Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Two plaintiffs, Smith-Phifer and Patterson, served with the Charlotte Fire Department for over twenty years and alleged racial discrimination by the department. They filed a lawsuit against the City of Charlotte, claiming violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983, and the North Carolina Constitution. The case was initially brought in state court but was removed to federal court. Smith-Phifer and the City reached a settlement during her trial, while Patterson's case was delayed due to illness and later went to mediation.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted Smith-Phifer and Patterson’s motions to enforce their settlement agreements. The court found that the City breached the agreements by not treating the settlement payments as pension-eligible wages under the Charlotte Firefighters Retirement Systems Act. The City appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its decision, particularly in not holding an evidentiary hearing for Patterson’s case and in its interpretation of the settlement terms regarding pension eligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s order regarding Patterson, stating that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether a complete settlement agreement was reached. The court found that there were unresolved factual disputes about the terms of the agreement, particularly regarding sick leave and pension eligibility.However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding Smith-Phifer. It held that the City breached the settlement agreement by failing to make the required retirement deduction from the payment to Smith-Phifer. The court concluded that the payment was “Compensation” under the Charlotte Firefighters Retirement Systems Act, which mandated the deduction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Smith-Phifer v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Woodsboro Farmers Cooperative contracted with E.F. Erwin, Inc. to construct two grain silos. Erwin subcontracted AJ Constructors, Inc. (AJC) for the assembly. AJC completed its work by July 2013, and Erwin finished the project in November 2013. However, Woodsboro noticed defects causing leaks and signed an addendum with Erwin for repairs. Erwin's attempts to fix the silos failed, leading Woodsboro to hire Pitcock Supply, Inc. for repairs. Pitcock found numerous faults attributed to AJC's poor workmanship, necessitating complete deconstruction and reconstruction of the silos, costing Woodsboro $805,642.74.Woodsboro sued Erwin in Texas state court for breach of contract, and the case went to arbitration in 2017. The arbitration panel found AJC's construction was negligent, resulting in defective silos, and awarded Woodsboro $988,073.25 in damages. The Texas state court confirmed the award in September 2022. In December 2018, TIG Insurance Company, Erwin's insurer, sought declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, questioning its duty to defend and indemnify Erwin. The district court granted TIG's motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend, finding no "property damage" under the policy, and later ruled there was no duty to indemnify, as the damage was due to defective construction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there were factual questions regarding whether the damage constituted "property damage" under the insurance policy, as the silos' metal parts were damaged by wind and weather due to AJC's poor workmanship. The court determined that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for TIG and concluded that additional factual development was needed. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Woodsboro Farmers Coop" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Robert and Stephen Samuelian (the Samuelians) and Life Generations Healthcare, LLC (the Company), which they co-founded along with Thomas Olds, Jr. The Samuelians sold a portion of their interest in the Company, and the new operating agreement included a noncompetition provision. The Samuelians later challenged this provision in arbitration, arguing it was unenforceable under California law.The arbitrator found the noncompetition provision invalid per se under California Business and Professions Code section 16600, as it arose from the sale of a business interest. The arbitrator also ruled that the Samuelians did not owe fiduciary duties to the Company because they were members of a manager-managed limited liability company. The Company argued that the arbitrator had legally erred by applying the per se standard instead of the reasonableness standard. The trial court reviewed the arbitrator’s ruling de novo, found no error, and confirmed the award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the arbitrator had applied the wrong standard under section 16600. The court concluded that noncompetition agreements arising from the partial sale of a business interest should be evaluated under the reasonableness standard, not the per se standard. The court reasoned that a partial sale leaves the seller with some ongoing connection to the business, which could have procompetitive benefits. Therefore, such restraints require further scrutiny to determine their reasonableness.The court reversed the trial court’s judgment confirming the arbitration award and directed the trial court to enter an order denying the Samuelians’ petition to confirm the award and granting the Company’s motion to vacate the entire award, including the portion awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

JES Farms Partnership sold crops through Indigo Ag's digital platform. In 2021, JES initiated arbitration against Indigo, alleging breach of a marketplace seller agreement and trade rule violations. Indigo counterclaimed, alleging JES breached the agreement and its addenda. JES then sought a federal court's declaratory judgment that Indigo’s counterclaims were not arbitrable and that some addenda were invalid. Indigo moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement's arbitration clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota partially denied Indigo's motion. The court agreed that Indigo’s counterclaims were arbitrable but ruled that the enforceability of the addenda was not arbitrable under the marketplace seller agreement. The court found the arbitration clause "narrow" and concluded that disputes about the addenda's enforceability did not relate to crop transactions. Indigo appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the arbitration clause in the marketplace seller agreement was broad, covering "any dispute" related to the agreement or transactions under it. The court found that the enforceability of the addenda was indeed a dispute "relating to crop transactions" and thus fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and directed it to grant Indigo’s motion to compel arbitration and address the case's status pending arbitration. View "JES Farms Partnership v. Indigo Ag Inc." on Justia Law

