Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Dr. John Insall, an orthopedic surgeon, developed and patented knee replacement devices, which he licensed to Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. In return, Zimmer agreed to pay royalties to Insall, and later to his estate after his death. When Insall’s last patent expired in 2018, Zimmer ceased royalty payments, claiming the obligation had ended. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the Estate prevailed. Zimmer then sought to vacate the arbitration award in district court, arguing that continuing royalty payments violated public policy. The district court confirmed the arbitration award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case. Zimmer argued that the arbitration award should be vacated based on public policy grounds, citing Supreme Court decisions in Brulotte v. Thys Co. and Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, which prohibit collecting royalties on expired patents. The district court rejected Zimmer’s argument and confirmed the arbitration award, leading to Zimmer’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review over arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court found that the arbitration panel had correctly interpreted the 1998 amendments to the agreement, which untethered the royalty payments from the patents themselves, making them based on the marketing and branding of the NexGen Knee products. Consequently, the court held that the arbitration award did not violate public policy as outlined in Brulotte and Kimble. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Insall’s Estate. View "Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Insall" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees and the University of Rhode Island (plaintiffs) and the Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter (defendant). The dispute arose from a breach-of-contract related to the construction of a Center for Hellenic Studies at the University of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs and defendant had entered into a Ground Lease Agreement that established the parameters for this construction project. The defendant failed to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the agreed timeframe, leading to litigation.The Superior Court stayed the litigation pending arbitration, as per the mandate. The arbitration proceedings were held, and the arbitrator issued a decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had breached the lease agreement by failing to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the requisite timeframe, among other failures. The arbitrator also determined that a joint venture did not exist between the parties. The arbitrator directed the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost and expenses that they will incur in their efforts to restore the construction site to its prior status.The plaintiffs filed a motion in Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award, which the defendant objected to and cross-moved to vacate. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award and denied the defendant's cross-motion to vacate. The trial justice declined to review the arbitrator’s determination that the plaintiffs properly terminated the lease agreement and rejected the defendant’s objection to the arbitral remedy.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' lease agreement and lacked any indication that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court affirmed the trial justice's order confirming the arbitration award. View "The University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees v. Hellenic Society Paideia-Rhode Island Chapter" on Justia Law

Ascension Data & Analytics, Rocktop Partners, and Rocktop Holdings II (collectively, "Ascension") entered into a contract with Pairprep, Inc. for data extraction services. The contract was terminated due to an alleged data breach and Pairprep's failure to extract reliable data. Ascension then contracted with another vendor, Altada Technologies Solutions, but that contract was also terminated early due to Altada's financial crisis. Ascension initiated arbitration proceedings against Pairprep to recover remediation costs incurred as a result of the data breach. Pairprep counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. The arbitration panel rejected Ascension's defenses and granted Pairprep a monetary award.Ascension filed an application in the Northern District of Texas to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that Pairprep's counterclaims were barred by res judicata due to a previous dismissal of identical claims against Altada. Pairprep filed an application to confirm the arbitral award in a Texas state court, which was granted. The district court dismissed Ascension's application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied its motion for preliminary injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which held that a district court must have an independent jurisdictional basis to consider applications to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court found that Ascension had not established an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, as the parties were not diverse and Ascension did not identify any federal law entitling it to relief. Therefore, the court concluded that the dispute over the enforceability of the arbitral award must be litigated in state court. View "Ascension Data v. Pairprep" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), and one of its drivers, Jonas Yohou. Good, a chef, used Uber's mobile application to secure a ride. On April 25, 2021, when Good opened Uber's app, he was presented with a screen notifying him of Uber's updated terms of use. The screen required Good to check a box indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms before he could continue using the app. Five days later, Good used Uber's app to order a ride home from work. During the ride, Yohou's car collided with another vehicle, causing Good to suffer severe injuries.Good filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and Yohou in the Superior Court Department. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the terms of use that Good had agreed to. The motion judge denied the motion, finding that a contract had not been formed because Good neither had reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use nor had manifested assent to the terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process provided Good with reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use, including the agreement to arbitrate disputes. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. The court remanded the case for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Choctaw Nation and several pharmacies it owns and operates entered into agreements with Caremark, LLC, and its affiliates to facilitate insurance reimbursements for the Nation’s costs for pharmacy services for its members. The Nation filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that Caremark unlawfully denied pharmacy reimbursement claims in violation of the Recovery Act. After the matter was stayed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Caremark petitioned to compel arbitration of the Nation’s claims in the District of Arizona. The district court granted the petition, concluding that the parties’ agreements included arbitration provisions with delegation clauses and therefore an arbitrator must decide the Nation’s arguments that its claims are not arbitrable.