Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Providers supply outpatient cardiac telemetry (OCT) services, used by doctors to monitor cardiac arrhythmias. The device differs from conventional technology in that it transmits electrocardiographic (EKG) data in real time to certified technicians, who forward the data to a physician. OCT is approved by the FDA, and has long been covered by Medicare and commercial insurers. CIGNA administers employer sponsored health benefit plans. CIGNA pays its in-network providers directly for the services rendered to patients. In 2007, the Providers joined CIGNA’s network by Agreements that set the reimbursement rate and define “Covered Services.” In 2012, CIGNA issued a statement that it would no longer cover OCT “for any indication because it is considered experimental, investigational or unproven.” The 2012 Policy acknowledged that this new position would be trumped by any conflicting language in the coverage policies themselves. In arriving at the new policy, CIGNA relied on the same medical literature it had previously relied upon in concluding that OCT should be covered. The Providers claim that CIGNA indicated that its motive was financial, but refused to reconsider the 2012 Policy. The district court found that the Providers’ claims fell within the arbitration clause of the Agreement. The Third Circuit vacated. The clause at issue is limited in scope to disputes “regarding the performance or interpretation of the Agreement” and the claims at issue do not relate to the performance or interpretation of the Agreement.View "Cardionet Inc v. Cigna Health Corp." on Justia Law

The Union filed suit against WUSA-TV, a television station, alleging that the station breached its contractual obligations by laying off a technician. Because the grievance did not "arise under" the 2008 bargaining agreement, and the 2012 agreement was not yet in effect, the district court concluded that the station was not obligated to arbitrate. The court affirmed, concluding that seniority provisions in the 2008 agreement did not create vested or accrued rights and therefore, the grievance was not arbitrable under the 2008 agreement. Nor do the qualified seniority protections against layoffs contained in the 2008 agreement survive expiration under normal principles of contract interpretation. Moreover, the union's extrinsic evidence was itself ambiguous. Finally, the court rejected the Union's claim that the grievance was arbitrable under the 2012 agreement.View "Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Detroit Free Press, Inc." on Justia Law

Guardian Builders, LLC, and E. Wayne Tackett appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Randy Uselton and his wife Melissa. In 2010, the Useltons sued Guardian alleging several claims arising from Guardian's construction of a house for the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted that motion. In late 2011, the arbitrator entered a final award in favor of the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award to the circuit court, to which it attached a copy of the arbitration award. The Useltons filed a 'motion to confirm' the arbitration award. The circuit court entered an order purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award, purporting to grant the Useltons' motion to confirm the arbitration award, and purporting to order Guardian to pay $1,421.75 in Better Business Bureau fees and facility costs related to the arbitration. Guardian objected only to a subset of the damages that were awarded the Useltons that were not directly related to the poorly constructed house, specifically, attorney fees and arbitration fees (including both the arbitrator fee and the forum fee charged by the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama ("the BBB"), which administered the arbitration). Furthermore, Guardian argued the arbitrator lacked the authority to award the Useltons attorney fees and arbitration fees. The Supreme Court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding those remedies. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment subtracting attorney fees and arbitration fees from the award made to the Useltons. View "Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in Mississippi state court against defendants seeking damages and declarative injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asserted two claims: first, common-law trade-secret misappropriate and intentional interference with business relations; and second, violation of state law, which protects a patient's right to use any pharmacy of his choosing. After removing plaintiffs' suit to federal court, defendants moved to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims under the arbitration contracts to which all or most defendants were not signatories under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 3-4. The court concluded that the relevant Arizona law, made controlling by the Provider Agreement's choice-of-law clause, supported the non-signatory defendants' motion to enforce the agreement to arbitrate against plaintiffs based on state-law equitable estoppel doctrine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment compelling arbitration. The court recognized that the court's prior decisions applying federal common law, rather than state contract law, to decide such questions have been modified to conform with the Supreme Court's holding in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle.View "Crawford Professional Drugs, et al. v. CVS Caremark Corp., et al." on Justia Law

