Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Plaintiff purchased a new car from Defendant. In 2014, Plaintiff filed the underlying petition for damages, alleging that Defendant violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by failing to pass title for her new vehicle. Thereafter, Defendant asked the trial court to enforce the arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court overruled the motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the contract between the parties was void under Mo. Rev. Stat. 301.210. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that even though the sale between Plaintiff and Defendant may be void under section 301.210, that question is for the arbitrator to determine, not the trial court. Remanded with instructions for the trial court to grant Defendant’s motion and compel arbitration. View "Ellis v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Westlake Services LLC appealed a trial court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Alfredo Ramos, and coplaintiffs (who are not parties to this appeal) sued Defendant Westlake Services LLC for causes of actions arising out of their purchase of used automobiles. Ramos alleged that negotiations for his purchase of a car were conducted primarily in Spanish. Defendant charged Ramos money for a “guaranteed auto protection” (GAP) contract to cover the vehicle he purchased. A copy of the GAP contract was not provided to him in Spanish. In exchange for the payment of a premium by the consumer and/or purchaser of the automobile, the ‘GAP’ insurance policy contract, which identifies the respective rights and liabilities of the parties to the contract, is purportedly intended to pay the difference between the actual cash value of the financed automobile and the then-current outstanding balance on the loan for the automobile should the financed automobile be destroyed or ‘totaled’ in an accident. Ramos asserted three causes of action based on Westlake’s failure to provide a translation of the GAP contract: (1) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); (2) violation of section 1632; and (3) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL). Westlake moved to compel arbitration of Ramos’s and his coplaintiffs’ claims, relying on the arbitration provisions contained in the underlying sales contracts they each had signed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Ramos reasonably relied on a Spanish translation of the English contract that Pena Motors (as Westlake’s agent) provided him that did not include the arbitration. The Court concluded that mutual assent to the arbitration agreement was lacking, void and that the trial court correctly denied Westlake’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Ramos v. Westlake Services" on Justia Law

Bowman law firm filed suit in Hendricks County Indiana, to recover Bentrud’s credit card debt owed to Capital One. Months later, Bowman moved for summary judgment. Bentrud responded by invoking the arbitration provision in his credit card agreement. The state court granted Bentrud’s election of arbitration and stayed the case, allowing Bentrud 30 days to initiate arbitration. The American Arbitration Association declined to do the arbitration because Capital One had previously failed to comply with its policy regarding consumer claims. Bentrud failed to meet the 30-day deadline, so that the stay automatically dissolved. Bowman filed a second summary judgment motion. Although the state court granted an extension, Bentrud characterized that motion, as an unfair or unconscionable means of attempting to collect a debt, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692f. Bentrud also claimed that the Annual Percentage Rate on his credit card debt was 13.9%, but when Bowman filed its state court complaint, it averred the applicable interest rate to be 10.65%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Bowman, noting that when Bowman filed a second summary judgment motion, it acted consistently with the state court order and that any interest rate violation would be attributable to Capital One, which was not a party. View "Bentrud v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vicia, P.C." on Justia Law

The parties’ dispute involved various “credit repair” services provided to plaintiff consumers, for which some of the disclosure requirements of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA, or the Act), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq., were not met. At issue was the district court's denial of a motion to vacate certain aspects of an arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by determining that plaintiffs failed to prove actual damages under the Act; the court rejected plaintiffs’ various arguments regarding their request for additional attorneys’ fees and costs; and the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his contractually delegated authority under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Dancel" on Justia Law

Gladys Tellis, Sherry Bronson, Gwendolyn Moody, Nadine Ivy, and Uneeda Trammell (collectively, "the policyholders") initiated separate actions against American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, asserting generally that American Bankers had sold them homeowner's insurance policies providing a level of coverage they could never receive, even in the event of a total loss involving the covered property. American Bankers moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions it alleged were part of the subject policies; however, the trial courts denied those motions, and American Bankers appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the five appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and reversed those orders denying the motions to compel arbitration. The Court based its decision on its holdings that the policyholders manifested their assent to the arbitration provision in their policies by continuing to renew the policies, that the sale of the policies affected interstate commerce, and that the arbitration provision in the policies was not unconscionable. View "American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis" on Justia Law

