Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Charter created a program for resolving and ultimately arbitrating employment-related disputes. Individuals who received an offer from Charter were required to complete a web-based onboarding process as a condition of employment; they were prompted to review and accept various policies and agreements, including the arbitration agreement and the program guidelines. After agreeing to submit all employment-related disputes with Charter to arbitration, Ramirez was hired in July 2019. In May 2020, Charter terminated Ramirez. Ramirez filed suit, alleging multiple claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration and sought attorney fees in connection with its motion pursuant to the arbitration agreement.The court denied Charter’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the requirement was substantively unconscionable because it shortened the statute of limitations for FEHA claims, failed to restrict attorney fee recovery to only frivolous or bad faith FEHA claims (contrary to FEHA), and impermissibly provided for an interim fee award for a party successfully compelling arbitration. The court of appeal affirmed. The arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, which establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability, and the agreement contained a high degree of substantive unconscionability. The arbitration agreement is permeated by unconscionability and cannot be enforced. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the district court entering judgment on an arbitrator's award, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding the award ambiguous and ordering a remand to the arbitrator for further clarification.Signal 88, LLC brought this contract action against Lyconic, LLC. The district court ordered the dispute to be submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator issued a decision, after which Lyconic applied for an order confirming the arbitration award. The district court confirmed the award but, in the process, modified it. The court of appeals vacated the judgment, determining that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in modifying rather than confirming the award; and (2) the court of appeals erred in finding that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. View "Signal 88, LLC v. Lyconic, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ahhmigo, LLC's motion to vacate the arbitrator's ruling in favor of The Synergy Company of Utah, LLC in this breach of contract proceeding, holding that the district court did not err.Ahhmigo filed a complaint and demand for arbitration against Synergy, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other climes. Synergy agreed to arbitrate Ahhmigo's claims, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Synergy. Ahhmigo moved the district court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law. The district court denied the motion and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court will not reach the question presented on appeal because Ahhmigo did not raise it in the district court. View "Ahhmigo, LLC v. Synergy Co. of Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in this dispute between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103 (the Union) and Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC over Johnson Controls' compliance with the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), holding that the district court erred by failing to order arbitration as called for by a clause in the CBA.Johnson Controls' Norwood, Massachusetts facility entered into a CBA with the Union, a labor organization that represented employees of the company, that contained an arbitration clause. The Union filed a grievance concerning Johnson Controls' reduction in its matching contribution to the company's 401(k) plan, which Johnson Controls denied. When the Union filed a demand for arbitration Johnson Controls brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA. The district court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable. The First Circuit reversed, holding that nothing in the record showed that the parties intended to exclude this type of dispute from the scope of the arbitration clause. View "Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court denying the motion to compel arbitration brought by Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber) in this action brought by Patricia Sarchi, a user of Uber's ride-sharing service, and the Maine Human Rights Commission, holding that the superior court did not err.Plaintiffs brought this action against Uber for violating the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4592(8), 4633(2), after Sarchi, who was blind, was refused a ride because of her guide dog. Uber moved to compel Sarchi to arbitrate and to dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration. The motion court denied the motion to compel, concluding that Sarchi did not become bound by the terms and conditions of Uber's user agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Sarchi was not bound by the terms. View "Sarchi v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this arbitration dispute, holding that direct benefits estoppel cannot be invoked in a garnishment action to bind the judgment creditor to the terms of the contract because applying the doctrine in this context would contravene Arizona's statutory garnishment scheme.Specifically, the Court answered that in a garnishment action by a judgment creditor against the judgment debtor's insurer claiming that coverage is owed under an insurance policy where the judgment creditor is not proceeding on an assignment of rights, the insurer cannot invoke the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel to bind the judgment creditor to the terms of the insurance contract. View "Benson v. Casa De Capri Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Curtis Olson failed to show the requisite "minimal merit" on a critical element