The Practice-Monroeville, P.C., is a medical-practice group located in Monroeville. Allscripts Healthcare, LLC, based in North Carolina with no Alabama offices, sells health-care software to health-care providers. Jackson Key Practice Solutions, LLC is a certified "sales-and-service partner" of Allscripts, selling and servicing Allscripts software, and Anderton is an employee and partial owner of Jackson Key. In May 2011, the Practice and Allscripts entered into a written contract in which the Practice purchased health-care software called "MyWay" from Allscripts through Jackson Key. The contract contained an arbitration provision, which stated in pertinent part: "Any dispute or claim arising out of, or in connection with, this Agreement shall be finally settled by binding arbitration in Raleigh, NC, in accordance with the then-current rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association ...." The Practice became dissatisfied with the performance of the MyWay software and unsuccessfully attempted to cancel its contract with Allscripts. The Practice sued Jackson Key and Anderton, but not Allscripts, in circuit court. Jackson Key and Anderton moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the contract. Anderton and Jackson Key appealed the Circuit Court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in its decision, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderton v. The Practice-Monroeville, P.C. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant, his employer, signed a written employment agreement detailing the terms of Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. Plaintiff later ceased working for Defendant, believing he had been fired. Defendant, however, believed that Plaintiff had resigned. Plaintiff’s termination became the subject of binding arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff had been terminated for reasons other than cause and ordered Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff “to the position he held prior to his wrongful termination.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) specific performance is not an available remedy for breach of an employment contract unless it is explicitly provided for in the contract or by an applicable statute; and (2) the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its authority by holding otherwise, as the contract clearly did not entitle Plaintiff to reinstatement. Remanded. View "Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas" on Justia Law

Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel’s imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its “Terms and Conditions.” The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel’s arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid. View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law

Buyers, a married couple from Cuba who were only able to communicate in Spanish, purchased a vehicle from a Dealership. Two of the documents Buyers signed with regard to the purchase contained arbitration clauses, and all of the documents were written in English. Buyers subsequently sued the Dealership for fraud in the inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Dealership moved to dismiss the complaint and/or compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed because the arbitration provisions were not agreed upon by the parties and that the provisions were unenforceable because they were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate disputes but reversed the order insofar as it declined to enforce the arbitration on the reverse side of the retail installment contract with respect to Buyers’ claims for monetary relief. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District and remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s judgment based on controlling precedent.View "Basulto v. Hialeah Auto." on Justia Law

Steak n Shake owns and operates 415 restaurants and grants about 100 franchises for the operation of Steak n Shake restaurants by others. The operators of franchises in Missouri, Georgia, and Pennsylvania claim that since 1939, franchisees have set their own menu prices and participated in corporate pricing promotions at their option. After a corporate takeover in 2010, Steak n Shake enacted a new policy that requires them to adhere to company pricing on every menu item and to participate in all promotions. They also must purchase all products from a single distributor at a price negotiated by Steak n Shake. The policy had an adverse effect on revenues. The franchisees sought a declaratory judgment. About a month later, Steak n Shake adopted an arbitration policy requiring the franchisees to engage in nonbinding arbitration at Steak n Shake’s request and moved to stay the federal lawsuits. The district court refused to compel arbitration. Although each franchise agreement (except one) contained a clause in which Steak n Shake “reserve[d] the right to institute at any time a system of nonbinding arbitration or mediation,” the district court concluded that any agreement to arbitrate was illusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the arbitration clauses are illusory and unenforceable under Indiana law, and declining to address whether the disputes were within the scope of the arbitration agreements or whether nonbinding arbitration fits within the definition of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners entered into a written agreement with Bastian Homes and Lion Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Bastian Homes”) for the construction of a new home. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. After a water leak allegedly substantially damaged major portions of the partially-constructed home, Petitioners sued Bastian Homes. Bastian Homes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the arbitration clause in the construction contract required the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the arbitration clause in this case was not bargained for and was therefore invalid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because the construction contract was properly formed and supported by sufficient consideration, there was no requirement that the arbitration clause be independently “bargained for”; and (2) because the circuit court decided the arbitration clause not unconscionable without the issue being fairly argued by the parties and without any factual development, this issue needed to be remanded for further development of the record.View "Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc." on Justia Law