Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that an action seeking a determination that an oil and gas lease has expired by its own terms is a controversy "involving the title to or the possession of real estate" so that the action is exempt from arbitration under Ohio Rev. Code 2711.01(B)(1).Appellants brought an action for declaratory judgment alleging that oil and gas leases between the parties had terminated because Appellee failed to produce oil or gas or to commence drilling operations within the terms of the lease. Appellee moved to stay pending arbitration. The trial court denied the request, concluding that Appellants' claims involved the title to or the possession of real property, and therefore, were exempt from arbitration under Ohio Rev. Code 2711.01(B)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court correctly declined to stay the action in this case pending arbitration. View "French v. Ascent Resources-Utica, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondents Louise McGraw and Charlotte Rodgers, by and through their daughters, Nancy Reuschel and Loretta Holcomb, filed a complaint against Petitioner, Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd., arguing that Petitioner defrauded their mothers by making misrepresentations and misleading statements and concealing material facts, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). See W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 to -8-102. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision set forth in the residency agreement Reuschel and Holcomb signed on behalf of their motions. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement could not be enforced as written. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that the arbitration agreement could not be enforced as written because it did not "comply with its own stated standards." View "Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that the parties' contract in this case and its arbitration provision were unenforceable on the grounds that the parties never had a meeting of the minds on the contract, holding that the parties formed the agreement reflected in the contract they signed.Plaintiffs, members of the family of a woman killed in a high-speed crash while riding in a car driven by an intoxicated adult entertainer employed by Defendant, sued for wrongful death and survival damages, alleging that Defendant continued serving the driver alcohol after knowing she was clearly intoxicated. Defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract containing an arbitration provision that the decedent and Defendant had signed almost two years earlier. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the terms in the contract were not perfectly clear, and therefore, there was no meeting of the minds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract terms were sufficient to constitute an enforceable contract. View "Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court in this case, holding that the district court applied an overly narrow legal standard in denying a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award but did not err in refusing to grant attorney fees.Sutey Oil Company brought a complaint against Monroe's High County Travel Plaza and Marvin Monroe (collectively, Monroe), and the parties stipulated to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator entered judgment for Sutey and awarded $220,750. Monroe moved to either modify or vacate the arbitration award. The district court denied the motion and refused to grant Sutey's request for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) remand was required for clarification of the amount of the award pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 25-5-217; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Sutey's motion for an award of attorney fees. View "Sutey Oil Co. v. Monroe's High Country Travel Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

When she began work, Campbell signed a contract with Keagle, the bar’s owner; it included an arbitration clause. After a dispute arose, the district judge denied Keagle’s motion to refer the matter to arbitration, finding several parts of the arbitration clause unconscionable: Keagle had reserved the right to choose the arbitrator and location of arbitration. Campbell had agreed not to consolidate or file a class suit for any claim and to pay her own costs, regardless of the outcome. The judge did not find that the contract was one-sided as a whole. Keagle accepted striking the provisions found to be unconscionable but sought to arbitrate rather than litigate.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to name an arbitrator, reasoning that the mutual assent to arbitration remains. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, provides that, absent a contrary agreement, the arbitration takes place in the same judicial district as the litigation; “who pays” may be determined by some other state or federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which Campbell’s suit rests. The chosen arbitrator can prescribe the procedures. Under 9 U.S.C. 5, “if for any … reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator" the court shall designate an arbitrator. View "Campbell v. Keagle Inc" on Justia Law

