Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Paul Kennamer and Dorothy Kennamer appeal an order entered by the Marshall Circuit Court compelling them to arbitrate their claims against Ford Motor Credit Company LLC and Ray Pearman Lincoln, Inc. (the dealership). The Kennamers had problems with the used car they purchased and stopped making payments on the loan they obtained through Ford Credit and the dealership. After review of the retail-installment contract at the center of this controversy, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision insofar as it granted the dealership's motion to compel arbitration and reversed insofar as it granted Ford Credit's motion to compel arbitration. View "Kennamer v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate. View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased property from Defendants pursuant to a lease agreement that included an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs later sued Defendants over disputes regarding the lease. After engaging in litigation with Plaintiff for more than two years, Defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration under the parties’ lease agreement. Plaintiff objected to the motion, arguing that Defendants had waived their right to enforce the arbitration clause by engaging in lengthy litigation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, concluding, as a matter of law, that a party cannot waive enforcement of an arbitration clause in a contract. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the record was inadequate for review because the trial court failed to make any factual findings on the issue of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the legal basis of the trial court’s decision was at issue, a factual record on the question of waiver was not necessary to review the trial court’s decision; and (2) the trial court based its judgment on an incorrect statement of the law, and therefore, the court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for a stay pending arbitration. View "MSO, LLC v. DeSimone" on Justia Law

When Respondent was promoted from her position was an hourly employee to a salaried managerial position at one of Appellants’ long-term care facilities, the parties signed an employment agreement and arbitration agreement. Appellants later terminated Respondent from her position. Respondent filed a class action lawsuit against Appellants seeking compensation for allegedly unpaid overtime hours. Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the circuit court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent’s continued at-will employment and Appellants’ promise to resolve claims through arbitration did not provide valid consideration to support the arbitration agreement. View "Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Lincoln T. Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy. Griswold established a Trust for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning the policy and named Griswold LLP as the Trust’s sole beneficiary. In 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry First LLC. The written purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. After learning that the policy was sold for an allegedly inflated price that included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker, Griswold sued. Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that both Griswold and the LLP had standing and that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as to the plaintiffs, who were non-signatories. Coventry appealed. The Third Circuit (1) concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Coventry’s motion to dismiss; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration against the plaintiffs, as they never consented to the purchase agreement. View "Griswold v. Coventry First LLC" on Justia Law

Cargotec appealed the district court's conclusion that Cargotec's contract with NMC did not contain arbitration and indemnification provisions. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that whether the arbitration clause became part of the parties' agreement remains a question "presumptively committed to judicial determination." On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to order a trial to resolve material factual disputes concerning whether the parties agreed to arbitration and indemnification. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to hold a non-jury trial, making findings of fact, and apply the appropriate U.C.C. provisions in light of those facts. View "Nebraska Machinery Co. v. Cargotec Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order denying a motion to compel nonparties to a contract to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clearwater REI v. Boling" on Justia Law

In 2007 the McDonalds opened a J.P. Morgan Bank investment account and a brokerage account with its affiliate, J.P. Morgan Securities (JPMS). Different contracts governed the accounts. The Bank managed the money in the investment account, while the McDonalds directed the funds in their JPMS brokerage account. By the end of 2008, the McDonalds had lost $1.5 million from the Bank investment account. The money held in the JPMS account produced a profit. The McDonalds filed an arbitration demand, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, and other misrepresentation and mismanagement. They did not name the Bank, but named only JPMS and Bank employees who set up and oversaw the accounts. The McDonalds claimed that the employees ignored their stated investment goals by putting nearly all their money in an illiquid proprietary hedge fund. The claim charged JPMS (not the Bank) with vicarious liability for failing to supervise. JPMS is registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, as are the employees. FINRA is an industry self-regulatory organization, and under its rules JPMS and the employees were subject to arbitration at the McDonalds’ request, an obligation reiterated in the contract governing the JPMS account. The Bank is not a member of FINRA; the Bank’s contract did not provide for arbitration. The Bank sought to prevent arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding that the Bank lacked standing to block the arbitration to which it was not a party and that the two employees were indispensable parties. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Bank has standing to sue because the arbitration would violate a forum-selection clause in its contract with the McDonalds. The McDonalds cannot avoid that clause by naming only an affiliate and the employees, who are not necessary parties.View "J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant provides residential real estate brokerage services in Seattle, Washington. Plaintiff lives in California. In 2009 the parties executed a form contract drafted by defendant. Defendant engaged plaintiff as a Contract Field Agent (CFA) as “an independent contractor.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, alleging defendant improperly classified CFAs as independent contractors when they were actually employees under California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Laws and claimed unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest periods, inaccurate and untimely wage statements, waiting time penalties, and unreimbursed business expenses. Defendant sought arbitration under the Agreement, which provides that it is to be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); that the arbitration clause did not apply to plaintiff’s statutory claims because those claims were based on statutes, not the contract; and noted “unrebutted evidence of substantial procedural unconscionability.” The court of appeal reversed, Under California law, there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and, even under California law, plaintiff’s unconscionability claim lacks merit. View "Galen v. Redfin Corp." on Justia Law

When Rita Licata was transferred to a nursing facility operated by Defendant Rita’s son Salvatore signed an agreement with the facility to arbitrate disputes arising from Rita’s stay at the facility. Salvatore signed the agreement in the space provided for the resident’s “authorized representative.” Rita suffered personal injuries at the nursing facility resulting in her death. Salvator filed a complaint as administrator of Rita’s estate against Defendant for, inter alia, wrongful death and negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that Salvatore lacked authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Rita’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Salvatore lacked authority to execute the agreement on Rita’s behalf; and (2) the arbitration agreement did not otherwise bind Rita’s estate.View "Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC" on Justia Law