of his breach of contract claim and thus could not defeat Jane Doe's anti-SLAPP motion.Doe and Olson each owned units in the same condominium building. Doe brought a civil harassment restraining order against Olson, and as a result of court-ordered mediation, the parties agreed if they encountered each other in a public or common place "not to disparage one another." Doe later filed a civil lawsuit against Olson seeking damages. Olson cross-complained for breach of contract and specific performance, and Doe moved to strike Olson's cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment insofar as it reversed the trial court's order granting Doe's special motion to strike the breach of contract clause of action with respect to statements in Doe's civil complaint, holding that Doe had no obligation under the contract to refrain from making disparaging statements in litigation, and therefore, Olson could not defeat Doe's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Olson v. Doe" on Justia Law

Ngo purchased a BMW. The dealership financed Ngo’s purchase; the purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. As a result of alleged defects with the car, Ngo sued BMW, the manufacturer, which was not a signatory to the purchase agreement. BMW moved to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion, finding BMW to be a third-party beneficiary.The Ninth Circuit reversed. Under California law, a nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary only to a contract made expressly for its benefit. Any benefit that BMW might receive from the clause was peripheral and indirect because it was predicated on the decisions of others to arbitrate. The purchase agreement was drafted with the primary "motivating purpose" of securing benefits for the contracting parties; third parties were not the purposeful beneficiaries of that undertaking. Nothing in the contract evinced any intention that the arbitration clause should apply to BMW. The parties easily could have indicated that the contract was intended to benefit BMW but did not do so. The court declined to apply equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. Ngo did not allege any “concerted misconduct.” BMW was mistaken that, under the Song-Beverley and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, Ngo’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the terms of the purchase agreement. View "Ngo v. BMW of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

The Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission d/b/a U.S. Space & Rocket Center ("ASSEC") filed suit against Space Race, LLC ("Space Race"), seeking to avoid an arbitration award entered in favor of Space Race and against ASSEC by an arbitration panel in New York. In July 2016, Space Race agreed to produce an animated series for ASSEC aimed at promoting the interest of children in space exploration and science. The series was to be created and released to the public over a three-year period. In exchange, ASSEC agreed to compensate Space Race with funds ASSEC would receive from a grant from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"), which had contracted with ASSEC to provide funding for the series. The compensation was to be paid to Space Race annually as the series episodes were created during the three-year contract term. The parties' agreement provided that it "shall be governed" by Alabama law. Space Race produced the series before the contract term expired, but ASSEC failed to pay the amount owed for the last year of the series. Space Race claimed that ASSEC still owed Space Race approximately $1.3 million when the contract term expired. The parties' agreement contained an arbitration provision. In December 2017, after being notified by ASSEC that it would no longer make payments to Space Race because the grant from NASA had been terminated, Space Race commenced arbitration proceedings against ASSEC in New York. Space Race moved to dismiss ASSEC's Alabama action, asserting that a New York court had already entered a final judgment confirming the arbitration award. The Alabama trial court denied Space Race's motion to dismiss, and Space Race petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss ASSEC's action. Because the New York judgment confirming the arbitration award against ASSEC was entitled to full faith and credit and res judicata effect, the Supreme Court granted Space Race's mandamus petition. The trial court was directed to vacate its order denying Space Race's motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting that motion. View "Ex parte Space Race, LLC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (K.D.) was a resident at Muirwoods when she suffered falls, resulting in a fractured hip and deteriorating health. She became bedbound and was allegedly left in unsanitary conditions and infected with scabies. Muirwoods alleged that K.D.’s daughter Tennier, signed an arbitration agreement pursuant to her authority to make health care decisions for K.D. when assisting in her placement at Muirwoods. The arbitration provision included a delegation clause providing that an arbitrator would decide whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated. The clause specified that the agreement to arbitrate could be withdrawn within 30 days and that “agreeing to arbitration is not a condition of admission to the Community.”The court of appeal affirmed the denial o the motion to compel arbitration. The initial determination of whether Tennier was authorized to agree to arbitration on K.D.’s behalf is one for the court, not the arbitrator. Tennier was not K.D.’s agent for purposes of binding her to arbitration. Because the arbitration provision was optional, with its own signature line, it was essentially a separate agreement, Muirwoods did not establish that Tennier, who did not act pursuant to a durable power of attorney or similar authorization, could bind K.D. to an arbitration agreement as part of authorizing her admission. View "Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law