Oteria Moses borrowed $1,000 under a loan agreement that was illegal under North Carolina law. When Moses filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, CashCall, Inc., the loan servicer, filed a proof of claim. Moses subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against CashCall seeking a declaration that the loan was illegal and also seeking money damages for CashCall’s allegedly illegal debt collection activities. CashCall filed a motion to compel arbitration. The bankruptcy court denied CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration and retained jurisdiction over both Moses’ first claim for declaratory relief and second claim for damages. On appeal, the district court affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction to retain in bankruptcy Moses’ first claim; but (2) erred in retaining in bankruptcy Moses’ claim for damages and denying CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration of that claim, as this claim was not constitutionally core. Remanded with instruction to grant CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration on Moses’ second claim for damages. View "Moses v. CashCall, Inc." on Justia Law

Shaun Trabert purchased a used vehicle from an automobile dealer. Trabert signed a preprinted industry-drafted installment sales contract. The dealer then assigned the contract to Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. Portfolio later repossessed Trabert's vehicle, and Trabert filed a class action complaint alleging Portfolio's repossession/default notices were defective under consumer statutes. This appeal was the second time the issue of an automobile purchaser who brought consumer claims against the creditor-assignee of the parties' sales contract came before the Court of Appeal. The first appeal involved the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the contract. In "Trabert I," the Court held the arbitration agreement contained certain unconscionable provisions, and remanded for the court to determine whether these provisions could be severed from the remaining agreement. On remand, the trial court declined to sever the provisions and denied the creditor-assignee's motion to compel arbitration. Portfolio challenged the trial court's last order in this second appeal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Portfolio's motion. "The unconscionable provisions concern only exceptions to the finality of the arbitration award, and can be deleted without affecting the core purpose and intent of the arbitration agreement. The deletion of these exceptions creates a binding arbitration award and promotes the fundamental attributes of arbitration, including speed, efficiency, and lower costs." The Court reversed and remanded with directions for the court to sever the unconscionable provisions from the arbitration agreement and granted Portfolio's motion to compel arbitration. View "Trabert v. Consumer Portfolio Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sharon McGill sued defendant-appellant Citibank, N.A. for unfair competition and false advertising in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her Citibank credit card account. She brought claims under California’s unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising law (FAL), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief to prevent Citibank from engaging in its allegedly unlawful and deceptive business practices. Citibank petitioned to compel McGill to arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration provision in her account agreement. The trial court granted the petition on McGill’s claims for monetary damages and restitution, but denied the petition on the injunctive relief claims. Citibank appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of McGill’s claims to arbitration. View "McGill v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Randy Howard sought to bring a class action suit against Ferrellgas Partners, LP in federal district court for allegedly overcharging him and other customers. Ferrellgas moved to force plaintiff to pursue his individual claim alone, in arbitration, arguing that arbitration was the procedure the parties had agreed to. The district court was unable to conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate. Rather than proceed to trial as the Federal Arbitation Act required, the district court entered an order denying arbitration outright. The Tenth Circuit concluded that denial was error: "When it's apparent from a quick look at the case that no material disputes of fact exist, it may be permissible and efficient for a district court to decide the arbitration question as a matter of law through motions practice and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing arbitration. . . . Parties should not have to endure years of waiting and exhaust legions of photocopiers in discovery and motions practice merely to learn where their dispute will be heard. The Act requires courts process the venue question quickly so the parties can get on with the merits of their dispute in the right forum. It calls for a summary trial — not death by discovery." View "Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, et al" on Justia Law

Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel’s imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its “Terms and Conditions.” The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel’s arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid. View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law