law provision. View "Bluebird v. World Business Lenders" on Justia Law