Payam Mahram used Instacart to purchase groceries from a grocery store and later sued the store, alleging it had cheated him on price. The grocery store, not a party to the Instacart contract, moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement between Mahram and Instacart. The trial court denied the motion, and the grocery store appealed.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and denied the grocery store's motion to compel arbitration without providing a written explanation. The grocery store then appealed this decision to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that while Mahram did agree to arbitration with Instacart by signing up for its service, the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. The court determined that the trial court, rather than an arbitrator, was the proper authority to decide the threshold questions of arbitrability because the contract did not clearly indicate that Mahram had agreed to arbitrate with anyone other than Instacart. Additionally, the court found that the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of the Instacart-Mahram arbitration contract, as the contract's motivating purpose was not to benefit the grocery store. Consequently, the grocery store could not compel arbitration based on the Instacart agreement. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondent. View "Mahram v. The Kroger Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Dr. John Insall, an orthopedic surgeon, developed and patented knee replacement devices, which he licensed to Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. In return, Zimmer agreed to pay royalties to Insall, and later to his estate after his death. When Insall’s last patent expired in 2018, Zimmer ceased royalty payments, claiming the obligation had ended. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the Estate prevailed. Zimmer then sought to vacate the arbitration award in district court, arguing that continuing royalty payments violated public policy. The district court confirmed the arbitration award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case. Zimmer argued that the arbitration award should be vacated based on public policy grounds, citing Supreme Court decisions in Brulotte v. Thys Co. and Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, which prohibit collecting royalties on expired patents. The district court rejected Zimmer’s argument and confirmed the arbitration award, leading to Zimmer’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review over arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court found that the arbitration panel had correctly interpreted the 1998 amendments to the agreement, which untethered the royalty payments from the patents themselves, making them based on the marketing and branding of the NexGen Knee products. Consequently, the court held that the arbitration award did not violate public policy as outlined in Brulotte and Kimble. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Insall’s Estate. View "Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Insall" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees and the University of Rhode Island (plaintiffs) and the Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter (defendant). The dispute arose from a breach-of-contract related to the construction of a Center for Hellenic Studies at the University of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs and defendant had entered into a Ground Lease Agreement that established the parameters for this construction project. The defendant failed to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the agreed timeframe, leading to litigation.The Superior Court stayed the litigation pending arbitration, as per the mandate. The arbitration proceedings were held, and the arbitrator issued a decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had breached the lease agreement by failing to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the requisite timeframe, among other failures. The arbitrator also determined that a joint venture did not exist between the parties. The arbitrator directed the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost and expenses that they will incur in their efforts to restore the construction site to its prior status.The plaintiffs filed a motion in Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award, which the defendant objected to and cross-moved to vacate. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award and denied the defendant's cross-motion to vacate. The trial justice declined to review the arbitrator’s determination that the plaintiffs properly terminated the lease agreement and rejected the defendant’s objection to the arbitral remedy.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' lease agreement and lacked any indication that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court affirmed the trial justice's order confirming the arbitration award. View "The University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees v. Hellenic Society Paideia-Rhode Island Chapter" on Justia Law

Ascension Data & Analytics, Rocktop Partners, and Rocktop Holdings II (collectively, "Ascension") entered into a contract with Pairprep, Inc. for data extraction services. The contract was terminated due to an alleged data breach and Pairprep's failure to extract reliable data. Ascension then contracted with another vendor, Altada Technologies Solutions, but that contract was also terminated early due to Altada's financial crisis. Ascension initiated arbitration proceedings against Pairprep to recover remediation costs incurred as a result of the data breach. Pairprep counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. The arbitration panel rejected Ascension's defenses and granted Pairprep a monetary award.Ascension filed an application in the Northern District of Texas to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that Pairprep's counterclaims were barred by res judicata due to a previous dismissal of identical claims against Altada. Pairprep filed an application to confirm the arbitral award in a Texas state court, which was granted. The district court dismissed Ascension's application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied its motion for preliminary injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which held that a district court must have an independent jurisdictional basis to consider applications to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court found that Ascension had not established an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, as the parties were not diverse and Ascension did not identify any federal law entitling it to relief. Therefore, the court concluded that the dispute over the enforceability of the arbitral award must be litigated in state court. View "Ascension Data v. Pairprep" on Justia Law