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that most of the Nation’s arguments challenging the district court’s arbitration order were foreclosed by a previous case, Caremark, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation, which addressed the enforceability of identical arbitration provisions. The court also held that the Nation’s remaining argument that the District of Arizona lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to compel arbitration failed because the Nation contractually agreed to arbitrate its claims against Caremark in Arizona, and in those contracts specifically “agree[d] to such jurisdiction.” Thus, the Nation expressly waived its tribal sovereign immunity as a bar to arbitration in the District of Arizona. View "CAREMARK, LLC V. CHOCTAW NATION" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber). Good, a user of Uber's ride-hailing service, suffered severe injuries in a car accident while riding in a vehicle driven by an Uber driver. He filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and the driver. Uber moved to compel arbitration based on its terms of use, which Good had agreed to when he used the Uber app.The Superior Court denied Uber's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Uber had not provided Good with reasonable notice of its terms of use, and that Good had not reasonably manifested his assent to those terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process, which required Good to click a checkbox indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms and then to activate a button labeled "Confirm," put Good on reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. Therefore, the court concluded that a contract had been formed between Good and Uber, and that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration as per the terms of that contract. The case was remanded for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a contract between a plaintiff, Pamela Phillips, and the defendant, Charlotte Metro Credit Union. In 2014, Phillips opened a checking account with the Credit Union and agreed to a standard membership agreement. This agreement included a "Notice of Amendments" provision, which allowed the Credit Union to change the terms of the agreement upon notice to Phillips. In 2021, the Credit Union amended its membership agreement to require arbitration for certain disputes and to waive members' right to file class actions. Phillips did not opt out of this amendment within the given 30-day window. Later that year, Phillips filed a class action complaint against the Credit Union for the collection of overdraft fees on accounts that were never overdrawn. The Credit Union responded by filing a motion to stay the action and compel arbitration.The trial court denied the Credit Union's motion to stay and compel arbitration, concluding that the "Notice of Amendments" provision did not permit the Credit Union to unilaterally add an arbitration provision. The Credit Union appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's determination and remanded the case to the trial court to stay the action pending arbitration.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Arbitration Amendment was within the universe of terms of the contract between the parties, and thus complies with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and does not render the contract illusory. As such, the Arbitration Amendment is a binding and enforceable agreement between Phillips and the Credit Union. View "Canteen v. Charlotte Metro Credit Union" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Coinbase, Inc., a cryptocurrency exchange platform, and its users. The users had agreed to two contracts with Coinbase. The first contract, the User Agreement, contained an arbitration provision stating that an arbitrator must decide all disputes, including whether a disagreement is arbitrable. The second contract, the Official Rules for a promotional sweepstakes, contained a forum selection clause stating that California courts have sole jurisdiction over any controversies regarding the promotion. The users filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the sweepstakes violated various California laws. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement’s arbitration provision. The District Court denied the motion, ruling that the Official Rules’ forum selection clause controlled the dispute. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court held that when parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs. The Court rejected Coinbase's arguments that the Ninth Circuit should have applied the severability principle and that the Ninth Circuit erroneously held that the Official Rules’ forum selection clause superseded the User Agreement’s arbitration provision. The Court also dismissed Coinbase's concern that its ruling would invite chaos by facilitating challenges to delegation clauses. The Court concluded that a court, not an arbitrator, must decide whether the parties’ first agreement was superseded by their second. View "Coinbase v. Suski" on Justia Law

The case involves Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC ("Fast Ferries") and Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran Marine, LLC ("SeaTran") (collectively, "defendants-appellees"). Fast Ferries had entered into a Master Time Charter Agreement with Mr. Cade, LLC to charter the motor vessel Mr. Cade and procure a licensed crew. The agreement contained mediation and forum-selection clauses. When the final Short Form expired, Fast Ferries returned the vessel to its home port in Louisiana. A year later, Fast Ferries filed a complaint against Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran alleging breach of contract and liability pursuant to culpa in contrahendo. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Master Agreement was still in effect and required a written agreement for the charter of M/V Mr. Cade.The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that the Master Agreement did not contain a termination date and remained in effect. Therefore, the contract's mediation and forum-selection clauses were binding on the parties. However, the district court did not address Fast Ferries' argument that SeaTran was not a signatory of the agreement and, therefore, could not invoke the mediation and forum-selection clauses contained therein.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order on the defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss. The court held that the Master Agreement was still in effect and that SeaTran, despite being a non-signatory, could enforce the Master Agreement's mediation and forum-selection clauses. The court reasoned that Fast Ferries' claims against SeaTran were necessarily intertwined with the Master Agreement, and thus, Fast Ferries was equitably estopped from avoiding the mediation and forum-selection clauses with respect to SeaTran. View "Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC" on Justia Law