Mendoza applied for employment with FTU. Mendoza cannot read English. A supervisor interviewed Mendoza in Spanish and filled out the application form, which Mendoza signed. All of the acknowledgments Mendoza signed were in English. FTU’s director of human resources later testified that it was his practice to review the FTU Employee Handbook, including an arbitration policy, in Spanish if appropriate, and to give Spanish-speaking employees a Spanish-language version of the Handbook. Mendoza denied receiving the Spanish-language Handbook.FTU hired Mendoza as a temporary, interstate truck driver. Mendoza filed a putative class action, alleging Labor Code violations: failure to pay minimum wages, to provide rest periods, to provide meal periods, to provide accurate wage statements, and to pay all wages owed upon termination. Mendoza opposed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the Handbook, which stated that it was not a contract and was merely for informational purposes, did not create a binding agreement and that any agreement was void for lack of mutual consent or voidable based on unilateral mistake.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. It was for a court to decide whether the parties had entered into an agreement to arbitrate. In these circumstances, the parties have not entered into either an express or an implied contract to arbitrate. View "Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that applied the doctrine of forfeiture as the basis for its reversal of the circuit court's vacatur of Loren Imhoff Homebuilder, Inc.'s arbitral award under Wis. Stat. 788.10(1), holding that remand was required.This case arose from a construction contract that Imhoff entered into with Homeowners for a remodeling project on Homeowners' home. Homeowners later asserted that Imhoff breach the construction contract. The parties proceeded to arbitration. Imhoff brought a motion to confirm the arbitral award. Homeowners moved to vacate the award based partly on the arbitrator's sleeping during arbitration, which Homeowners alleged was both misbehavior that resulted in prejudice and indicative of a flawed process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homeowners did not forfeit their objection to the arbitrator's sleeping; and (2) because this Court is divided on whether the arbitration award should be vacated pursuant to Wis. Stat. 788.10, remand was required for consideration of section 788.10 issues. View "Loren Imhoff Homebuilder, Inc. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Sacks is a law firm with a 20-year history of working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2011, IMF hired Sacks to negotiate disputed claims of various contractors that worked on the renovation of its headquarters. The parties’ contract asserts IMF’s immunity from suit and provides that any disputes not settled by mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. In a subsequent fee dispute between Sacks and IMF, Sacks filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA. The arbitration panel awarded Sacks $39,918.82 plus interest but denied Sacks’ claim of underpayment in connection with earlier work.Sacks sued the Fund, claiming that the award should be vacated pursuant to the D.C. Code as “the result of misconduct by the arbitrators.” IMF removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it on immunity grounds pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, given effect in the U.S. by the Bretton Woods Act, 22 U.S.C. 286h. Sacks asserted the contract waived immunity by expressly providing for arbitration pursuant to the AAA Rules, which contemplate courts’ entry of judgment on arbitral awards. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The AAA Rules and D.C. law contemplate judicial involvement in the enforcement of arbitral awards, so arguably the contract also does so but an international organization's waiver of the immunity must be explicit. The parties' contract expressly retains the IMF’s immunity, reiterating it even within the arbitration clause. View "Leonard A. Sacks & Associates P.C. v. International Monetary Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that an arbitration provision was void under Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 for failure to include a specific authorization, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted section 597.955, and therefore, the district court's decision was erroneous.Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 requires any agreement that includes an arbitration provision to include a specific authorization for that provision. The district court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue in this case was void for failure to include a specific authorization, as required by section 597.995. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because section 597.995 singles out and disfavors arbitration provisions by imposing stricter requirements on them than on other contract provisions, the FAA preempts the statute in cases involving interstate commerce; and (2) the district court erred by concluding that section 597.995 voided the parties' arbitration agreement. View "Maide, LLC v. Dileo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing order of the circuit court denying the motion of Legacy Health Services, Inc. Cambridge Place Group, LLC, and Cambridge Place Properties, LLC (collectively, Defendants) to dismiss or stay this lawsuit and compel arbitration of the medical malpractice claims brought by Christopher Jackson, as guardian for Christine Jackson, his mother, holding the court of appeals erred.At issue was whether Christopher possessed the authority, as his mother's guardian, to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement that was not a prerequisite to the provision of care or services to his ward. The circuit court concluded that Christopher did not have that authority. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a guardian's authority to enter into contracts generally is within the ambit of what is reasonably inferable from the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) guardians have the authority to bind their wards to contracts that limit or deprive the civil rights of their wards only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services to the ward; and (2) because the arbitration agreement was not necessary to provide care or services to Christine, Christopher lacked the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Jackson v. Legacy Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law